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This study analyzes the auctions organized by power exchanges in Europe. Power 
exchanges are institutions that facilitate wholesale trade in electric energy. Most 
exchanges organize separate auctions day ahead for every hour of the next day. 
Generators, large consumers, suppliers and traders fine-tune their portfolios via 
these trading platforms. 
Most exchanges originally only organized trade within national borders. 
Increasingly, they are also involved in facilitating cross-border trade. The changing 
context implies new challenges but also renews the discussion on how former 
challenges have been addressed. 
This work provides insight into the problems faced by exchanges. The auction 
problem is modeled as a constrained optimization problem and alternative solutions 
are analyzed. In its role of auctioneer, the exchange receives orders introduced by 
market parties and then decides which to accept and at which prices to settle the 
contracts. Taking this decision is not straightforward due to network constraints, 
order formats (block orders), and political constraints. The text is divided in three 





Deze studie analyseert de door elektrische energiebeurzen georganiseerde veilingen 
in Europa. Beurzen zijn instituties die de groothandel in elektrische energie 
vergemakkelijken. De meeste beurzen organiseren aparte veilingen een dag voordat 
de levering plaatsvindt voor elk uur van de volgende dag. Generatoren, 
grootverbruikers, leveranciers en handelaars optimaliseren hun portfolio’s via deze 
handelsplatformen.  
Initieel organiseerden de meeste beurzen in Europa handel binnen nationale grenzen. 
In toenemende mate worden ze ook betrokken bij het organiseren van 
grensoverschrijdende handel. De veranderende context impliceert nieuwe 
uitdagingen maar hernieuwt ook de discussie over hoe vroegere uitdagingen werden 
aangepakt.  
Dit werk geeft inzicht in de problemen waarmee beurzen te kampen hebben. Het 
veilingsysteem is gemodelleerd als een optimalisatieprobleem met beperkingen en 
alternatieve oplossingen worden onderzocht. In zijn rol als veilingmeester, ontvangt 
de beurs door marktpartijen geïntroduceerde orders en beslist dan welke orders te 
aanvaarden en aan welke prijzen de contracten worden afgerekend. Het nemen van 
deze beslissing is niet vanzelfsprekend door netwerkbeperkingen, order formaten 
(blokorders) en politieke beperkingen. De tekst is onderverdeeld in drie delen die 
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I.  Ontwerp van een veilingsysteem voor 
elektrische energiebeurzen 
De liberalisering van de elektriciteitsindustrie in de Europese Unie ging van start 
met de invoering van Richtlijn 96/92/EC en werd later versneld met Richtlijn 
2003/54/EC. De vrijmaking kadert in de creatie van een Interne Markt met vrij 
verkeer van mensen, kapitaal en goederen zoals vastgelegd in de Europese 
Verdragen. Er wordt een verbeterde competitiviteit van de industrie nagestreefd met 
de introductie van concurrentie in de opwekking en levering van elektrische energie. 
Netwerkactiviteiten worden beschouwd als een natuurlijk monopolie en zijn daarom 
gereguleerd. 
Elektrische energie is een secundaire energiedrager die men verkrijgt door de 
omzetting van primaire brandstoffen zoals steenkool, olie, aardgas en uranium, maar 
in toenemende mate ook uit hernieuwbare bronnen zoals de reeds lang gebruikte 
waterkracht en windenergie. Elektrische energie kan daarenboven economisch niet 
in grote hoeveelheden en niet voor lange duur worden opgeslagen. Daarom moet op 
elk ogenblik de belasting van het netwerk gelijk zijn aan wat er in het netwerk wordt 
geïnjecteerd door de verschillende generatoren die met het netwerk verbonden zijn. 
De netwerkgebruikers of hun vertegenwoordigers staan in voor het individueel 
evenwicht per evenwichtsperiode. Dat wil zeggen dat producenten per 
evenwichtsperiode zo goed mogelijk hun productie overeen laten komen met wat ze 
gecontracteerd hebben en dat grootverbruikers en leveranciers in de 
groothandelmarkt zo goed mogelijk aankopen wat ze denken te verbruiken. 
Onbalans wordt ontmoedigd met boetes die gebaseerd zijn op de kost van het regel– 
en reserve vermogen dat de netwerkbeheerder aankoopt bij de netwerkgebruikers 
om de globale onbalans op te heffen. Elk land heeft ten minste één zone waarin een 
netwerkbeheerder instaat voor het globale evenwicht.                                                               NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING               
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Op groothandel niveau kan elektrische energie vele malen verhandeld worden 
alvorens de uiteindelijke levering plaatsvindt. Dit gebeurt aan prijzen die sterk 
kunnen schommelen naarmate de verwachtingen omtrent productie en verbruik zich 
aanpassen in functie van de beschikbare informatie. Hoe dichter bij het moment van 
levering, des te kleiner en meer specifiek de noden zijn enerzijds, en des te 
moeilijker het wordt nog een tegenpartij te vinden anderzijds. Beurzen spelen in op 
dit probleem door geautomatiseerde handelsplatformen aan te bieden waar anoniem 
en volgens vereenvoudigde regels gehandeld kan worden met garantie van betaling. 
Beurzen zijn het meest bekend voor hun veilingsystemen waarin gestandaardiseerde 
uurcontracten worden verhandeld één dag voor de uiteindelijke levering. De 
uurprijzen die zij publiceren zijn een belangrijke referentie voor handel in andere 
markten. In toenemende mate worden er ook financiële producten ontwikkeld die 
deze prijzen gebruiken als referentieprijs. Meer en meer organiseren de beurzen via 
hun veilingsystemen ook de grensoverschrijdende handel in samenwerking met de 
netwerkbeheerders en hierdoor winnen zij aan belang. 
Het is in deze context dat onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van een veilingsysteem 
voor stroombeurzen werd verricht. De rol van beurzen in de creatie van een Interne 
Elektriciteitsmarkt in Europa is reeds besproken door anderen, zodat dit 
doctoraatswerk zich concentreert op de implementatie en functionering van het 
veilingsysteem. 
In essentie moet de beurs op basis van ontvangen orders voor verschillende uren, 
eventueel van verschillende locaties, beslissen wie handelt en aan welke prijzen. De 
beurs laat zich bij die beslissing leiden door een zo min mogelijk betwistbaar 
objectief, zoals maximale totale handelswinst voor haar participanten. Met andere 
woorden, een veilingsysteem kan gemodelleerd worden als een 
optimalisatieprobleem met beperkingen, zodat bestaande commerciële software kan 
gebruikt worden om het op te lossen. 
De uitdagingen voor een beurs hebben betrekking tot het omgaan met 
netwerkbeperkingen, order formaten (blokorders) en politieke beperkingen. De drie 
delen van deze tekst behandelen respectievelijk deze drie uitdagingen. In deze 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting wordt echter enkel ingegaan op de kern van het 
doctoraat: de behandeling van blokorders (hoofdstuk 5-8). Alvorens de voornaamste 
bijdragen samen te vatten, volgt er een korte inleidende beschouwing over het 
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II.  Belang van elektrische energiebeurzen 
in Europa 
De elektriciteitsindustrie is vanouds gekenmerkt door verticale integratie en 
regulering. Bovendien zijn de nationale transmissienetwerken verbonden om mekaar 
te kunnen bijstaan in geval van nood, maar niet om de ruggengraat te vormen van 
een Interne Elektriciteitsmarkt in Europa. Het is dus allesbehalve vanzelfsprekend 
om over te gaan naar een marktsysteem in deze sector. Het ontwerp van een systeem 
dat marktwerking mogelijk maakt, is daarom van cruciaal belang voor de 
competitiviteit van de elektriciteitsindustrie en dus ook voor de competitiviteit van 
de Europese economie in zijn geheel. 
Merk op dat een elektriciteitsmarkt niet staat of valt met de implementatie van een 
beurs. Een beurs is slechts een onderdeel van het marktsysteem en misschien niet 
eens strikt noodzakelijk. Een beurs creëert geen concurrentie waar de marktstructuur 
het niet toelaat. Een beurs bevordert enkel de handel door bepaalde diensten aan te 
bieden via een handelsplatform en kan zo transactiekosten helpen verminderen en 
handel stimuleren. Anderzijds is een goedwerkende beurs wel een indicatie van een 
meer volwassen markt. 
Deelname aan de beurzen in Europa is vrijblijvend. Hierin verschillen de Europese 
groothandelsmarkten fundamenteel van bijvoorbeeld de Amerikaanse. Op veel 
andere plaatsen in de wereld vindt groothandel plaats in veilingen waaraan 
marktpartijen verplicht moeten deelnemen. Het ontwerp van die veilingen bepaalt 
dus zeer direct de efficiëntie van de handel. In Europa daarentegen hangt de 
efficiëntie van de globale markt niet noodzakelijk af van de efficiëntie van de 
veilingen georganiseerd door beurzen. Dit onderscheid is belangrijk voor de 
argumentatie die volgt. Daarenboven betekent dit dat de argumentatie niet 
noodzakelijk van toepassing is op alle veilingen. 
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III. Blokorders 
Beurzen hebben naast uurorders ook orders die betrekking hebben op meerdere uren 
tegelijkertijd. Uurorders worden gekarakteriseerd door een bepaald volume 
(volumelimiet, typisch in MWh) dat wordt gevraagd of aangeboden voor een 
bepaald uur aan een bepaalde prijs (prijslimiet, typisch in €/MWh). Blokorders 
worden gekarakteriseerd door een volume dat wordt gevraagd of aangeboden voor 
een aantal opeenvolgende uren (grootte van het blok, typisch in MWh/h). 
Daarenboven wordt een blokorder in zijn geheel aanvaard of volledig geweigerd. 
Beurzen met uurorders en blokorders zijn bijvoorbeeld het Nederlandse APX, het 
Franse Powernext, het Scandinavische Nord Pool, het Sloveense Borzen, 
Oostenrijkse EXAA en het Duitse EEX. 
Blokorders zijn belangrijk voor participanten maar ook voor de beurzen zelf. Aan de 
hand van blokorders kunnen marktpartijen hun kosten beter uitdrukken. Generatoren 
kunnen bijvoorbeeld de vaste kosten die gelinkt zijn aan het opstarten van een 
centrale beter in rekening brengen aan de hand van zo’n blokorder. Voor beurzen 
betekent deze extra flexibiliteit dat zij meer handel aantrekken in competitie met 
andere markten. Merk op dat in bilaterale markten contracten zo flexibel zijn als 
overeengekomen kan worden door de betrokken partijen. 
Door de aanwezigheid van blokorders, is het niet vanzelfsprekend om het resultaat 
van de veiling te bepalen. Aangezien blokorders niet gedeeltelijk aanvaard kunnen 
worden, zijn binaire variabelen nodig om het veilingprobleem te modelleren. 
Modellen met binaire variabelen voor blokorders en continue variabelen voor 
uurorders zijn Mixed Integer Problemen (MIP) die moeilijk oplosbaar zijn. De 
beschikbare commerciële software om zulke problemen op te lossen heeft de laatste 
decennia een enorme ontwikkeling doorgemaakt, maar er blijft het fundamentele 
probleem dat in het slechtste geval alle combinaties moeten afgegaan worden. De 
tijd die een beurs beschikbaar heeft om een oplossing te publiceren is echter beperkt 
tot 10 à 30 minuten.  
Daarenboven heeft een veiling met blokorders niet noodzakelijk een 
evenwichtsprijs. Dit is het gekend probleem van niet-convexe markten. Beurzen 
lossen dit probleem op door prijzen op te leggen die niet noodzakelijk 
evenwichtsprijzen zijn. Vraag en aanbod zijn dan niet noodzakelijk gelijk aan de 
bepaalde prijzen, maar de beurs forceert de gelijkheid. Blokorders die geld zouden 
kunnen verdienen indien ze aanvaard worden, worden bijgevolg mogelijk 
uitgesloten zonder dat zij daarvoor een compensatie krijgen. In deze tekst wordt naar 
zulke blokorders verwezen als ‘paradoxaal geweigerde’ blokorders (PRB).  
Om de uitdagingen aan te pakken, werd het probleem met blokorders gemodelleerd 
als een optimalisatieprobleem met beperkingen. De verschillende oplossingen van 
dit model werden vervolgens bestudeerd in een ontworpen steekproef van 
representatieve scenario’s. De voornaamste besluiten van deze studie worden in wat 
volgt samengevat.  
 




De optimale oplossing van het veilingprobleem werd gemodelleerd met lineaire 
prijzen die niet noodzakelijk evenwichtsprijzen zijn, maar ook met niet-lineaire 
evenwichtsprijzen. Een veilingsysteem met niet-lineaire prijzen is een alternatief 
voor de aanpak die ingeburgerd is bij Europese beurzen en wordt in wat volgt verder 
besproken. Het model met lineaire prijzen heeft meer beperkingen. In deze studie 
werden die beperkingen als de voornaamste bron van numerieke complexiteit 
geïdentificeerd. Zonder die beperkingen kon het probleem opgelost worden binnen 
1,4 seconden voor alle scenario’s in de steekproef.  
Met deze beperkingen, werd de software gestopt na 2,5 dagen in 2 scenario’s omdat 
de optimale oplossing nog niet gevonden was. Voor alle andere scenario’s in de 
steekproef van 200 scenario’s is de rekentijd gemiddeld 4 minuten en altijd tussen 
een paar seconden en 3,5 uur (Figuur 2). Merk op dat tegen de verwachtingen in er 
geen statistisch significant verband werd gevonden tussen de numerieke 
complexiteit van het probleem en het aantal blokorders. 
 



















Figuur 2: Rekentijd voor alle scenario’s in de steekproef, met uitzondering van 
de twee scenario’s die gestopt werden na 2,5 dagen 
 
De standaard praktijk van beurzen om snel tot een oplossing te komen bestaat uit het 
probleem op te delen in een blokorder selectiemodule en een coördinatie module die 
de prijs bepaalt voor een vaste blokset. Een speciaal ontworpen procedure zoekt dan                                                                                                                                     VII 
 
binnen de beschikbare tijd een zo goed mogelijke combinatie van blokorders om te 
aanvaarden. De details van de procedures zijn niet publiek beschikbaar zodat ze niet 
geëvalueerd konden worden. Daarom werd de optimale oplossing vergeleken met de 
oplossing van een eenvoudig algoritme gebaseerd op de decompositie zoals 
toegepast door de beurzen. Gecumuleerd over de 200 scenario’s genereerde de 
optimale oplossing bijna een half miljoen € meer handelswinsten voor de 
participanten. Dit onderstreept het belang van een goed ontworpen algoritme.  
Merk op dat sommige beurzen eigenlijk een nog moeilijker probleem oplossen dan 
hetgeen gemodelleerd werd in deze studie. Het gaat om beurzen zoals het Franse 
Powernext die uurorders hebben met hellingen erin. Er zijn reeds solvers 
beschikbaar om zulke problemen op te lossen maar ze zijn nog niet vergaand 




De aantrekkelijkheid van blokorders in vergelijking met uurorders is een gevolg van 
de ondeelbaarheid en het feit dat ze meerdere periodes linken. Maar zoals hierboven 
uitgelegd, worden blokorders die willen handelen aan de vastgelegde marktprijzen 
mogelijk toch geweigerd. De mogelijkheid dat een blokorder paradoxaal wordt 
geweigerd is natuurlijk een minder aantrekkelijk kant van het product.  
Paradoxaal geweigerde blokorders (PRBs) kunnen leiden tot klachten en in de limiet 
tot een verlies van vertrouwen in het product en de beurs. Dit verklaart mogelijk 
waarom beurzen het gebruik van blokorders beperken. Alle beurzen beperken het 
aantal blokorders dat per participant per dag kan worden ingediend of de grootte 
(MWh/h) van een blokorder en de opeenvolgende uren die kunnen gecombineerd 
worden in zo'n order (het aantal types).  
Een sensitiviteitsanalyse werd uitgevoerd op de steekproef van 200 scenario’s, die 
bestaat uit scenario’s met en zonder een type beperking, met een totaal aantal 
blokorders gaande van 1 tot 200 per scenario en een maximum grootte van 
blokorders in een scenario gaande van 10 tot 300MWh/h.  
De analyse toont aan dat het aantal PRBs toeneemt met het aantal blokorders in een 
scenario (Figuur 3). Bovendien lopen kleinere blokorders minder risico paradoxaal 
geweigerd te worden. Maar dit op zichzelf is geen reden om alle participanten te 
verplichten tot het gebruik van kleinere blokorders. In de steekproef is de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat een klein blokorder (<50MWh/h) paradoxaal wordt 
geweigerd niet groter indien er ook grotere blokorders aanwezig zijn (tot 
300MWh/h). Daarenboven is het risico sowieso klein (gemiddeld 4% in de 
steekproef). 
 































Figuur 3: Aantal PRB (Z-as) in functie van het aantal blokorders (X-as) en de 
maximale grootte van de blokorders (Y-as) in een scenario 
 
Tegen de verwachtingen in (Figuur 4), is de waarschijnlijkheid dat een blokorder 
paradoxaal geweigerd wordt niet groter indien het totaal aantal blokorders in een 
scenario groter is, noch indien er grotere blokorders van veel verschillende types 
zijn in een scenario. Daarom werd geargumenteerd dat het in het voordeel is van 
zowel beurzen als participanten de beperkingen op het gebruik van blokorders op te 
heffen. Deze beperkingen reduceren immers het volume dat verhandeld wordt op de 
beurzen en verplicht marktpartijen naar alternatieven te zoeken. 









































Figuur 4: Waarschijnlijkheid PRB (Z-as) in functie van het aantal blokorders 
(X-as) en de maximale grootte van de blokorders (Y-as) in een scenario 
 
In deze analyse is wel abstractie gemaakt van de numerieke complexiteit. De situatie 
met veel blokorders en enkel een paar uurorders werd ook niet expliciet onderzocht. 
Met andere woorden, het is niet de bedoeling te beweren dat elke beurs van bij de 
start blokorders zonder beperkingen zou moeten toelaten. Bijvoorbeeld de 
Oostenrijkse beurs introduceerde nadat de markt een zekere maturiteit had gekregen 
pas blokorders na een jaar. 
 
Prijsbepaling 
Een veilingsysteem met niet-lineaire prijzen is een alternatief voor de aanpak die 
ingeburgerd is bij Europese beurzen. De meeste literatuur schrijft voor dat men in 
non-convexe markten best niet-lineaire prijzen toepast. De vraag kan daarom gesteld 
worden of beurzen in Europa best zouden overschakelen naar een systeem met niet-
lineaire prijzen, zoals gesuggereerd in O’Neill et al. (2006). 
Het belangrijkste argument in het voordeel van niet-lineaire prijzen is 
handelefficiëntie. Figuur 5 toont echter dat het verschil in handelswinst tussen de 
twee systemen klein is in de steekproef. In meer dan de helft van de scenario’s is er 
geen verschil en het verlies in handelswinst door het opleggen van lineaire prijzen is 
nooit meer dan 3697€ in een scenario (0.05% van de totale handelswinst). 
Bovendien is de beursveiling slechts een van de mogelijke markten waarop                                                               NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING               
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marktpartijen contracten kunnen afsluiten. Licht inefficiënte handel op deze beurzen 
impliceert niet noodzakelijk dat de groothandelsmarkt in zijn geheel ook inefficiënt 
is. 
 



















Figuur 5: Cumulatieve waarschijnlijkheidsfunctie van het verschil in 
handelswinst niet-lineair – lineair prijssysteem 
 
Het belangrijkste argument in het nadeel van niet-lineaire prijzen is het noodzakelijk 
gebruik van discriminatoire betalingen. Aanvaarde orders die aan de vastgelegde 
uurprijzen geld verliezen en geweigerde orders die geld hadden kunnen verdienen 
indien ze aanvaard waren geweest, worden daarvoor gecompenseerd via een extra 
betaling. Die extra betalingen worden dan teruggevorderd van andere orders. Het 
probleem van zulke discriminatoire betalingen is dat ze niet afgedekt kunnen 
worden met financiële standaardproducten. Het komt erop neer dat een persoonlijke 
verzekering moet worden afgesloten, wat duur is. Daarenboven wordt een systeem 
met niet-lineaire prijzen als complex aanzien door marktpartijen en niet altijd goed 
begrepen. Ten slotte is het overschakelen naar een nieuw systeem op zich al 
kostelijk. 
In de steekproef moeten in totaal 317393€ extra betalingen worden gemaakt. Dit is 
ruim 8 keer meer is dan de totale handelswinst die gerealiseerd kan worden door 
niet-lineaire prijzen toe te passen. 
Figuur 6 illustreert de ratio extra betalingen over verschil in handelswinst per 
scenario voor de 97 scenario’s waarin er een verschil in handelswinst is. De                                                                                                                                     XI 
 
maximale waarde van deze ratio is 1098 en in slechts 9 scenario’s is de ratio kleiner 
dan 1. Merk op dat in 31 scenario’s extra betalingen nodig zijn zonder dat dit 


































































Figuur 6: Sensitiviteit van de ratio extra betalingen onder het niet-lineaire 
prijssysteem over het verschil in handelswinst onder het lineaire prijssysteem 
 
Er zijn dus duidelijke voordelen aan de aanpak die ingeburgerd is bij beurzen in 
Europa, terwijl het nadeel minder een rol speelt gezien participatie aan de beurs 
vrijwillig is en er handelsalternatieven zijn. Daarenboven werden de oplossingen 
onder beide prijssystemen vergeleken en is aangetoond dat voor elke € gewonnen in 
handelswinsten verschillende € extra betalingen nodig zijn. Merk op dat in een pool 
met verplichte participatie inefficiënte handel meer problematisch is zodat het 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and thesis 
motivation 
1.1 Overview   
There are two parts in this chapter. The first part introduces the problems and the 
main contributions of this study. The second part introduces terminology and 
highlights the changing context in which power exchanges operate. The readers less 
familiar with these concepts are advised to first read section 1.3. 
1.2 Research  subject 
In this section, respectively the research subject is discussed and the main 
contributions to this topic are outlined per chapter. 
1.2.1  Power exchange auction trading platform design 
Power exchange 
In the past the electricity industry was characterized by vertical integration and 
regulation. National transmission networks have been interconnected for mutual 
assistance, but not to be the backbone of an Internal Electricity Market in Europe. 
Introducing a market system in this industry is therefore not trivial. Furthermore, the 
competitiveness of this sector is important for the competitiveness of the whole 
European economy.                                                        INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
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Therefore, it is of crucial importance to have a system that makes market 
functioning possible. The well functioning of the electricity market does not depend 
on the implementation of a power exchange. An exchange is only a part of the 
market system and perhaps not even strictly necessary. An exchange does not create 
competition where the market structure does not allow it. An exchange only 
facilitates trade by offering certain services via a trading platform. As such, it can 
only help reducing transaction costs and stimulate trade. However, a well 
functioning exchange is an indication of a more mature market (DG COMP, 2006).  
Auction trading platform design 
Exchanges are most known for the auctions they organize day ahead for every hour 
of the next day. In its role of auctioneer, the exchange receives orders and then 
decides which to accept and at which prices to settle the contracts. When taking this 
decision, it is not up to the exchange to question whether these orders actually 
reflect the costs or the values of their participants. The auctioneer selects the buyers 
who name high prices and the sellers who name low prices. 
An auction can be implemented as a constrained optimization problem. The least 
contested objective to decide which orders to accept is to maximize the profits for 
participants. The participants’ profits or gains from trade result from the demand 
side that has to pay less than its willingness to pay and the supply side that receives 
more than what it wanted to be paid. 
Behavior of participants should be taken into account when designing the rules of 
the exchange, such as the format of the orders, the price rules, etc.  As discussed in 
Stoft (2002), one way to arrange efficient trading is for all the traders to bid prices 
that are equal to their costs and values. If all bidders tell the truth, the outcome is 
efficient. For these reasons economists look for so-called incentive-compatible 
designs, but sometimes they are too complex or politically unpopular. In this case, a 
less efficient design will usually need to be adopted. 
The study has been inspired and partly also made possible by research projects 
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Box 1-1: Industry funded project work  
•  At the beginning of this PhD in 2003, the research group ELECTA 
became involved in the task force of the Belgian TSO Elia that studied 
the possibility of creating an exchange in Belgium. In 2003, the group 
also started contributing to the research efforts of the APX Group 
(Encompassing the Dutch and UK power exchanges, but also several 
gas exchanges) investigating the implementation of market coupling. 
Since then, research in this area has increased as a consequence of 
some important events. 
•  September 2004, there was the cooperation agreement on the creation 
of the Belgian exchange, called Belpex. In cooperation with the Dutch 
APX and the French Powernext, Elia set up Belpex. It is the first time 
that 3 European PX will be linked with a day-ahead market coupling 
mechanism. 
•  December 2004, the Dutch regulator DTe approved the investment 
plans of the Dutch TSO TenneT and the Norwegian TSO Statnett to 
interconnect Norway and the Netherlands by a submarine HVDC cable. 
A condition for the approval of the NorNed cable was that it is to be 
used to couple the day-ahead auctions of APX and Nord Pool
1. Nord 
Pool is the PX of Norway but also of Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
(December 2004). 
 
1.2.2 Main  contributions 
The PhD of Boisseleau (2004) is an inspiring primer on European power exchanges. 
His text focuses on the role exchanges have in the creation of a single market in 
Europe, while this text is rather on auction implementation and functioning.  
Chapter 2 essentially discusses that auction design does not always allow traders to 
express their costs. The aim of chapter 2 is to put in perspective the design common 
among exchanges in Europe. The power exchange design is compared with 
alternative designs that have been implemented elsewhere. The most relevant design 
experiences worldwide are discussed and a sample of relevant literature is provided. 
Chapter 3 then illustrates for a simplified laboratory setting that even if the auction 
design allows traders to express their costs, they can have an incentive not to do so.  
The following chapters focus on the implementation of the design that is prevailing 
in Europe. Most exchanges originally only organized trade within national borders. 
Increasingly, they are also involved in facilitating cross-border trade. The changing 
context implies new challenges but also renews the discussion on how former 
challenges have been addressed.  
                                                           
1 A case study on the NorNed cable, including a viewpoint on the application by Tennet and Statnett and 
the approval by DTe is provided in Meeus et al. (2005a).                                                        INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
4
The three main issues addressed are network constraints, block orders and political 
constraints. Besides the introductory chapters 1 and 2, the text is structured in three 
parts respectively dealing with network constraints (chapter 3 and 4), block orders 
(chapters 5,6.7 and 8) and political constraints (chapter 9). In what follows, the three 
parts are outlined: 
Network constraints 
Much literature has already been devoted to dealing with network constraints, but 
applying the auction problem with network constraints to exchanges is not 
straightforward.  
Chapter 3 describes a laboratory on the competitive functioning of the European 
Electricity Market. In the laboratory, the students trade via an auction trading-
platform with network constraints. The chapter introduces the auction problem with 
network constraints. The problem is modeled as a constrained linear optimization 
problem.  
Chapter 4 applies the model introduced in chapter 3 to power exchanges, largely a 
European phenomenon. Existing commercial software can be used to solve the 
auction problem. However, the problem does not necessarily uniquely determine 
prices and quantities. This implies that the software that is used to solve the problem 
has a significant impact on the determination of the market outcome, which is of 
course unacceptable. The contribution of this chapter is to discuss this issue and 
potential solutions. 
Block orders 
The auctions organized by exchanges are hourly. Also the standardized orders are 
hourly and consist of a quantity that is offered or requested with a certain price limit. 
Besides these hourly orders, most exchanges also have block orders. A block order 
consists of a quantity that is offered or requested in multiple hours at an average 
price limit. Besides this inter-temporal rigidity, blocks also have a fill-or-kill 
constraint, meaning that the order has to be accepted completely or not at all. 
Determining the market outcome in the presence of block orders is not 
straightforward. The indivisibility of block orders means that binary variables are 
necessary to model the auction problem. Models with binary variables for blocks 
and constrained continuous variables for hourly orders are Mixed Integer Problems 
(MIP), which are difficult to solve. The available commercial software has evolved 
substantially the last decades, but there is still the fundamental problem that in the 
worst case all combinations have to be enumerated to select the optimal solution, i.e. 
the problem is computational intractable.  
Furthermore, a market-clearing price does not necessarily exist for auction with 
blocks. As will be discussed in chapter 2, this is because the auction with blocks is 
non-convex. Exchanges solve this problem by imposing linear prices that are not 
necessarily market clearing. The prices they determine do not necessarily equalize 
demand and supply, but the exchanges force the equality. More specifically, they 
exclude blocks that are in the money. In other words, blocks that want to trade as 
they can make a profit at the determined prices can be rejected without receiving a 
compensation for this lost trade opportunity. In this text, these blocks are referred to 
as Paradoxically Rejected Blocks (PRB).  RESEARCH SUBJECT                                                                                                5                                                   
 
The challenges of dealing with blocks are discussed by modeling the problem as a 
constrained optimization problem and analyzing the solutions in representative 
scenarios. Chapter 5 introduces the models that are used in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The 
chapter also introduces a batch of representative scenarios that has been designed to 
study auctions with blocks.  
Chapter 6 analyses the computational complexity of the auction problem with 
blocks. This chapter introduces a simple but fast algorithm that finds a feasible but 
not necessarily optimal solution. The performance of this simple algorithm is a 
lower bound for the performance of the heuristics used in practice that are not 
publicly available. The batch of scenarios is solved with this simple algorithm and 
also optimally with commercial software to indicate the exposure to sub-optimal 
solutions when using heuristics. The results illustrate a significant gap between both 
solutions, both in terms of gains from trade and number of PRBs. 
Chapter 7 analyses the rationale of block order restrictions. All exchanges restrict 
the size (MWh/h) or the type (span in terms of hours) or the number of blocks that 
can be introduced per participant per day. There is no methodology available to 
impose such restrictions. This can partly explain why all exchanges have very 
different restrictions. The contribution of this chapter is therefore to discuss the 
trade-off that exchanges need to make when imposing such restrictions and to 
provide recommendations. It is argued that the use of blocks is too restricted in 
practice. 
Chapter 8 analyses an alternative pricing approach for an auction with blocks. To 
avoid PRBs, exchanges could apply nonlinear pricing. An auction with blocks is 
non-convex and most literature prescribes nonlinear pricing for non-convex 
auctions. The main argument is trade efficiency. The question is therefore raised 
whether exchanges should shift to nonlinear pricing, as suggested by O’Neill et al. 
(2006). In this chapter we show that the increase in gains from trade that could be 
achieved would be small relative to the large side payments that would be necessary 
under nonlinear pricing. 
Political constraints 
Chapter 9 analyzes the effect of political constraints on the auction problem with 
blocks and network constraints. Many of the market coupling proposals that are on 
the table are conceptual and do not include an implementation or model. Ehrenmann 
A. and Y. Smeers (2005) have already raised concerns on the implementation of 
network constraints in these proposals.  
In these proposals, order books of different exchanges are not necessarily merged. 
The main reason is that exchanges are reluctant to completely share their order 
books
2. As will be explained, a decentralized model cannot guarantee to find the 
optimal solution, even if enough time is available to enumerate all solutions. The 
contribution of this chapter is to indicate that decentralizing block order information 
reduces performance. Representative scenarios are solved using simple algorithms. 
                                                           
2 It is exchange’s business to fix prices” and “order books contain valuable information about 
participants”.                                                        INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
6
Box 1-2 discusses the papers on which the chapters have been based, acknowledging 
the colleagues that collaborated with me and helped developing these papers. 
 
Box 1-2: Papers                                                      
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/electa/publications/search.php     
http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~leonardo                        
•  Chapter 1 is based on two papers: 1) "Development of the internal 
electricity market in Europe", a paper presented at the 2005 Regulatory 
Round Table of the Florence School of Regulation, and published in 
the Electricity Journal (Meeus, Purchala and Belmans, 2005) and 2) 
"Regulated cross-border transmission investment in Europe", a paper 
presented at the 2006 IEEE Transmission and Distribution Conference 
in Dallas and accepted for publication in the European Transactions on 
Electric Power (Meeus, Purchala, Van Hertem and Belmans, 2005). 
•  Chapter 3 is based on a working paper “Laboratory on the competitive 
functioning of the European Electricity Market” (Meeus, Willems and 
Belmans). 
•  Chapter 4 is based on a working paper "Complexity of price rules for 
coupled PXs and the use of LMP" (Meeus, Vandezande, Cole and 
Belmans, 2006). 
•  Chapter 7 is based on a working paper "Block order restrictions in 
combinatorial electric energy auctions" (Meeus, Verhaegen and 
Belmans, 2005). 
•  Chapter 8 is based on "Pricing electric energy auctions with blocks", a 
paper presented at the 2005 ETE Workshop on Market modeling of the 
Central Western European Market in Leuven, which has been revised 
to "Clearing auctions with block bids: linear versus nonlinear pricing" a 
paper pending at IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (Meeus, 
Verhaegen and Belmans, 2005). 
•  Chapter 9 is based on a working paper "Market coupling algorithm: 
centralized versus decentralized block order selection" (Meeus, Saguan, 
Glachant, Dessante, and Belmans, 2006). 
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1.3 Context 
This section addresses the changing context in which exchanges operate. The aim of 
this section is to introduce terminology and concepts used in this text. Respectively, 
power systems, and the Internal Electricity Market in Europe are discussed. 
1.3.1 Power  systems 
This section respectively discusses the delivery of a unit electric energy (kWh) and 
the European transmission system. The aim is the underline the relevance of 
network constraints. 
1.3.1.1  Delivery of a kWh 
Weedy (1998) provides an interesting discussion on the delivery of a kWh. Electric 
energy is a secondary product that cannot be excavated or mined. Production is done 
in so-called generation plants, the delivery points of the transport or transmission 
network. After generation, electric energy is brought to a higher voltage using 
transformers. Next, it flows through the transmission network to nodes where it is 
transformed into lower voltages for direct supply to large consumers or distribution 
and ultimately consumption at the load points of the network (Figure 1-1). 
The characteristics of consumption or demand, generation and transport are essential 
in understanding the electricity system in its current form. Demand is characterized 
by low price elasticity, especially in the short-run. Demand is also highly variable 
and uncertain. The volatile nature of demand is partly explained by the seasons, days 
of the week and hours of the day. The International Energy Agency has forecasted a 
1.4% average annual demand growth up to 2030 in Europe (EU-15). 
As demand increased, larger generation units (economies of scale) have been 
increasingly connected to high voltage transmission lines forming grids that 
consequently have been interconnected. Diverse consumer groups 
(industrial/residential, geographic spread) have been linked to flatten the demand 
profile. At the location of consumption, the voltage is transformed to a consumer 
adapted voltage level. The more power needed, the higher the consumption voltage 
level. 8                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Interconnected power system 
Historically, electric energy has often been centrally generated using hydropower, 
followed by a shift to engines and steam turbines, using primary energy sources such 
as coal, oil, gas, and uranium. More recently, there has been a shift towards 
distributed generation (Pepermans et al., 2005) and also Renewable Energy Supply 
(RES), mainly wind generators. 
Electric energy is economically non-storable
3 so that generation and load 
(consumption + losses) have to be balanced at all times.  Moreover, transmission of 
electric power is economically uncontrollable
4, meaning that energy flows distribute 
themselves over the transmission lines according to the impedances (Kirchoff's 
Laws). As a consequence, it is not trivial to manage the constraints of such a 
network
5.  
The danger of a power system is that the failure of a single element can lead to the 
collapse of the whole system. To prevent blackouts, the network is designed and 
operated in such a way that it can absorb the breakdown of every single critical 
element, being line, consumer or generator, i.e. the so-called (N-1) contingency rule.  
                                                           
3 Note that Pumped Hydro and Compressed Air Energy Storage are an exception to this rule but they are 
not widespread due to geological constraints. As discussed in Cole et al. (2006), upcoming technologies 
have the potential to challenge the rule all together.  
4 The increasing penetration of power flow controlling devices is challenging this view, see for instance 
the discussion provided in Van Hertem et al. (2006). 
5 This problem is commonly referred to as congestion management. Purchala (2006) discusses congestion 
management in a market environment. 
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1.3.1.2  European transmission network 
In the past, national networks have been interconnected for mutual support in the 
case of emergencies. The European network therefore consists of relatively strong 
national networks weakly interconnected across borders. Furthermore, it is made up 
of 5 synchronous areas
6, being UCTE on the continent, Scandinavian Nordel, Great 
Britain, Ireland and the area of the Baltic States. These areas are relatively weakly 
interconnected with High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) links. 
In other words, the European network has not been designed to be the backbone of 
the Internal Electricity Market (IEM). Besides serving the market, the network also 
has to ensure security of supply and to allow connecting renewables such as wind 
energy that are very demanding for the network. 
From the beginning of the liberalization process, European authorities have 
recognized that an efficient use of the existing infrastructure in combination with 
network expansions is crucial.  Figure 1-2 illustrates the bottlenecks as identified by 
the European Commission in the framework of the Trans-European Network for 
Energy program (TEN-E). 
For detailed information on the priority project objectives and main elements, see 
the brochure of DGTREN (EC, 2004a). Meeus et al. (2005b) provide an overview of 
the regulatory environment in which these investments take place, concluding that 
the current regulatory framework is inadequate to deliver the necessary investments. 
 
                                                           
6 Note that in all of these areas there are Member States of the European Union but that there are also non-
Member States in these areas. In comparison, the North-American network consists of 3 interconnected 
synchronous areas, being the East, the West and the Texas area. 10                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Axes for priority projects TEN-E program                                                 
(dark arrows EL1-7 agreed, light arrows EL8-9 additionally proposed) 
1.3.2  Internal Electricity Market in Europe 
The liberalization process in the European Union has gradually been progressing for 
10 years. First, the legislation that guided this process is briefly summarized. Then, 
the resulting market architecture is described, discussing the role of power 
exchanges and introducing the auctions organized by these exchanges. 
1.3.2.1 Legislation 
In the past, the electricity industry has been vertically integrated, state owned and 
regulated. The growing ideological and political disaffection towards vertically CONTEXT   11 
 
integrated monopolies and the liberalization successes in other network industries 
like telecommunication, have lead to liberalization initiatives world wide in the 
electricity industry. Vertically integrated utilities have been unbundled and barriers 
to entry in generation and supply are being removed to create competition, seen as a 
vehicle to increase the economic efficiency of the electricity industry. For a 
discussion on liberalization, see for instance Littlechild (2001) and Newbery (2001). 
  The liberalization of the electricity industry in Europe started with the 
implementation of Directive 96/92/EC and was later accelerated with Directive 
2003/54/EC. The liberalization is inline with the creation of an Internal Market in 
Europe with free movement of people, capital, goods and services, as determined by 
the European Treaties.  
In what follows, the 3 major implementation
7 aspects of the Directives are 
discussed, being market opening, third party access and the system operator. As 
Hancher (1997) commented, Directive 96/92/EC allowed nearly everything, except 
an integrated internal market. The second Directive 2003/54/EC can however be 
characterized by shorter-term deadlines and less freedom: 
•  First, Directive 96/92/EC introduced the concept of eligible consumers, 
being consumers who have the legal capacity to contract volumes of 
electric energy from any supplier. The Directive aimed at a slow and 
gradual opening of the Member States' electricity markets so that more and 
more generators and consumers have the opportunity to freely negotiate the 
purchase and sale of electricity. With the new Directive 2003/54/EC, put 
into force in 2003 and replacing the first Directive, this process is 
accelerated: all non-households customers are eligible from 1 July 2004 
and all consumers will be from 1 July 2007. 
•  Second, suppliers and generators need to be assured they will have access 
to the grid to settle negotiated electric energy transactions for delivering 
electric energy. Directive 96/92/EC included 3 third party access models, 
being negotiated third party access (nTPA), regulated third party access 
(rTPA), and the single buyer model. The single buyer model allows the 
creation of a mandatory power pool for generators with for instance the 
system operator acting as a 'single buyer' in the pool. In the rTPA model, 
prices for access to the network are regulated, while in the nTPA they may 
be subject to negotiations. Different access and tariff regimes have proven 
to be one of the main obstacles to the creation of the IEM (Roggenkamp 
and Boisseleau, 2005). Directive 2003/54/EC therefore imposes one 
regime, being rTPA, and the requirement to appoint a regulator, who has to 
approve tariffs, monitor congestion management methodologies and act as 
a dispute settlement authority. 
•  Third, the system operator plays a crucial role, also in a liberalized market. 
He provides the critical coordination services: keeping the balance between 
generation and supply, keeping the voltage at the right level, restart it when 
                                                           
7 The annual benchmarking reports of the European Commission provide an overview of the 
implementation status per Member State (e.g. EC 2005). 12                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
it suffers a complete collapse, etc. Partially, the system operator carries out 
these basic functions by purchasing what are called ancillary services, 
which can be supplied by generators, but also by the demand side. In order 
to ensure transparency of the market and to avoid discrimination, network 
activities on one hand and supply and generation activities on the other 
hand have to be separated. While the first Directive required an 
administrative unbundling, only obliging companies to present a separate 
balance sheet for each activity, the second goes a step further requiring 
legal unbundling. Transmission and distribution companies respectively 
have to apply legal unbundling from 1 July 2004 and 2007 onwards.  
Together with the Directive 2003/54/EC in 2003, Regulation 1228/2003 was issued. 
Regulation 1228/2003 is the first to address cross-border trading. The rationale 
behind it is to set harmonized principles on cross-border transmission charges and 
on the allocation of cross-border capacities. 
The Directorate-Generals of the European Commission (EC) are responsible for 
developing and implementing European policies (The three DG’s directly involved 
in the energy field are DG Transport and Energy, DG Competition and DG 
Environment). Twice a year they discuss the creation of the IEM at the Florence 
forum with the stakeholders. Some of the most important associations or 
organizations taking part in this debate are: 
•  The consumers (IFIEC);  
•  The European Regulators (ERGEG, CEER); 
•  The industry (Eurelectric); 
•  The system operators (ETSO, UCTE, Nordel, etc.);  
•  The traders (EFET);  
•  The power exchanges (Europex);  
1.3.2.2 Market  Architecture 
Stoft (2002) defines market architecture as a map of its component submarkets 
including the type of each submarket and the linkages between them. The European 
legislation discussed in the previous section, imposes the conditions that should 
allow market functioning, but the implementation of a market architecture is a 
competence of the Member States.  
Most European countries have chosen to keep centralized components to a minimum 
and to leave market organization to the dynamics of the private initiative. This has 














































Figure 1-3: IEM market architecture 
The entire Internal Electricity Market is divided into submarkets according to the 
control zones of the different Transmission System Operators (TSO). The control 
zones of a TSO mostly coincides with national borders, with exception of for 
instance Germany that has 4 TSOs. Figure 1-3 illustrates that the zonal division is 
also reflected in the average market prices. On average there are large price 
differences, with day-ahead wholesale prices going from 30€/MWh in the 
Scandinavian countries to 60€/MWh in Italy. 
National markets can be seen as divided in balancing markets and wholesale 
markets. Finally, wholesale markets are further divided in bilateral markets and 
power exchanges. 14                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
 
Figure 1-4: Average day-ahead price Jul 2004 –Jul 2005 DGTREN (2005) 
1.3.2.2.1  National wholesale and balancing markets 
To explain the role of exchanges in the market, balancing and portfolio management 
are introduced in this section. Consequently the auctions organized by exchanges are 
introduced. 
Balancing 
Grid users or their business representatives are responsible for their individual 
balance. This means that generators have to match as well as possible what they 
generate with what they sell. Large consumers or suppliers try to match their 
consumption with what they purchase. Unbalances are discouraged with fines based 
on the cost of the regulating and reserve power the TSO procures from grid users to 
alleviate the overall unbalance in its control zone (Box 1-3). 
The TSO also purchases other services to perform its tasks, such as reactive power 
support, black-start capability, etc. In general, these services are referred to as 
ancillary services or system services. The distinction with balancing services is not 
always as clear. In principle, the difference is that balancing services are paid by 
unbalanced grid users, while the costs of the other services are socialized, i.e. paid 
for by all users through the transmission tariffs. 
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Box 1-3 Balancing  
•  At  gate closure, grid users 
(A,B) submit their intentions 
in terms of injections in and 
withdrawals or off-takes   
from the grid to the TSO: 
AA
BB
(Cons  - Prod ) 0






•  This process is often referred 
to as nomination.  
•  Grid users can choose to be 
represented by balancing managers, who aggregate several portfolios 
within one control zone. In Belgium, such balancing managers are 
called Access Responsible Parties (ARP).  




≠ ∑  
•  Therefore, the TSO uses services purchased from grid users and settles 
the costs with unbalanced users per settlement period. The details of the 
balancing system are very different for every country, see for instance 
ETSO (2003). Payments for these balancing services are generally 
based upon availability and use, as the TSO procures options or rights 
to call upon regulating and reserve power at a certain strike price. 
Markets range from mandatory to purely commercial and from day-
ahead offering to long term tendering. Settlement periods range from 
15 minutes to 1 hour. 
•  Between gate closure and real time, conditions can change so that not 
all users are balanced. However, it is also possible that the unbalance is 




At the wholesale level, electric energy is traded several times before the actual 
delivery takes place. Trade takes place at prices that can vary substantially as 
expectations towards generation and consumption adjust based on the available 
information. 
Most wholesale trade volume in the Internal Electricity Market is traded bilaterally. 
Bilateral trade means the negotiation of large tailor made contracts, but also trade in 
more a standardized type of markets, often called over-the counter (OTC) markets. 
Suppliers buy in advance using long-term contracts to cover their consumption 





Operator   
TSO
B
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energy cannot be stored, there is also a need for additional daily and even hourly 
contracts in day-ahead or intra-day markets. 
 
Box 1-4 Portfolio management  
•  To avoid being unbalanced in real time, market parties try to balance their 
portfolio. E.g. suppliers:  
•  Will forecast consumption of their clients as in Figure 1-5. 
•  Will typically purchase multi-year to monthly base load contracts, i.e. for 
delivery during the whole day for a certain period. 
•  Will typically still have an open position one day ahead of delivery. This 
is because their position has to be covered hour per hour and hourly 
forecasts become more accurate as real time approaches. 
•  One day ahead of delivery (D-1) this means that in some hours they will 
have purchased too much (D-1 Long) and in other hours they will have 
purchased too little (D-1 Short). As illustrated in the figure this position 
can for instance be very different during week days and weekends. 
 
Figure 1-5: Managing a supplier portfolio 
 
Power exchange 
The closer to real time the more specific the needs are on the one hand, and the more 
difficult it is to find a counterparty on the other hand. Power exchanges offer a 
solution to this problem by providing automated trading platforms. Power exchanges 
are organized markets that typically facilitate trade in standardized hourly and multi-
hourly contracts. They offer a centralized platform where potential traders can 
exchange electric energy. The exchanges provide several services: CONTEXT   17 
 
•  The exchange is the counter-party for all transactions. This means that 
traders do not have to worry about counterparty risk
8, i.e. risk of insolvency 
of their counterparty. Trade is therefore also anonymous so that participants 
do not necessarily expose their net position by participating on the demand 
or on the supply side. 
•  The exchange has simple rules to match and settle contracts, i.e. there is no 
time consuming negotiation of prices or discussion of contract details. 
A mixture of private and public initiatives by market parties and TSOs has lead to 
the creation of a PX in most countries in Europe
9 (Figure 1-6). 
P P
 
Figure 1-6: European Power Exchanges  
                                                           
8 To hedge the risk of a counter-party that does not pay, exchanges often asks traders for bank guarantees 
and sometimes cooperate with a clearinghouses. 
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The volumes traded on the exchanges (Figure 1-7) are still relatively low, with the 
exception of the Spanish and the Scandinavian exchange. However, these relative 
higher volumes on the Omel and Nord Pool can be partly explained by 'liquidity 
supporting measures':  
•  In Spain, only generators that transact through the exchange receive a 
capacity payment, i.e. a payment for making generating capacity available. 
•  In the Scandinavian countries, the exchange has cross-border trade 
exclusivity. How this works will be explained in section 1.3.2.2.2 
The hourly prices on the exchanges are extremely volatile, which can be partly 
explained by the relatively low trading volumes, but also by the characteristics of 
electric energy, such as non-storability. Figure 1-8 illustrates the price evolution on 
the different exchanges. Note the figure shows the monthly average prices and not 









































































Figure 1-7: Trading volumes on the day-ahead Power Exchange markets % 
Total Consumption (DGTREN, 2005) CONTEXT   19 
 
 
Figure 1-8: Monthly average price evolution on European Power Exchanges 
(day-ahead prices, DGTREN, 2005) 
Auction 
Power exchanges in Europe are most known for their auctions that run one day 
ahead of delivery for every hour of the next day. Often these exchanges also 
organize intra-day trade and even continuous financial markets for monthly, 
quarterly and annual futures contracts (Box 1-5). However, in the remaining of the 
text, power exchange refers to the institute organizing the auction, or the auction 
itself.  
Figure 1-9 illustrates how such an auction functions. First, the market opens and 
traders can submit their orders. Then, the market closes, the orders are aggregated in 
demand and supply curves according to merit order and the market clears at 
intersection of these curves. Finally, the results are published and the transactions 
are settled. Order submission is typically in the morning and the markets close 
around noon. Results are then published 10 minutes to 1 hour after closure. 
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Figure 1-9: Power exchange auctions 
These auctions are different from the auctions we all know, such as flower auctions, 
the auctions of radio licenses or Internet based auctions such as e-bay. Also 
mainstream auction theory cannot be directly applied to power exchanges, as it 
restricts attention to the sale of a single item. A very readable introduction can be 
found in Klemperer (1999). 
The auctions organized by power exchanges are  
o  Double sided: there is demand and supply side bidding by 
generators, suppliers, traders, large consumers, etc. 
o  Multi unit: orders are typically expressed in MWh for delivery or 
off-take in a certain hour of the next day 
o  Uniform priced: all orders are settled at the same price 
o  Sealed bid - Single round: order books are not disclosed and 
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Box 1-5 Continuous trade  
•  Continuous trade platforms allow traders to post bid and ask prices for a 
standardized product. The bid price is the highest price any buyer is willing 
to pay for a given product at a given time. The ask price is the lowest price 
that any trader has declared that he/she will sell a given product for.  
•  The standardized product can for instance be the delivery of 1 MWh for a 
whole year, starting next year.  
•  Figure 1-10 illustrates a continuous trade market in which traders post bid 
and ask prices. The price is discovered at time T1 where the first deal takes 
place and rediscovered at time T2 when the next deal takes place. 
•  Note that the UK power exchange (UKPX) and several gas exchanges do 








Figure 1-10: Illustration of continuous trade  
 
1.3.2.2.2  Linkages between national markets 
In Europe, most TSOs do not avoid but only resolve intra-zonal congestion; 
counting on the fact that congestion does no easily occur within the control zones. 
Because cross-border interconnection capacity is scarce, inter-zonal congestion is 
also avoided as much as possible by restricting cross-border trade. Cross-border 
trade is constrained by allocating a limited amount of transfer capacities via 
interconnector capacity markets (Figure 1-3). 
Interconnector capacity markets 
On most European borders, these interconnector capacity markets are implemented 
as explicit or implicit auctions (Figure 1-11). Under explicit auctioning, cross-border 
capacities are allocated to individual market participants, who can use these 
capacities to arbitrate between electric energy markets, i.e. to trade on price 
differences. Under implicit auctioning, cross-border capacities are not allocated to 22                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
individual market participants. Rather, arbitrage is internalized in the mechanism for 
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Figure 1-11: Cross-border capacity allocation end 2006
10 
Implicit auctioning in Europe is referred to as market coupling. Market coupling is 
best described as market clearing in international context with network constraints. 
Note that the term market coupling wrongly suggests that it is about coupling 
markets that were previously not coupled. In Europe, it is about replacing the 
explicit allocation of transfer capacities in separate interconnector capacity markets 
                                                           
10 Illustration is based on a illustration in a presentation of Electrabel. CONTEXT   23 
 
by a system where exchanges can use the capacities to optimize the clearing of 
orders introduced to their auctions. For instance France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands are currently implementing such an initiative (Figure 1-11) and more of 
these initiatives have been announced. 
Example (based on example in EC, 2004b) 
To illustrate the difference between explicit and implicit auctioning, consider the 
following example with two markets A and B (Table 1-1): 
•  In market A, 100MWh is requested at 80€/MWh and 20MWh is requested 
at 30€/MWh. Generator 1 (G1) offers 50MWh at 20€/MWh and Generator 
2 (G2) offers 100MWh at 40€/MWh.  
•  In market B, 110MWh is requested at 90€/MWh, Generator 3 (G3) offers 
60MWh at 25€/MWh and Generator 4 (G4) offers 110MWh at 60€/MWh. 
Table 1-1: Load and generation at market A and B 






(G1) 50MWh@20€/MWh  (G3) 60MWh@25€/MWh 
(G2) 100MWh@40€/MWh  (G4) 110MWh@60€/Mh 
 
When both markets are isolated, Figure 1-12 and Figure 1-13 illustrate the 
aggregated curves of market A and B respectively. Market A would clear at 
40€/MWh, market B at 60€/MWh. When the orders of the two exchanges are 
aggregated (Figure 1-14), the fully integrated market AB would clear at a price 
between 40 and 60€/MWh. In what follows we assume it clears at 50€/MWh. 24                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
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Figure 1-12: Market A isolated 



















Aggregated supply curve 
location B              





Figure 1-13: Market B isolated CONTEXT   25 
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Figure 1-14: Fully integrated market (AB) 
In the isolated market situation (Table 1-2), surplus at market A is 5000€ and 5400€ 
on market B. This surplus results from generators that are paid more than requested 
and from load that has to pay less than the willingness to pay. For instance at market 
A, G1 offers to supply 50MWh at 20€/MWh and the offer is accepted at 40€/MWh, 
meaning that G1 makes a profit of 1000€ (=(40-20€/MWh) x50MWh). This profit is 
called producer surplus, while gains from trade of the demand side are called 
consumer surplus and the sum surplus.  
This total surplus is the surface between the demand and supply curves, which is 
also referred to as net utility, i.e. brut utility (the surface under the demand curve) 
minus the cost of supply (surface under the supply curve). Note however that in the 
next chapters, the term gains from trade is used, as orders received by exchanges do 
not necessarily represent the actual costs of generators or the actual values that 
consumers attribute to electric energy. 
In the fully integrated market situation, total surplus increases because the same load 
is supplied with cheaper generation. G2 is accepted for an extra 50MWh at the 
expense of G4. The increase of surplus compared to the sum of the surplus of the 
separate markets, equals the difference in price between the orders (20€/MWh) 
times the 50MWh, which is 1000€. In other words, integrating these markets 
increases surplus. 
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Table 1-2: Surplus per participant and market at the given market prices 
Isolated markets A and B  Fully integrated market AB 








Load A  4000    3000   
Generator (G1)  1000    1500   
Generator 2 (G2)  0    1000   
Load B    3300    4400 
Generator 3 (G3)    2100    1500 
Generator 4 (G4)    0    0 
5000 5400 5500 5900  Total 
10400 11400 
 
The fully integrated market solution means that generation is larger than load in 
market A, and vice versa in market B.  
•  At location A, generation is 150MWh, while load is only 100MWh. 
•  At location B, generation is 60MWh and load is 110MWh. 
The difference (50MWh) is then exchanged. Assuming that markets A and B are 
two locations (A and B) that are interconnected by a line and that these markets are 
hourly markets, 50MW will be injected in the grid at A and 50MW will be 
withdrawn from the grid at B during this hour resulting in a flow of 50MW on the 
interconnecting line. In other words, the fully integrated market solution can only be 
possible if 50MWh can be transferred from A to B.  
In the following two sections, it is assumed that only 40MW is available to explain 
the difference between implicit and explicit auctioning. 
Implicit auctioning 
Under implicit auctioning, a market operator (e.g. exchange) maximizes surplus 
subject to network constraints (e.g. imposed by the TSO). The next chapter models 
this problem. In this example it means that instead of 50MWh, only 40MWh can be 
transferred from A to B. 
Therefore, Generator 4 at market B (60€/MWh) will be accepted for 10MWh instead 
of the cheaper Generator 2 at market A (40€/MWh), whose order becomes curtailed. 
Brut utility is unchanged but the cost of supply increases with 200€ (=(60-
20€/MWh) x40MWh), meaning that net utility or surplus decreases with 200€. 
The remaining surplus is 11200€. The marginally accepted (curtailed
11) orders of G2 
and G4, respectively 40 and 60€/MWh set the price is market A and B. At these 
prices, the market operator, who is counterparty for all transactions, will therefore 
have a net pay-off different from zero:  
                                                           
11 I.e. partly accepted. For instance G2 offers 100 MWh but only 90 MWh is accepted. CONTEXT   27 
 
•  At location A, more generation than load is accepted so that the operator pays 
more than he receives. He looses 1600€ (=40MWhx40€/MWh)  
•  At location B, more load than generation is accepted so that the operator 
receives more than he pays. He wins 2400€  (=40MWhx60€/MWh)  
The net pay-off for the operator
12 is equal to 800€ (=2400-1600€). Note that this net 
pay-off is called congestion revenue and its use falls under Regulation 1228 (Box 
1-6).  
 
Box 1-6 Congestion Revenue 
•  If congestion revenue were profit for the TSOs, their profit would 
decrease from investing in the grid, giving them the wrong incentives.  
•  Therefore, Regulation 1228 limits the use of congestion revenue to 
either investment in the grid, a reduction of transmission tariffs or 
offering firm transfer capacity to the market. 
•  Meeus et al. (2005a) argue that there should be guidelines to determine 
the choice between the alternative uses for congestion revenue; 
otherwise this will lead to under-investment in the grid as regulators are 
biased towards a short-term tariff reduction. 
  
Explicit auctioning 
Under explicit auctioning, the 40MW transmission capacity would be auctioned in a 
separate capacity market. With perfect foresight, bidders for transfer capacity would 
predict the market outcomes with efficient use of the capacity. In the example, they 
would correctly predict the market prices of 40€/MWh at location A and 60€/MWh 
at location B and would therefore not bid more than 20€/MW per hour (i.e. 
20€/MWh) for transfer capacity between the two locations. Under perfect 
competition, they would bid 20€/MW. The market operator would then receive 
800€/MWh from explicitly auctioning this capacity, which is the same as under 
implicit auctioning. 
Note that explicit arbitrage implies that a trader that acquired the transfer capacity 
will bid in the energy market. Assuming that the traders will introduce price taking 
bids in both markets to avoid unbalance penalties, the situation in the energy 
markets is as follows: 
•  At the low price market A: the trader introduces a price taking supply offer 
of 40MWh, meaning that the supply curves shifts to the right in comparison 
with the isolated situation. As illustrated in Figure 1-15, the resulting 
market price is 40€/MWh. 
                                                           
12 This net pay-off is called congestion revenue. In Europe, the use of this revenue is falls under 
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•  At the high price market B: the trader introduces a price taking demand bid 
of 40MWh, meaning that the demand curve shifts to the left in comparison 
with the isolated situation. As illustrated in Figure 1-16: the resulting 
market price is 60€/MWh. 
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Figure 1-15: PXA under explicit auctioning (40MW A-B) CONTEXT   29 
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Figure 1-16: PXB under explicit auctioning (40MW A-B) 
Note that in this example, the outcome of the market under explicit auctioning is the 
same as under implicit auctioning. The prices are the same and the same generators 
are supplying the same quantities in the two markets. Furthermore, the consumer 
and producer surplus and congestion revenue are equal. Both provide efficient 
locational signals. In the example, the signal is to invest in generation at B or to shift 
consumption from B to A. At the same time an investment signal is given to the 
TSO as a 10 MW increase of transfer capacity yields an increase in surplus of 200€. 
However, explicit and implicit auctioning are not necessary the same under more 
realistic assumptions, e.g. imperfect competition. Chapter 2 provides a sample of 
relevant literature on the difference in design between implicit and explicit auctions.  
Flow based auctioning 
More important than the difference between explicit and implicit auctioning, is 
whether the approach is flow based or not.  
As illustrated in Figure 1-11, the allocation of cross-border capacities on most 
borders is explicit. Furthermore, the allocation is done independently per border, i.e. 
not flow based. Note that even if the allocation is jointly as is the case for the 
internal borders of the Scandinavian countries, the approach is not necessarily flow 
based. The implicit auctioning approach applied in that region assumes that the 
underlying network is radial, while it is not. 30                                                    INTRODUCTION AND THESIS MOTIVATION 
 
The fact that dependency between borders exists or that the network is meshed 
13 
instead of radial is considered implicitly by reducing the capacities that are made 
available on European borders. This is necessary because even if no capacity is 
made available to contractually transfer electric energy over a certain border, 
contractual transfers in other parts the network can cause physical flows on that 
border. In highly meshed networks, it is even possible that these physical flows are 
as high as the available capacity on that border. 
In the current non-flow based system, every TSO independently calculates Net 
Transfer Capacities (NTC) (Box 1-7) for its borders and distracts the capacities that 
are reserved for long-term historical contracts (Box 1-8). What remains is then made 
available to the market. As argued above, NTCs are actually a prudent 
underestimation of what is available. Therefore, a more coordinated flow based 
approach would imply a more efficient use of the scarcely available network 
capacities. 
 
Box 1-7 Calculation of NTCs 
•  NTC values are typically used for flow gates or virtual lines that 
interconnect two zones, while physically several lines interconnect the 
zones and potentially also different loops interconnect the two zones. 
•  The NTC is the Total Transfer Capacity (TTC) corrected for a 
reliability margin. 
•  TTCs are calculated starting from a base case. Production on one side 
of a flow gate is increased and equally decreased on the other side until 
a network constraint is met. The TTC is then the total cross-border 
flow. The implementation of this scheme is discussed in Haesen et al. 
(2004). 
•  Indicative NTC values for winter and summer are published every year 
by ETSO. Note that these are respectively based on the base cases of 
the third Wednesday of January and June at 10.30 a.m. 
•  There is no harmonized calculation methodology. Two TSOs can have 
different values for the same flow gate, in which case ETSO 
(http://www.etso-net.org) publishes both, but eventually the minimum 
of the two is imposed on both TSOs. 
•  The multilaterally agreed 2004 Operations Handbook of UCTE 
(http://www.ucte.org) did not change this, as it explicitly describes 
three alternative TTC calculation methodologies. 
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Box 1-8 Historical long term contracts 
•  In the pre-liberalization period, long-term contracts with foreign 
generators were sometimes preferred over authorizing the construction 
of a new domestic plant. Often this was because of different national 
policies towards nuclear power; countries pro-nuclear then signed 
export contracts to countries contra-nuclear. 
•  These supply contracts also included a guaranteed network access. This 
meant that these contracts could also involve transit countries. 
•  In a liberalized context, less capacity can be made available for cross-
border trade by the TSO due to these contracts. 
•  Recently (press release No 53/05 7 June 2005), the Court of Justice 
ruled that "The grant of preferential access to the cross-border 
electricity transmission network to an undertaking which previously 
held a monopoly, because of contracts concluded prior to the 
liberalization of the market, amounts to discrimination prohibited by 
the second electricity Directive." in Case C-17/03 against the Dutch 
company Samenwerkende ElektriciteitsProductiebedrijven NV (SEP). 
•  This led to an increase of the capacity auctioned by the involved TSOs, 
e.g. 350MW extra was auctioned on the French-Belgian border (Elia 
newsletter 21 oct 2005). 
•  Note that this ruling only has an effect on the SEP-contract, but creates 






Chapter 2  
Introducing market design via 
the characteristics of electric 
energy auctions 
2.1 Outline 
Market design can explain how market parties behave in that market. However, 
market parties do not necessarily behave perfectly competitive in a perfectly 
designed market. Their behavior is largely driven be the market structure. Still, a 
badly designed market can make it easier for them to misbehave or can even make it 
impossible to behave perfectly competitive. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, most power exchange auction-trading 
platforms in Europe have a similar design and the main contributions of this text are 
on the implementation of that design. However, the aim of this chapter is to discuss 
this prevailing design by comparing it with alternative designs that have been 
implemented elsewhere.  
The chapter starts by discussing the main design characteristics of electric energy 
auctions organized worldwide. The chapter then comments on different designs that 
are prevailing in Europe and the US, by arguing that the two designs are not 
necessarily that different. 34                                                                    INTRODUCING MARKET DESIGN 
 
2.2 Main  design  characteristics of electric energy auctions 
Table 2-1 illustrates the main design characteristics of some of the most well-known 
electric energy auctions worldwide. The auctions are often categorized into 
exchanges and pools, although there is no unique way of doing this. By means of 
illustration, the definition proposed in Roggenkamp and Boisseleau (2004) is 
included in the Table. However, also these authors recognize that in practice every 
auction design differs.  
Most designs are close to what can be called a pure power exchange or a pure power 
pool. Under the strict definition, only PJM would be a power pool and only CalPX 
would be an exchange. Under a less strict definition: 
•  Nord Pool, APX, Powernext, EEX, EXAA can be called exchanges. 
•  UK Pool can be called a pool.  
•  Omel and GME are a bit of both. 
Note that the Californian exchange (CalPX) and the UK Pool are not operational 
anymore. Still, it is interesting to discuss these auctions, as most of the market 
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Table 2-1: Main design characteristics electric energy auctions 
  Participation Non-convexities   Network constraints 





auctions?  Nodal? 
Power 
Exchange  No No  No 
CalPX (US)  No
1 No  No 
Nord Pool 
(Scandinavia)  No
2  Yes        
(blocks)  No Yes No 
APX 
(Netherlands)  No
3  Yes        
(blocks)  No No 
Powernext 
(France)  No  Yes          
(blocks)  No No 
EEX 
(Germany)  No  Yes       
(blocks)  No No 
EXAA 
(Austria)  No  Yes       
(blocks)
 4  No No 
Yes 
Omel (Spain)  No




GME (Italy)  Yes  No 
No
7 No 
Power Pool  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PJM (US)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
UK Pool  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
1   Mandatory for the three largest utilities 
2    Mandatory for international trade 
3    Mandatory for day-ahead transfer capacity 
4    Not from start 
5 Participation encouraged with capacity 
payments 
6 Omel takes into account network constraints but 
in case of intra-zonal congestion in Spain, demand 
pays for redispatching. 
7 GME takes into account network constraints and 
in case of intra-zonal congestion in Italy, Italy can 
be split up in predefined generation price zones, but 
a single demand price is imposed. 
 
2.2.1 Participation 
There is a debate on bilateral versus pool based trading arrangements. Pool based 
trading arrangements mean that all trade is centralized in an auctions, i.e. 
participation to that auction is mandatory. This was for instance the case for 
liberalization pioneers England and Wales, Alberta (Canada), Chile, Argentina and 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) in the United States.  
More recently in California and also in Europe, market systems based on bilateral 
trade have been implemented. Under bilateral trading arrangements, wholesale trade 
takes place in several market types of which auctions are one. Participation to these 
auctions is voluntary. 36                                                                    INTRODUCING MARKET DESIGN 
 
In 2001, the regulator
14 in the UK replaced the Pool (England and Wales) by a 
market system based on bilateral trade. Several authors have analyzed this change in 
design as a shift from a uniform to pay-as-bid (discriminatory) price auction
15: 
•  Wolfram (1999) argues against the reforms, saying that switching to 
discriminatory pricing is unlikely to solve the problem of high prices in the 
UK given the market structure, which is dominated by a small number of 
generating companies. 
•  Bower and Bun (2000, 2001) even suggest that the reforms would actually 
increase prices. Their results are based on an agent-based simulation model. 
The reason, they argue, is that market prices are not publicly available and 
agents with a large market share gain a significant informational advantage 
in a discriminatory auction, thereby facing less competitive pressure. 
•  The results in Fabra et al. (2004) are based on a multi-unit auction model.  
They present an analysis inline with the view of the regulator. 
Also in 2001, the CalPX commissioned a report by leading auction theorists on the 
advisability of a switch from uniform to a discriminatory auction format for its day-
ahead auction. In other words, there the discussion was not on participation, but on 
the pricing rules of the voluntary exchange. Still, it is relevant as the same literature 
on uniform versus pay-as-bid pricing was used as input for this discussion. Kahn et 
al. (2001) advised CalPX not to switch to a discriminatory auction, adding: "In these 
dramatically altered circumstances, the suggested remedy we were called upon to 
evaluate has paled in significance." 
Note that both pricing rules are commonly used in financial and other markets, and 
there is now a voluminous economic literature devoted to their study (Binmore and 
Swierzbinski, 2000). However, also in other industries, there is no consensus on 
which is best. 
2.2.2 Network  constraints 
The design choices related to network constraints are part of the debate on how to 
incorporate the network constraints into the electric energy trading arrangements. 
First, there is a debate on the degree of abstraction that can be made of the 
underlying physical network, i.e. zonal versus nodal. Second, there is a debate on the 
allocation of the network capacity. Depending on the allocation mechanism, the 
energy and capacities are integrated (implicit auctioning) or there is a separate 
capacity market (explicit auctioning). 
2.2.2.1 Network  abstraction 
In Europe, intra-zonal or national network constraints are not taken into account in 
the trading arrangements. As explained in the previous chapter, TSOs only constrain 
cross-border trade, i.e. a zonal system. Therefore, for wholesale trade it is as if the 
                                                           
14 At that time called Offer, now called Ofgem. 
15 The pool is classified as uniform price because successful bidders all receive the same price for 
multiple units of output. The bilateral system is a discriminatory auction with successful bidders receiving 
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national networks have no constraints. These constraints are dealt with in real time 
and the cost of alleviating intra-zonal congestion is socialized among grid users. 
In a nodal system as in PJM, all network constraints are taken into account in the 
trading arrangements and every node can have a different price in the wholesale 
market. Most European countries have a single price zone. Even Germany, which 
has 4 control zones, only has one price zone. Exceptions are Norway, which can be 
split up in two price zones, and GME (Italy), which can be split in several price 
zones, although a single price for demand is retained. 
Several authors have analyzed the difference in design between a zonal and a nodal 
system, e.g.: 
•  Stoft (1998, 1999) presents a game theoretic analysis of the zonal design. 
He considers strategic behavior of market players who take unanticipated 
advantage of market rules. The author explains and illustrates how 
generators with high costs can get paid not to generate in a zonal system. 
As also discussed in Hogan (1999), generators have incentives to cause 
intra-zonal congestion to get paid for redispatching their plants. This will 
raise the short-run cost to loads and will encourage inefficient entry of new 
generation. 
•  Glachant and Pignon (2005), referring to the zonal Scandinavian market, 
argue that TSOs have an incentive to avoid intra-zonal congestion by over-
constraining inter-zonal transfers. By over-constraining inter-zonal 
transfers, TSOs can hide the need for intra-zonal network investments. 
Most European exchanges organize trade in electric energy nationally. In a system 
with national price zones, this means that they do not take into account network 
constraints. Omel is an exception. The Spanish exchange takes into account the 
intra-zonal network constraints, but in such a way that from a design point of view, 
Spain is a single price zone. First, Omel determines a single intra-zonal price for 
Spain. Second, Omel redispatches generators to deal with intra-zonal network 
constraints. Third, the costs are socialized with a general mark-up (cost increase) 
called uplift. In other words, the costs are socialized via the wholesale prices, instead 
of via the transmission tariffs. Therefore, these market rules exhibit the same 
problematic incentives as in a zonal system where the exchanges do not take into 
account network constraints. 
2.2.2.2 Network  capacity  allocation 
As explained in chapter 1, most European TSOs allocate the available cross-border 
capacities in separate interconnector capacity markets. The Scandinavian countries 
are the exception with Nord Pool that implicitly auctions all capacities made 
available by the TSOs on the internal interconnections of Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland. Also PJM has implemented implicit auctioning. 
Several authors have analyzed the difference in design between a system with 
explicit and implicit allocation, e.g.: 
•  As argued in EC (2004b), explicit auctions can yield inferior outcomes due 
to the time lag between the clearing of the explicit auction and the 
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is purchased but before it is used, changes its value. Furthermore, under 
imperfect information, bidders for transfer capacity could even contract 
capacity and arbitrate in the wrong direction based on erroneous price 
forecasts. 
•  It has also been argued that implicit auctioning mitigates some 
opportunities of exercising market power, as for instance illustrated in EC 
(2004b) and modeled in Gilbert et al. (2004) and Ehrenmann and Neuhoff 
(2003). Neuhoff (2003) also gives empirical support in favor of implicit 
auctions, using the example of the German-Dutch interconnection. 
•  Willems (2002, 2004) on the contrary provides a simple example where 
implicit auctioning is sub-optimal under imperfect competition. The author 
notes that the paper is not meant to compare implicit with explicit 
auctioning. Still, the example shows that implicit auctioning does not 
always reduce market power. 
Europe is moving towards a system with implicit allocation of network capacity. 
Concerns can however be raised related to some of the proposals that have been 
made to implement implicit auctioning in Europe. The political constraints of these 
proposals are discussed in chapter 8. 
2.2.3 Non-convexities 
In a convex market, generators do not have any fixed costs, have strictly increasing 
variable costs and can produce at any output level between zero and their capacity 
limit. Figure 2-1 illustrates a convex market. A price, p*, defined by the (unique) 
intersection of supply and demand curves, clears the market, i.e. demand equals 
supply at that price. Total gains from trade are then maximized at the market-
clearing price. Also participants' gains from trade have been exhausted at p*, 
meaning that all the consumers that value consumption at p* or more are being 



















Figure 2-1: Convex market 
In electricity markets, generators have startup costs, as well as minimum output 
levels, etc. Therefore, the electricity market is a market with non-convexities. In a 
convex market, a market-clearing price as in Figure 2-1 does not necessarily exist. 
Consider the following example with start-up costs, taken from Elmaghraby et al. 
(2004). 
•  Suppose there are four sellers in the market, each with a positive startup 
cost, associated with generation (Table 2-2). 
•  Assume that market’s inverse demand curve is given by:  () 6 / 2 Pq q = − . 
•  The sellers express their startup costs in multi-part orders. 
The determination of the efficient dispatch is discussed in the section 2.4. The 
efficient dispatch solution is the solution that maximizes total surplus for this 
market. In this solution, seller 2 supplies 4MWh to the market. Sellers 1, 3 and 4 
should produce nothing. The marginal valuation of energy by consumers at 4MWh 
is 4€/MWh ( (4 ) 6/ 2 Pq q == − ). The market price should therefore be 4€/MWh  
(maximally). However, this solution is not profitable for Seller 2. The cost for Seller 
2 of supplying 4MWh is 19€ (=7€+4MWh*3€/MWh). Therefore, seller 2 wants to 
be paid at least 4,75€/MWh (=19€/4MWh).  
This is essentially the problem caused by non-convexities in a market. In this 
example, the optimal solution in terms of total surplus cannot be settled with a 
uniform price, as this price needs to be at least 4,75€/MWh, but not more than 40                                                                    INTRODUCING MARKET DESIGN 
 
4€/MWh. Therefore, there is no uniform market-clearing price that the market finds 
by itself. The auction design can ignore non-convexities such a start-up costs, or can 
allow participants to express them, which means that the auctioneer has to deal with 
this problem.  
 
Table 2-2: Costs and capacities for four generators 
Generator  Seller 1  Seller 2  Seller 3  Seller 4 
Energy  cost  (€/MWh)  2 3 5 6 
Start-up  cost  (€)  10  7 4 3 
Max  quantity  3 4 4 4 
 
2.2.3.1  Multi part orders and nonlinear pricing 
For instance the UK Pool and PJM allow generators to submit the minimum and 
maximum output levels of their plants, the start-up costs, variable costs and ramping 
rates, i.e. multi-part orders.  
Therefore, these auctioneers can be faced with the problem illustrated in the 
previous section. Pools, such as the UK Pool and PJM typically solve that problem 
by applying nonlinear pricing, meaning that contracts (q) are settled at an hourly 
reference price (p) in combination with an extra payment (EP): EP + pq.  
There are many ways to implement this approach. The most extreme form is pay-as-
bid, meaning that all accepted orders are settled at their order price or price limit 
(p=0 and A = order price limit). The approaches used by power pools are however 
very different from pay-as-bid. Most trade is settled at the hourly reference prices 
(EP=0), but some contracts are settled at these prices in combination with a 
discriminatory payment, i.e. side payment (EP>0). In other words, not all contracts 
are settled at the same average price, i.e. nonlinear pricing. 
As an illustration, assume an hourly reference price of 4€/MWh for the above 
example. At this price, seller 2 has a deficit of 3€  (=19€-4MWhx4€/MWh). Under 
nonlinear pricing, this deficit will then be compensated with a side payment of 3€. 
Next, the 3€ needs to be recovered from the demand side. A market-up or uplift of 
0.75€/MWh (=3€/4MWh) is not possible as demand at 4,75€/MWh 
(=4+0,75€/MWh) is smaller than 4MWh. Therefore, two-part tariffs need to be used, 
transferring consumer surplus to supplier 2. Consumer surplus is 4€ (=(6-4€/MWh) 
x4€/MWh/2), while only 3€ needs to be recovered. A possibility is to charge 
demand in proportion to surplus. 
It is important to note that such charges will create additional incentives for the 
charged parties to distort their bids from true costs (see O’Neill et al., 1993). If the 
charge is related to the demand volume (EP(q)) instead of a uniform charge on 
demand, as in the example, this can distort the market and reduce surplus. 
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generators that could have made a profit. To clear the market, they also have to be 
compensated, but again this can create wrong incentives. 
2.2.3.2  Single part orders and linear pricing 
In California (CalPX) and in Italy (GME), the auctioneer does not allow its 
participants to submit multi-part orders. Orders are single part, implying that the 
auctioneer can simply stack up orders according to merit order and clear the auction 
at intersection of the aggregated demand and supply curves, as in Figure 1-9. 
The easy solution for the auctioneer is indeed to ignore the non-convexities in the 
market. However, in such a system trading is more difficult for market parties. Even 
if generators want to, they cannot directly express their costs. Figure 2-2 illustrates 
demand versus the aggregated variable cost curve of the example in Table 2-2. This 
would be the supply curve if sellers simply submit their energy costs in the example. 
 
Figure 2-2: Demand versus aggregated variable cost curve               
(Elmaghraby et al., 2004) 
In Figure 2-2, the auction clears at a price of 3€/MWh and 6MWh would be traded. 
Sellers 1 and 2 produce 3MWh, while sellers 3 and 4 do not produce. At these 
production quantities both seller 1 and 3 are asked to produce unprofitably. Seller 1's 
profit is equal to –7€ (=(3€/MWh – 2€/MWh)* 3MWh – 10€) and seller 2's profit is 
–7€ (=(3€/MWh – 3€/MWh)* 4MWh – 7€). Stoft (2002) provides more examples. 
Obviously, generators have a clear incentive to include their start-up costs into the 
single part bids. As discussed in Stoft (2002), this kind of 'justified gaming' is 
difficult to distinguish from gaming in the meaning of exercising market power. As 
a result, it becomes more difficult to monitor abuse of market power in these 
auctions. Market power and abuse of market power are discussed in the next chapter 
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Some have argued that auctions with multi-part orders are necessary for the 
efficiency of electricity markets (Elmaghraby, and Oren, 1999; Elmaghraby, 2005). 
Others have suggested using multi-round auctions
16 with single instead of multi-part 
orders (Wilson, 1997). However, these studies tend to assume that auctions are 
mandatory. In a mandatory system, the outcome of the auction determines the 
dispatch of generators. In a bilateral based market, traders can iteratively adjust their 
portfolio by trading in consecutive markets. Therefore, inefficient trade in an auction 
with voluntary participation is not necessarily a problem. Note that the effect of 
having multi-round auctions is similar to having many markets. 
2.2.3.3  Block orders and linear pricing 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the auctions organized by European exchanges 
are hourly. Also the orders are hourly and consist of a quantity that is offered or 
requested with a certain price limit. Besides these hourly orders, most exchanges 
also have block orders. European power exchanges with block orders are APX 
(Netherlands), Powernext (France), EEX (Germany), EXAA (Austria), Borzen 
(Slovenia) and Nord Pool (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). 
A block order consists of a quantity that is offered or requested in multiple hours at 
an average price limit. Besides this inter-temporal rigidity, blocks also have a fill-or-
kill constraint, meaning that the order has to be accepted completely or not at all. 
Note that blocks can be introduced on the supply as well as on the demand side. 
Note also that Omel is an exception in Europe. Omel has multi-part orders instead of 
blocks. 
In comparison with the single-part or hourly orders of exchanges, blocks allow 
traders to some extend to express their multi-period cost structures. However, blocks 
are not as flexible as the multi-part orders. For instance, blocks do not allow 
generators to directly express their fixed costs. As an illustration, assume that seller 
2 wants to introduce a block order in the above example (Table 2-2) and assume that 
there are two periods. To be sure he earns back his costs if the block order is 
accepted, he could do the following: 
•  Introduce a 1MWh block with a price limit of 6,5€/MWh. His variable 
costs are 3€/MWh, so that in both periods he earns 3,5€ 
(=3,5€/MWh*1MWh), which is enough to compensate for his fixed costs 
of 7€. 
•  Introduce a 2MWh block with a price limit of 4,75€/MWh. 
•  Etc. 
In other words, generators using blocks have to fix volume to get revenue certainty. 
Therefore, generators cannot directly express the costs and constraints by using 
blocks, which implies that the auction with blocks is not incentive compatible for 
generators. However, blocks can also be introduced at the demand side. Therefore, 
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also consumers can express their multi-period cost structures. For instance, a block 
can be introduced for the start-up of an energy-intensive production process. 
As with multi-part orders, a market-clearing price does not necessarily exist for an 
auction with block orders. Instead of resorting to nonlinear pricing, European 
exchanges (also Omel) impose linear prices
17. These prices are not necessarily 
market clearing, i.e. block orders can be excluded even though they are in the 
money. In other words, blocks that want to trade as they can make a profit at the 
determined prices can be rejected without receiving a compensation for the lost 
opportunity. In this text, these blocks are referred to as Paradoxically Rejected 
Blocks (PRB). 
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2.3 Standard  market  design 
In the US, the standard market design supported by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) is basically the PJM design, its most successful market
18. 
Therefore, the standard market design advocated in the US is a system with a 
mandatory pool, multi-part bidding and nonlinear and nodal pricing. While there is 
no standard market design in Europe, it is possible, using the discussion in the 
previous sections, to advance a prevailing design
19: 
•  Trading arrangements are not pool based but bilateral. 
•  The exchanges only have block bidding (less flexible than multi-part 
bidding in pools) and apply linear pricing instead of nonlinear pricing. 
•  At the moment, most exchanges organize trade nationally so that they do 
not take into account network constraints and arbitrage between the zones 
is via separate capacity markets. 
At first sight, these designs seem very different. However, Europe is moving 
towards a system with implicit allocation of network capacity. There is still a zonal 
system in place but full spatial arbitrage as in a nodal system may be too much to 
ask for. The arguments for simplification are that there are few agents at each node, 
which makes the market illiquid. It may not make much sense to have as many 
prices as the number of physical nodes in a network. As in Nord Pool, control zones 
could gradual split in several price zones. In other words, the designs are actually 
not that different.  
It is also increasingly recognized that electricity markets are too complex to be 
modeled adequately so that there will never be closure on best design. Illustrative is 
the statement by Newbery (2005) as one of the conclusions in the framework of the 
SESSA project for the European Commission on refining market design: "The 
British evidence of increased wholesale competition suggests that, where the market 
design is reasonably sensible, market structure is determinative." 
Bushnell (2004) noted that, ironically, in response to its crisis, California is moving 
to adopt a market design somewhat similar to the UK Pool
20, which has in turn been 
rejected in the UK in favor of a design similar to the one that has now been rejected 
in California. The following two sections describe the events and provide a sample 
of relevant literature. 
2.3.1 UK  experience 
The UK Pool, actually the Electricity Pool of England and Wales, was introduced as 
part of the liberalization process that started in 1990. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
                                                           
18 Note that it is successful in terms of short-run allocation. In terms of long-term investment, this market 
has still to deserve its merits. 
19 See Glachant et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of market design issues that need to be improved in 
Europe. 
20 More specifically California is moving towards the FERC's standard market design, which is basically 
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were subject to separate market arrangements, which will not be further discussed. 
The Pool operated for 10 years until it was subjected to a review process. Following 
this review by the regulator Ofgem, at that time called Offer
21, the Pool was 
replaced with the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) in 2001. NETA 
basically implied that a bilateral trade based market with PXs
22 replaced the pool-
based market architecture. A more comprehensive discussion of the liberalization of 
the UK market and its transition is provided by Bartholomew (2004). 
As stated in Bower and Bunn (2000), the review was part of a wider UK energy 
policy debate, with 
•  Consumer groups, who believed that the Pool contributed to generator 
market power and high prices. 
•  Offer, who wanted to create a more competitive industry and greater 
synergy with the gas market. Illustrative is the explicit statement "Pool 
prices must come down" by the regulator (Offer, 1999). 
•  The government, which was concerned about fuel diversity and security, 
wanted to prevent excessive investments in gas-fired generation capacity at 
the expense of coal. 
Most parties believed that the defaults of the Pool could be remedied by redesigning 
the Pool. Often cited was that both the marginal system price and the capacity 
payments calculation methodology provided opportunity for generators to profit 
from market manipulation. Most suggested remedies were therefore simplifying 
price rules
23, discriminatory pricing and the abolishment of the capacity payments.  
Neushloss and Wolf (1999) and many others state that perhaps the most important 
reason for the abolishment of the Pool was the governance arrangement that created 
a deadlock situation. Changes to trading rules could only be implemented with the 
consent of a majority of Pool Members. Furthermore, the voting system was 
weighted in favor of larger participants.  
Ofgem has credited the fall in electricity prices in England and Wales after the 
introduction of NETA to the new market design. This as well is however 
controversial. Empirical analysis by Evans and Green (2002) supports this view, 
while Bower (2002) and Newbery (2003) argue that the decline in price is fully 
explained by the reduction in market concentration brought about by asset 
divestitures, an increase in imports and market excess capacity. Fabra and Toro 
(2003) on the other hand, suggest that besides the reduction in market concentration, 
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1997, after which many documents followed, most are available at: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk. 
22 This led to the creation of several exchanges, the most important one being UKPX. Note that UKPX is 
the only exchange in Europe that does not organize an auction but facilitates continuous trade in half 
hourly contracts up to 2 hours before delivery. 
23 Offer identified in its review that the Pool is overly complex, for example, it requires the submission of 
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the change in market design is significant in explaining the reduction in wholesale 
electricity prices. 
2.3.2 California  experience 
When restructuring of the electricity industry in California started in 1996, the state 
was facing some of the highest retail rates in the US. The California Public Utilities 
Commission (CUPC) decided to provide supplier choice, at first only to large 
consumers, later also to all retail customers. The FERC had already started 
promoting wholesale electricity markets throughout the US. In contrast with the UK 
Pool, the California PX (CalPX) was not a mandatory market, but intended to 
compete for trading volume with other markets. There was however a significant 
liquidity supporting measure: California's three main suppliers Pacific Gas and 
Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric 
(SDG&E) had to utilize the PX and the California ISO real-time market for their 
wholesale electric energy needs. 
Figure 2-3 shows that starting May 2000 energy prices climbed to previously unseen 
levels, averaging at 110$/MWh that year. The Figure is taken from Borenstein et al. 
(2002) who investigated market power abuse, which they measure as a margin over 
an estimated perfectly competitive price (dashed line). Their study indicates that 
there were already signs of future trouble as early as August 1998, the critical 
difference being that imports were lower and costs were higher in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: California electricity prices Borenstein et al. (2002) 
As discussed in Bushnell (2004), there was a retail freeze at a level equivalent to 
about 60$/MWh, meaning that in 2000 they lost about 50$/MWh for each MWh 
they carried to their customers. In 2001, California's largest utility PG&E declared 
bankruptcy and SCE came close to declaring it.  Generation companies that were no STANDARD MARKET DESIGN    47 
 
longer paid for their output began to shut down their facilities. Rolling blackouts 
occurred in January, March and May 2001. Bushnell (2004) argues that the financial 
stress of the utilities created the physical supply crisis, although there were also 
many accusations of 'withholding' during the rolling blackout period.  
Many observers underlined the regulatory failure. An in depth discussion of the 
market rules and regulations is provided in Wolak (2003) and in Peterson and 
Augustine (2003). Perhaps most striking is the reaction of the FERC after the price 
surges in the summer of 2000. The FERC eliminated the requirement for the utilities 
to use the PX and the California ISO real-time market for their wholesale electric 
energy needs, which lead to the bankruptcy of CalPX in the beginning of 2001. The 
FERC also proposed replacing the 250 $/MWh hard price cap in both markets by a 
soft cap of 150 $/MWh. This soft price cap required all generators to justify bids in 
excess of 150 $/MWh. In 2001, the Market Surveillance Committee noted that the 
average real-time wholesale energy price during Jan 2001 was approximately 290 
$/MWh despite the existence of a 150 $/MWh soft cap. Many stated that affiliate 
transactions were used to raise the announced spot price of natural gas in California 
and thereby cost-justify higher electricity bids. 
Others stressed that the only factor not seen in other markets in the world is the lack 
of contracts or other forms of long-term supply arrangements
24. Given that the 
utilities had negotiated a retail rate freeze, one would think they would have had 
very strong incentives to hedge the wholesale price. Bushnell (2004) argues that 
there are two possible reasons why they did not. One is that they simply did not 
believe spot prices could possibly exceed the levels set in their retail rate freeze. The 
other possible explanation is that the utilities expected that the retail freeze was not 
firm. However, the appeal of PG&E and SCE to raise retail rates to reflect the 
dramatic increase in wholesale prices after the summer of 2000, was refused by 
CPUC. 
From the beginning of 2001, the state of California started signing long-term 
contracts with durations averaging approximately 10 years. Most of these contracts 
began delivering in the summer of 2001. By the summer of 2001 spot prices 
returned to pre-crisis levels, as illustrated by the shaded line in Fig 1, which depicts 
the real-time prices in the ISO market. 
2.4 Appendix 
Determining the efficient dispatch in the example in section 2.2.3.1 implies solving 
a unit commitment problem. This means maximizing gross demand surplus minus 
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power (Allaz and Vila, 1993). However, this is disputed by others (Harvey and Hogan, 2000). For 
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j q the production and 
D q  the optimal level 
•  1,...4 j =  the sellers 
•  , j j vf  the variable and fixed start-up costs of the seller (Table 2-2) 
•  j z a binary variable that is 1 if the seller supplies (2.2) 
•  j K the maximum capacity of the seller (Table 2-2) 
2.5 Conclusions 
The contribution of this chapter is to put the design of European power exchanges in 
perspective. The conclusion is that auctions organized by power exchanges in 
Europe are different from auctions elsewhere.  
They have in common with power pools that they take into account non-convexities. 
However, the way they do this is very different. First, the exchanges have block 
orders instead of the multi-part orders. In contrast to an auction with multi-part 
orders (pool), an auction with block orders (exchange) is not incentive compatible 
for generators. However, blocks can also be introduced on the demand side and 
therefore also allow consumers to express their multi-period cost structures. 
Furthermore, the use of blocks is so common in Europe that it will be taken as given 
in the remaining of this text. 
Second, the exchanges do not actually clear their auctions. They impose linear prices 
and blocks can become 'paradoxically rejected'. In chapters 5 to 8 this approach is 
further analyzed. Important for that analysis is that exchanges are voluntary markets. 
It means that inefficient trade in these auctions does not necessarily lead to 
inefficient wholesale trade and inefficient dispatch, as there are many trading 
alternatives.  
Third, the exchanges do not take into account network constraints, with the 
exception of Nord Pool. However, Europe is moving towards a system with implicit 
allocation of network capacity, meaning that the treatment of international 
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Finally, different market design standards take shape in Europe and the US, which 
can be partly explained by different experiences. The difference in design should 
however not be exaggerated, as Europe is actually moving towards a more 






Chapter 3  
Laboratory on the competitive 
functioning of the European 
Electricity Market 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous section, auction rules do not always allow traders to 
express their costs. However, if the auction design allows them to express their 
costs, this does not necessarily mean they will. This chapter illustrates such cost 
deviating behavior in a simplified laboratory setting. 
This chapter discusses the Leuven Electricity Spot Market Game (LESMAG), an 
educational tool for the integrated European electricity market, and reports the usage 
of the tool as part of a course in Power Economics. 
LESMAG models an integrated European power market. It takes into account not 
only the technical issues, modeling the production park of the generation firms and 
the transmission network, but also the economic aspect, modeling the bidding, and 
market clearing process, and the resulting profit for the firms.  
LESMAG can be used to teach power economics to engineering students, to explain 
economists the effect of congestion on market clearing, and to train traders in their 
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The goal of the laboratory is that students gain some insight into cost deviating 
bidding behavior of generation firms. Students play the role of generation firms that 
offer to supply electric energy in a mandatory auction. Abstraction is made of non-
convexities and multi-part bidding (see chapter 2) so that the focus is on the effect 
transmission constraints have on their competitive behavior.  
Others have reported successful experiences with electricity games without network 
constraints (Debs et al., 2001; Anders, 2000; Kumar and Sheble, 1998; Contreras et 
al., 2001 and 2002). In this laboratory, these constraints are brought to the forefront, 
as they are an important barrier to competition in Europe (see chapter 1). 
The laboratory
25 has been carried out two times at the KULeuven in Belgium, but 
also at Imperial College in London, UK, as part of a course on electricity markets 
for master students in electrical engineering. The chapter starts by explaining the 
game and ends with discussing the experiences with the laboratory. 
3.2  Explanation of the game 
In this section, respectively a general description of the game is provided and its 
practical implementation. 
3.2.1  Description of the game in general terms 
The electricity game LESMAG simulates the European electricity wholesale market. 
It models the wholesale market in eight countries, the production park of the largest 
fourteen generation firms, and contains a simplified representation of the 
transmission network. 
Generation firms own generation capacity in different countries, and submit bids for 
generating power in all the countries where they have production capacity. The 
players of the game submit bid functions. 
3.2.1.1  Market clearing process of the auctioneer 
The auctioneer clears the market subject to network constraints. Gains from trade are 
maximized, given the offers (t) received from the students (i) for delivery at 
different locations (z) and the demand bids (j) for consumption at location (z), which 
are fixed in the laboratory. Every order has a price and quantity limit ( , PQ). 
If there are no network constraints, it does not matter where the orders are 
introduced. It means that the accepted demand and supply quantities at a certain 
location can deviate freely, as long as demand equals supply totalized over all 
locations. If network constraints are taken into account, the difference between 
supply and demand at a certain location implies an injection in the network (if 
positive) or a withdrawal from the network (if negative) at that location. These 
injections and withdrawals or off-takes cause flows that have to be constrained in a 
limited capacity network. 
The problem to be solved ((3.1)-(3.5)) can be formulated as follows, with the 
accepted order quantities  ( , izt jz qq ) as the decision variables: 
                                                           




jz jz izt izt qq
zj i
Max q P q P
⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑                                                                             (3.1) 
Subject to order constraints 
izt izt qQ ≤                                                                                                     (3.2)  
jzj z qQ ≤                                                                                                 (3.3) 
and network constraints. There are two groups of physical constraints (laws of 
Kirchoff). First, the algebraic sum of injections and off-takes at each location and of 
the incoming or outgoing power flows must be zero.  z ∀ : 
,
() 0 izt jz zx z x
it j x
qqB θθ −− − = ∑∑∑                       (3.4) 
With: 
•  zx B  susceptance of the line interconnecting zone z and x, given that 
( x Z ∈ ) 
•  z θ voltage angle 
Second, the line capacities.  , zx ∀ : 
() zxz x z x BC a p θ θ −≤                          (3.5) 
with:  
•  zx Cap  capacity of the line interconnecting location z and x 
Note that (3.4) and (3.5) are the DC power flow constraints, which are a 
simplification of the real power flow equations as for instance discussed in Purchala 
et al. (2005). Furthermore, the voltage angles are often substituted in these 
constraints, which results in constraints with so-called flow factors or more 
specifically Power Transport Distribution Factors (PTDF). 
This constrained optimization problem ((3.1)-(3.5)) is the so-called market-coupling 
problem or implicit auctioning problem. It can be solved with standard algorithms. 
The solution determines which orders to accept and at which locational prices the 
contracts are settled. The prices (pz) are the shadow or dual prices of (3.4).  
3.2.1.2  Profit function of players and optimization method 
When submitting their offers ( , izt izt PQ), students maximize profits totalized over 
different locations, given a marginal function for every location () iz iz Cq : 
, (( ) )
izt izt
z izt iz iz PQ
zt
Max p q C q
⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑                                                                              (3.6) 
Subject to order constraints. First, at every location the student cannot offer to 




Q Gencap ≤ ∑                                                                                                   (3.7)
 
Second, the student cannot offer to deliver at prices higher than the price cap. This 
price cap is a sufficiently large number, being 1000€/MWh in the laboratory: 
0 Pricecap izt P ≤≤                                                                                                   (3.8) 
Students also know the behavior of the auctioneer. They know how the auctioneer 
determines the accepted order quantities based on their orders and those introduced 
by others: 
(, ) ( , )   izt izt qp f Q P =                                                                                               (3.9) 
When submitting their orders, students do not know the orders submitted by their 
colleagues. Furthermore, the market result only yields aggregated information of the 
orders introduced by their colleagues. 
3.2.2 Practical  implementation
26  
The game encompasses Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Switzerland. There is only one node per country and all line impedances 
are assumed to be equal. The capacity values used for the internal interconnections 
of these countries are based on the NTC values (Box 1-7). 
Students play the role of a generation firm and are randomly assigned one of the 
following firms: ACEA, AES, EDF, Edipower, Electrabel, EnBW, Endesa, Enel, 
E.ON, Essent, Iberdrola, Nuon, RWE and Vattenfall  (Figure 3-1). The instructor is 
the market operator that organizes the mandatory auction where the generators 
compete to supply electric energy. In the following two sections, respectively the 
role of the students and the instructor are explained in more detail. 
                                                            
26 Thomas De Bontridder and Thomas Meersseman (2004) have implemented the first version of the 
auction model for their master thesis. Yulia Kallistratova has been so kind to implement the interface and 
the visualization of the market outcome (Figure 3-7) is based on code kindly provided by Konrad 
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Figure 3-1: Generation firms and countries in the laboratory 
3.2.2.1 Students 
Students are a generation firm (i) that can supply in up to 3 countries (z). E.g. 
Iberdrola can only supply in Spain (Figure 3-2 illustrates the assumed marginal cost 
curve of Iberdrola in Spain ( () iz iz Cq ). Iberdrola has a capacity of 16821MW 
( iz Gencap ), meaning that it can supply up to 16821MWh per hour. It is assumed 
that the generation firm can supply up to 8747MWh at a price of 0€/MWh. These 
marginal costs represent generation where variable costs are zero, e.g. wind and 
hydro generation. Those of higher supply levels represent the variable cost 
associated with gas and coal generation and the marginal costs of the highest level 
represent the variable costs associated with peak generation such as turbo jets.  
In the game, a supply function is introduced by submitting up to 10 price-quantity 
pairs or orders ( , izt izt PQ) at a certain location/country. E.g. if the student playing 
Iberdrola wants to introduce a supply curve equal to its marginal cost curve, he/she 
will introduce the following orders: (0,8747), (10,3028), (25,4542), (60,504). Note 
that this means that in total 16821MWh (8747+3028+4542+504) is offered, which is 
the maximum. Note also that the students actually have to submit the breakpoints of 
the supply curve (in this case (0,8747), (10,11775), (25,16317), (60,16821)) and that 




















Figure 3-2: Assumed marginal costs of Iberdrola in the laboratory 
When logged in, the student selects the generation firm he/she has been assigned to. 
Subsequently, he/she and can proceed to submit a supply curve or to view the results 
of the last session (Figure 3-3). Figure 3-4 illustrates the submission page of 
Electrabel. Several sessions are run so that students can learn from previous ones 
and can interact to improve their profits. Students are allowed to communicate 
during the game and can make agreements. 
At the end of the laboratory, a spreadsheet shows the evolution of their performance 
(Figure 3-5). A work sheet is available per session with: 
•  The marginal cost curves already filled in (Figure 3-5: row 6-7 “Fuel 
costs”) for every country in which the student has to submit a supply curve 
(Figure 3-5 only illustrates Belgium). 
•  Room to fill in the breakpoints of the submitted supply curves (Figure 3-5: 
row 10-11). This curve is then visualized (Figure 3-5: "Bids" as opposed to 
“Marginal costs”). 
•  Room to fill in the market prices (Figure 3-5: row 14 “MCP”) and traded 
volumes (Figure 3-5: row 15 “traded volume”) afterwards as determined by 
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Figure 3-3: Student interface 
 
Figure 3-4: Supply function submission page 58                                                                                                          LABORATORY 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Spreadsheet 
3.2.2.2 Instructor 
The instructor is the auctioneer or market operator who receives the offers to supply 
from the students (Figure 3-6) and consequently closes that market and 
communicates the market outcome. 
  
Figure 3-6:  Administrator interface 
Every student privately receives his accepted or traded volumes per country and has 
access to the aggregated information. The aggregated information is made public as 
illustrated in Figure 3-7. Figure 3-7 illustrates a situation with congestion on the 
connections between France and Spain, France and Italy and France and Belgium EXPLANATION OF THE GAME                                                59 
 
(normally red line, now slightly darker line). As a result of these binding 
transmission constraints, there is no single price for the 8 countries, and prices vary 
from 10€/MWh in France to 48€/MWh in Italy. Under the prices, it is mentioned 
what is injected (+) in the network or withdrawn (-) from the network at per 
location. Next to the lines, the line loading (MW) is mentioned (white numbers). 
 
Figure 3-7:  Visualization of the market outcome (competitive equilibrium) 
Additionally, students have access to the aggregated curves of every country. The 
aggregated supply curve is an aggregation of the supply curves submitted by all 
generation firms active in a country.  Figure 3-8 illustrates this for the Netherlands 
in a certain session, where the generation firms Electrabel, EON, Essent and Nuon 
for the Netherlands are active. 
In that session, the supply curve intersects with the demand curve at a price of 
45€/MWh. At that price, demand and supply are equal (8750MWh). Note that 
demand is curtailed because the requested demand volume at 45€/MWh is actually 
9500MWh. If supply is curtailed and different students offer to supply at the market 
price, their offers are curtailed proportionally to the requested volumes at the market 
price.  
Without imports or exports, the price would be 45€/MWh in the Netherlands. The 
market operator however maximizes gains from trade totalized for the 8 countries, 
which implies in this illustration that the price in the Netherlands increases to 
60€/MWh. At that price 8800MWh supply volume is cleared and 6500MWh 
demand volume. The difference (2300MWh) is exported.   60                                                                                                          LABORATORY 
 
 
Figure 3-8:  Market clearing at a location with export 
3.3 Laboratory  experiences
27 
In the first session of the laboratory, students are asked to submit their marginal 
costs. Figure 3-7 visualizes the market outcome of that session. It is explained to 
students that this is the solution under perfect competition and that they should try to 
improve their profits by interacting with each other. The Excel sheet that keeps track 
of their performance throughout the laboratory sessions benchmarks that 
performance against the profits under perfect competition. 
Electrical engineering students are not always familiar with the concept of market 
power, i.e. the ability to profitably control prices. In the three laboratories that have 
been organized, students were very prudent and did not easily raise their supply 
curves significant above marginal costs. In the laboratory illustrated in Figure 3-9, 
prices in Spain increased significantly from session 1 to 5 without any intervention 
of the instructor, reaching up to 160€/MWh in session 5. 
 
                                                            
27 Thomas Meersseman, Leen Vandezande and Karolien Verhaegen have been so kind to help organizing 
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Figure 3-9: Locational price evolution from session 1 to 5 
Table 3-1 illustrates that there are two dominant players in Spain, being Iberdrola 
and Endesa. Even though the interconnector is not generating capacity as such, it 
reflects the import potential of Spain and should therefore be taken into account 
when analyzing their competitive behavior. The sum of the capacities of the 
interconnectors is actually an upper bound of the import potential. Especially for 
markets as France, the import (or export) potential is lower than the total 
interconnection capacity as the power flows are not distributed over the different 
lines according to capacity but according to the impedances.  
Table 3-1: Generation and interconnection capacities in Spain 
Endesa   45% 
Iberdrola 46% 
Enel   6% 
Interconnector 3% 
 
In the laboratory, Iberdrola and Endesa therefore have 91% of Spain’s supply 
capacity (Table 3-1). High concentration in combination with high demand and a 
low demand elasticity can imply that these players have market power, meaning that 
they can increase their profits by supplying less as this yields much higher prices.   
Figure 3-10 shows that the student playing Iberdrola indeed lifted its supply curve 
gradually from session 1 to 4 with a substantial shift upwards in session 5. As 
illustrated in Figure 3-11, this strategy increased the student's profits with a factor 10 62                                                                                                          LABORATORY 
 
from session 1 to 5. Figure 3-11 also shows that Endesa's profits increased even 
more than the profits of Iberdrola. This is because the volume supplied by Endessa 
increased, while the volume supplied by Iberdrola decreased as a consequence of its 
strategy (Figure 3-12). However, this is not necessarily so as it also depends on other 

































Figure 3-11: Profit Iberdrola and Endesa in Spain 



















Figure 3-12: Accepted volume Iberdrola and Endesa 
As the laboratory progresses, students increasingly start to notice that they can 
exercise market power. Their behavior does however never fully converge to what 
could then be called the equilibrium solution of the laboratory. In the following 
section it is discussed whether such an equilibrium can be modeled. 
3.4 Laboratory  equilibrium 
The actual game that is played should be modeled as a supply function equilibrium. 
These models are however computationally intractable, especially in combination 
with network constraints. For an overview of electricity market models and a 
discussion of supply function equilibrium literature, see Ventosa et al. (2005). 
Cournot models are commonly applied to analyze electricity markets. These models 
assume that generation firms compete on quantities, instead of supply curves. In 
other words, the models do not completely represent the strategy space students 
have in the laboratory. Still, even Cournot models with network constraints are not 
without problems: 
•  As illustrated in Stoft (1999) and Cunningham (2002), an equilibrium does 
not necessarily exist and it is also possible to have multiple equilibriums. 
Note that these findings are inline with the observation that the laboratory 
does not seem to converge to a solution
28. 
                                                            
28 The amount of noise in the laboratory should also not be underestimated as well. There can be human 
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•  In the laboratory, students anticipate the behavior of the market operator. It 
is known to the students that the market operator optimally uses the 
network to maximize total gains from trade. As discussed in Hobbs and 
Helman (2004), Cournot models that take this into account are 
computationally intractable. To overcome this numerical problem, most 
studies assume that generating firms are naïve. For instance, it is implicitly 
assumed that generation firms do not anticipate that there can be congestion 
in the network. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The laboratory discussed in this chapter confronts students during several trading 
sessions with the interactions of their trading strategies. They are exposed to the 
functioning of the liberalized electric energy market and develop a feeling of the 
important role of the transmission network in this market. 
The electricity industry is demanding an increasing number of electrical engineering 
students with knowledge of the competitive functioning of electricity markets. One 
way to develop this knowledge is by means of a game. This chapter described the 
experience with a laboratory developed for that purpose. 
This chapter also introduced the market-coupling problem. The next chapter 
discusses the detailed implementation of the auction problem with network 
constraints. Chapter 9 discusses the market-coupling problem in the presence of 
blocks and political constraints. 
For the argumentation in the next chapter it is important to note that supply offers 
seldom represent the actual marginal costs, as can be observed in experimental 
setting of the laboratory. Equivalently, demand bids seldom represent the actual 
willingness to pay. Furthermore, as discussed in this chapter, it is numerically 
infeasible to adequately model behavior in a simplified laboratory setting without 
block orders. Therefore, behavior of participants in not explicitly modeled in the 






Chapter 4  
Auction problem with network 
constraints 
The previous chapter introduced the auction problem with network constraints and 
provided the optimization model. This problem has intensively been discussed in 
literature. In this chapter the well-known problem is applied to power exchanges, 
largely a European phenomenon. 
Increasingly, the day-ahead auctions organized by exchanges are coupled to allow a 
better clearing of orders introduced at different countries. This implies that the 
exchanges take into account network constraints. Market coupling is implemented 
by solving the Linear Programming (LP) problem introduced in the previous 
chapter. Existing commercial software can then be used to solve the auction 
problem. 
However, the LP problem does not uniquely determine prices and quantities. Due to 
verticals in the aggregated curves of the exchanges, there can be several price 
solutions to the auction problem. Furthermore, due to horizontals in the curves, there 
can be several quantity solutions. This implies that the software that is used to solve 
the problem has a significant impact on the determination of the market outcome, 
which is of course unacceptable. The contribution of this chapter is to discuss the 
problem and potential solutions. Respectively, indeterminacies in quantities and 
prices are discussed. 66                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 
4.1  Problem applied to exchanges 
In an international European context, market clearing with network constraints is 
referred to as market coupling. In Europe, it is about replacing the explicit allocation 
of cross-border capacities by a system where capacities are used to optimize the 
clearing of the orders introduced to the day-ahead auctions organized by exchanges.  
Exchanges from different countries (z) receive hourly orders from the demand 
( , jzj z PQ) as well as the supply side ( , iz iz PQ). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
given these orders and the network topology ( B ) and capacities (Cap ), the market-
coupling problem is as follows, with the accepted order quantities  ( , iz jz qq) as the 
decision variables: 
() jz jz iz iz q
zj i
Max q P q P
⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑                                                                                
(3.10)                                                                                                
Subject to 
iz iz qQ ≤                                                                                                     (3.11)  
jzj z qQ ≤                                                                                                 (3.12) 
() : ( ) 0 iz jz zx z x
ijx
locations z q q B θθ ∀− − − = ∑∑∑                    
(3.13) 
() : ( ) zxz x z x lines zx B Cap θ θ ∀− ≤                        
(3.14) 
The solution ( *, * iz jz qq) determines which orders to accept of the different 
exchanges making optimal use of the available network. The shadow prices of (3.13) 
are then the market prices set for the auction participants. 
4.2  Indeterminacies in quantities 
Consider a simple single market example illustrated in Figure 4-1. Gain from trade 
is maximized at price p*, but from 100 to 150MWh can be cleared. In other words, 
solving this simple problem with (3.10) to (3.14) does not yield a unique solution in 
terms of quantities. In the illustration, the only choice is between more or less traded 
volume. As discussed in the previous chapter, the supply side does not necessarily 
represent the actual costs and the demand side not necessarily the real willingness to 
pay
29. Therefore, in this example the solution that maximizes volume increases trade 
efficiency. 
                                                            
29 As discussed in the previous chapter, market parties can have an incentive to deviate their orders from 














Figure 4-1: Single market example with horizontal intersection 
Consider a simple multiple market example illustrated in Figure 4-2. Maximizing 
gain from trade fixes the total accepted volume (q*) and price (p*), but both 
locations have a supply order that is marginally accepted. If 50MWh is accepted of 
both orders, demand and supply are equal in both locations; otherwise there will be 
an unnecessary flow from one location to the other. Unnecessary flows should be 
avoided as they cause losses. Therefore, the solution that minimizes flow in this 
example increases trade efficiency. Note that losses are not taken into account in the 
market-coupling problem. As discussed in the previous chapter, the network 
constraints are based on DC flow assumptions and one of these assumptions is that 
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Figure 4-2: Two markets example with curtailed supply of different locations 
In the above examples choosing between the different sets of solutions that 
maximize gain from trade is straightforward. However, consider the example 
illustrated in Figure 4-3. Gain from trade is maximized at price p*, but from 150 to 
200MWh can be cleared: 68                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 
•  If the total accepted volume is 150MWh, demand equals supply in both 
locations A (50MWh) and B (150MWh) so that there is no flow on the line 
interconnecting these locations. 
•  If the total accepted volume is 200MWh, there is a 50MWh increase in 
demand and supply respectively in location A and B, meaning that 50MWh 
flows from B to A during that hour so that the load of the line is 50MW. 
The choice between these solutions is not straightforward. More volume increases 
trade efficiency but also less flow and the exchange does not have adequate 
information to choose between the two. In other words, there is no clear answer to 
what practitioners should do. However, the above examples illustrate that besides 
gain from trade maximization, also traded volume and flow are necessary decision 
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Figure 4-3: Two markets example: volume maximization or flow minimization? 
4.3  Indeterminacies in prices 
First, the price properties of the auction problem with network constraints are 
discussed. Second, it is explained and illustrated why the prices of this problem are 
sometimes not uniquely determined. Finally, potential solutions are discussed and an 
approach is proposed. 
4.3.1 Price  properties 
Market coupling is also referred to as Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP)
30 because 
prices are determined as the shadow or dual price of the auction problem. Note that 
in optimization theory, the duality principle states that optimization problems may 
be viewed from either of two perspectives, the primal or the dual problem. In other 
words, the properties of LMP prices can be derived from the optimality conditions 
of the market-coupling problem.  
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The optimal solution to (3.10)-(3.14) is characterized by the existence of prices such 
that (3.15)-(3.17) hold, with  p the dual prices of constraints (3.13) and μ  the dual 
prices of constraints (3.14): 
()
() : ( )












                            (3.15) 
[ ] () : 0 zx z x zx xz
x
lines zx B p p μμ ∀− + − = ∑                    (3.16) 
[ ] () : ( ) 0 zx zx zx zx zx lines zx B Cap μθ θ ∀− − =                        (3.17) 
(3.15) to (3.17) are the optimality conditions of the auction problem with network 
constraints. Equations (3.15) and (3.16) follow from the first order conditions of the 
Lagrangian
31 and Equation (3.17) is the complementary slackness condition. These 
optimality conditions can be translated as follows: 
•  (3.15) states that every location or market has a uniform price, i.e. all 
demand and supply orders are settled at the same price.  
•  (3.16) formulates the necessary relation between the prices. 
•  (3.17) states that a line that is not fully used has a zero price. If the line is 
fully used, it can but does not have to have a price different from zero, i.e. 
the price of a fully loaded line ( z μ ) is undetermined. 
As discussed in Stoft (2002), LMP is widely accepted as being able to provide the 
necessary incentives for an efficient short-term allocation of resources and long-term 
investments in electricity markets. However, LMP prices are not always as intuitive 
as one might think. Based on simplified examples in non-meshed networks, these 
prices have sometimes been attributed properties that the approach cannot deliver. 
Illustrative is the paper of Wu et al. (1996) on what these authors call ‘folk 
theorems’ of LMP. Furthermore, O'Neill et al. (2005b) discuss prices observed in 
PJM (applies LMP) that at first sight can be considered abnormal but are actually 
normal LMP prices.  
It is for instance often thought that electric energy can only flow from locations with 
lower prices to locations with higher prices, i.e. there are no counter-flows. The 
following two sections, illustrate that this is the case for non-meshed networks, 
while it is not necessarily true for meshed
32 networks. 
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4.3.1.1 Non-meshed  network 
Consider an example with 3 exchanges in a non-meshed network. Location 1 and 3 
are connected with location 2 and there is no line between location 1 and 3. In that 
case, (3.16) simplifies into: 
2 1 12 21 ppμ μ −= −                                   (3.18) 
12 3 1 2 2 3 2 1 3 2 20 pp p μμμμ −+ − − + + − =                                                             (3.19) 
3 2 23 32 ppμ μ −= −                                                                                               (3.20) 
(3.18) and (3.20) illustrate for this example that the locational price difference 
always equates to the price of the line interconnecting these locations in a non-
meshed network. Therefore, given that a line cannot be fully loaded in both 
directions at the same time and the price of a line cannot be negative it follows that a 
non-meshed network cannot have counter-flow.  
4.3.1.2 Meshed  network 
As a simple example with counter-flows, consider 3 exchanges PX1, PX2 and PX3 
to which the orders shown in Table 4-1 are introduced. Figure 4-4 illustrates the 
implied demand and supply curves at every location and how these locations are 
interconnected. All line susceptances are assumed to be one. 
Table 4-1: Demand and supply at PX1-3 Example 1 
PX1 PX2 PX3 















Solving (3.10)-(3.14) yields the solution illustrated in Figure 4-4. The exchange with 
the highest price (PX3: 50€/MWh) is exporting and there is a counter flow between 
location 2 and 3, i.e. the flow is from PX1 to PX3, respectively the lowest 
(10€/MWh) and highest (50€/MWh) price location. 
Without network constraints, the optimal solution is to accept the demand orders and 
to match demand (300MWh) with the supply orders of PX1 (200MWh) and PX2 
(100MWh), meaning that 100 MWh is transferred from PX1 to PX3. A transfer 
between PX1 and PX3 reduces the cost of supply with 40€/MWh, which is the 
difference between the price limits of the supply orders at these locations. However, 
the network does not allow a large transfer between PX1 and PX3. All line 
susceptances are assumed to be one. Therefore, 2/3 of what is injected at location 3 
and withdrawn at location 1 flows on the line between 1 and 3. Because this line has INDETERMINANCIES IN PRICES    71 
 
a very limited capacity of 10MW, only 15MWh can be exchanged between the 
lowest and highest price location. 
Alternatively, gains from trade can be increased by transferring electric energy 
between PX1 and PX2, respectively the lowest (10€/MWh) and second highest price 
(30€/MWh
33) location. Such a transfer reduces the cost of supply with 30€/MWh. 
Furthermore, only 1/3 of a transfer between PX1 and PX2 flows over the weakest 
line in the network so a transfer of 30MWh is possible, which is the double of the 
possible transfer between PX1 and PX3. In other words, more gains from trade can 
be created with a transfer between PX1 and PX2 in this network, i.e. 900€   
(=30MWhx30€/MWh) instead of 600€ (=15MWhx40€/MWh). 
A more counter-intuitive result is perhaps that PX3 is exporting. A transfer between 
PX3 and PX1 in itself indeed increases the cost of supply with 40€/MWh. However, 
2/3 of this transfer creates a flow on the line between location 1 and 3 and this flow 
counters the flow caused by a transfer between PX1 and PX2. Therefore, a 2/3 
capacity is freed on the weakest line. Furthermore, a transfer between PX1 and PX2 
only uses 1/3 of this capacity so that 2MWh more can be transferred between these 
exchanges, which decreases the cost of supply with 30€/MWh. In other words, a 
transfer between PX3 and PX1 increases gain from trade in this network, i.e. 
20€/MWh  (=2MWhx30€/MWh-1MWhx40€/MWh). 
                                                           
33 Why this price is 30€/MWh and for instance not equal to the cost of supplying (as at the other 
locations), is explained in the next section. 72                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 
 
Demand                                                       
Market price                  
Aggregated curves                   
Demand                                                       
Supply 
Accepted volumes  
Supply             S          
Demand          D          
Injection         INJ 
Fully loaded line 
Cap = 100         
Flow = 55
Cap = 10          
Flow = 10
MWh 
Cap = 50 
Flow =  45
PX2 
S     – D =  INJ 
0 – 100 =    -  100 
PX1
PX3
S   – D =  INJ 
135 – 100 =  35 
S   – D =  INJ
165 – 100 = 65
€  /  MWh 





100    200
90
10





Aggregated curves                   
Supply 
Accepted volumes  
Supply             S          
Demand          D          
Injection         INJ 
Fully loaded line 
Cap = 100         
Flow = 55
Cap = 10          
Flow = 10
MWh 
Cap = 50 
Flow =  45
PX2 
S     – D =  INJ 
0 – 100 =    -  100 
PX1
PX3
S   – D =  INJ 
135 – 100 =  35 
S   – D =  INJ
165 – 100 = 65
€  /  MWh 




100    200
90
10






Figure 4-4: LMP 3 locations meshed with orders Example 1 
4.3.2  Different price sets with the same properties 
Indeterminacies in LMP prices exist if there is more than one price set that satisfies 
(3.15) to (3.17). First, it is explained how based on (3.15), price ranges can be 
defined. Then, it is illustrated that having price ranges does not necessarily mean 
that there are different sets of prices that satisfy (3.15) to (3.17). Finally, an example 
with several price sets is discussed. 
4.3.2.1 Price  ranges 
As introduced in section 4.3.1, (3.15) only states that every location or market has a 
uniform price, i.e. demand and supply orders are settled at the same price. Demand 
and supply curves have verticals so that this condition in itself is not always 
sufficient to determine a unique set of prices. Sometimes this condition defines a 
price range. To explain how these price ranges are derived and how relevant they 
are, consider the following example summarized in Table 4-2 with two demand and 
supply orders submitted to the exchange for a certain period. INDETERMINANCIES IN PRICES    73 
 





In Figure 4-5, the orders are aggregated into supply and demand curves according to 
merit order. In the example, 100MWh can be cleared at 40€/MWh. In case the 
exchange is coupled to another exchange, the clearing can deviate from this 
intersection point of demand and supply, meaning that the exchange can export or 
import electric energy. 
Figure 4-6 illustrates the locational price in function of what is exported or imported, 
i.e. net export curve: 
•  The exchange can export up to 50MWh at 40€/MWh, which equals the 
non-accepted volume of the curtailed supply order of 100MWh at 
40€/MWh. If 50MWh is exported, this order is completely accepted, 
meaning that the price can also be higher than 40€/MWh. As long as the 
order is curtailed, the price has to be equal to 40€/MWh because a higher 
price implies a lost opportunity for the curtailed supplier. 
•  Up to 50MWh can be imported by further curtailing the supply order of 
100MWh at 40€/MWh. If 50MWh is imported, this order is completely 
rejected, meaning that the price can also be lower than 40€/MWh. The 
price should at the same time be higher than 30€/MWh because the demand 
order of 20MWh at 30€/MWh is accepted.  
•  Etc. 
In other words, the verticals of the net export curve are the price ranges. If the 
exchange level of an exchange is at such a vertical, (3.15) yield a price range equal 
to this vertical. 74                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 


























Aggregated demand curve 
 
Figure 4-5: Aggregated demand and supply curve constructed from the orders 
in Table 4-2 
























Figure 4-6: price range in function of export and import derived from the 
curves in Figure 4-5 INDETERMINANCIES IN PRICES    75 
 
The impact of how prices are determined on verticals, depends on the size of these 
verticals. APX publishes the aggregated curves on their website, e.g. Figure 4-7. 
Figure 4-8 illustrates that in January 2003
34 the verticals were 40€/MWh large on 
average and that 5% of these segments were larger than 200€/MWh. The size of the 
verticals is therefore not negligible, even though the largest segments are often at the 
end of the net export curve.  
 
Figure 4-7: Aggregated curves example: APX (Netherlands) 07h 28-02-2006; 
2444MWh cleared at 53€/MWh 
                                                           
34 Sample is taken from master thesis S. Cole (2005).  76                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 















Figure 4-8: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Size of verticals on NEC, 
e.g. APX January 2003 
4.3.2.2 Price  sets 
4.3.2.2.1  Illustration with price range but single price set 
In the example discussed in section 4.3.1.2, there is only one set of possible LMP 
prices (Figure 4-9). This is because the optimality conditions of the market-coupling 
problem determine a set of unique prices, which is explained as follows: 
(3.15): only PX2 is cleared at a vertical in the net export curve, PX1 and PX3 do 
yield a price range. Therefore:  
13 2 10, 50,0 40 pp p == ≤ ≤                         (3.21) 
(3.16): only the line between location 1 and 3 is fully loaded in the direction 1-3, the 
other two lines are not fully loaded. Therefore:  
12 21 23 32 31 13 //// 0 , 0 μ μμμμ μ =≥                      (3.22) 
(3.17) for this example yields:  
1231 21 32 13 1 20 pppμμμμ −−+ + − − =                      (3.23) 
12 3 1 2 2 3 2 1 3 2 20 pp p μμμμ −+ − − + + − =                                                             (3.24) 
12 33 23 12 31 3 20 pp pμμμμ −− + + + − − =                                                           (3.25) 
Substituting (3.21) and (3.22) into (3.23)-(3.25) yields: INDETERMINANCIES IN PRICES    77 
 
21 3 20 50 0 p μ −−+ =                                    (3.26) 
2 10 2 50 0 p −− − =                                                                        (3.27) 
21 3 10 100 0 p μ −− + − =                                                                            (3.28) 
(3.26)-(3.28) is a set of two linear independent equations with two unknowns, 
meaning that prices are determined:  2 30 p =  and  13 60 μ = . 
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Figure 4-9: Example 1 yields a price range but only single price set 
4.3.2.2.2 Illustration  with several price sets 
Consider 3 exchanges PX1, PX2 and PX3 to which the orders shown in Table 4-3, 
are introduced. Figure 4-10 illustrates the implied demand and supply curves in 78                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 
every location and how these locations are interconnected. All line susceptances are 
assumed to be one. 
Table 4-3: Demand and supply at PX1-3 Example 2 
PX1 PX2 PX3 















Figure 4-10 shows the optimal solution. The exchange (PX3) with the highest price 
is importing from the other two exchanges. Without network constraints, the optimal 
solution is to accept the demand orders and to match demand (400MWh) with the 
supply orders of PX1 (300MWh) and PX2 (100MWh), meaning that 200MWh is 
transferred from PX1 to PX3. The network does however not allow such a large 
transfer, i.e. maximally 50MWh can be transferred. Therefore, PX3 additionally 
imports 50MWh from PX2, the second cheapest price location. 
The optimality conditions of the market-coupling problem (3.15) to (3.17) for this 
example yield: 
2 30 90 p ≤≤                              (3.29) 
3 50 90 p ≤≤                         (3.30) 
231 3 20 0 ppμ −−+ =                                                                                      (3.31)                     
23 10 2 0 pp −+ − =                                                             (3.32) 
23 1 3 10 2 0 pp μ −− + − =                                                            (3.33) 
23 0 μ ≥                                                                                                                  (3.34) 
(3.31)-(3.33) is a set of 2 linear independent equations with 3 bounded unknowns so 
that prices are not uniquely determined, meaning that multiple price sets are 
possible. Indeed, solving the example in Matlab using the linprog solver yields 
prices of 10, 41,4 and 72,9€/MWh, respectively for PX1, PX2 and PX3 and solving 
it with CPLEX yields prices of 10, 30, 50€/MWh. In other words, the example 
clearly illustrates that prices can differ significantly depending on which software is 
used to solve the problem.  INDETERMINANCIES IN PRICES    79 
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Figure 4-10: Example 2 yields two price ranges and several price sets 
4.3.3  Choosing between possible price sets 
Also in non-coupled exchanges the price can be undetermined on a range, i.e. when 
the demand and supply curve intersect vertically. Most exchanges then take the 
middle price. In Spain, Omel however selects the lowest possible price. Note that 
with the middle price more parties win. 
The middle price rule applied by exchanges cannot be easily extended. This can be 
illustrated with Example 2 of the previous section. As there are two price ranges, 
there are two possible ways to start applying the middle price rule in this example: 
•  Taking  2 p  at the middle of its price range (60€/MWh) means that from (3.32) 
follows that 3 p  is 110€/MWh, which is conflicting with its price range and 
therefore not feasible. 80                                  AUCTION PROBLEM WITH NETWORK CONSTRAINTS 
 
•  Taking  3 p  at the middle of the price range (70€/MWh) means that from (3.32) 
follows that also  2 p  is determined (40€/MWh), but not at the middle of its price 
range.  
In the above example, it is not possible to take the middle price of both price ranges. 
It is only possible to take the middle price at location 3 and to determine the price at 
location 2 in function of this decision. In general, it is not neutral towards the 
different locations to take the middle price at one location and to determine the 
prices of the other locations in function of this arbitrary choice. 
Prices should be determined by a global objective, which is neutral towards 
locations and therefore acceptable for all exchanges. Practitioners should then 
maximize this global objective, subject to (3.15) to (3.17), given the price ranges 
and the line loadings that result from solving the market-coupling problem (3.10)-
(3.14). 
Most global objectives are either discriminative towards the demand or supply side, 
such as maximizing or minimizing prices or demand or supply surplus. Alternatively 
congestion revenue could be minimized or maximized. Recall that the choice is 
between LMP price sets that yield equal efficient signals to demand and supply (as 
discussed in chapter 1: implicit auctioning). Note also that congestion revenue is a 
short-term cost for market parties that can be used in their long-term benefit via grid 
investment. However, as congestion revenue is not always used efficiently (Box 
1-6), it can be argued that minimizing congestion revenue increases efficiency. 
Therefore, the proposed global objective is to minimize congestion revenue (CR): 
() jzi z z
zj i
qq p −⋅ ∑∑ ∑                                     (3.35) 
When applied to the above example, the proposed approach (Min CR) implies 
solving the following LP problem: 
23 ( 50 10 50 100 ) Min p p −⋅−⋅ + ⋅                                         (3.36) 
Subject to (3.29)-(3.34) 
Table 4-4 summarizes the sets of prices that respectively result from taking the 
shadow or dual prices given by linprog and CPLEX when solving (3.10)-(3.14) and 
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Table 4-4: Different sets of LMP prices for Example 2 
(€/MWh)  Linprog  CPLEX  Min CR  Max CR 
PX1 10.0000  10  10  10 
PX2 41.4413  30  30  50 
PX3 72.8825  50  50  90 
4.4 Conclusions 
Market coupling is implemented as an auction problem with network constraints. 
The shadow or dual prices of this problem can then be used as market prices, i.e. 
Locational Marginal Pricing. Due to verticals in the demand and supply curves, 
there are in fact several sets of LMP prices. It has been illustrated that these verticals 
are not negligible in size. Furthermore, the simple rules as currently applied by 
exchanges to deal with verticals cannot be used for coupled exchanges. 
An approach has been provided to consciously decide which LMP prices to take as 
market prices. It has been argued that a pricing approach that minimizes congestion 
revenue is the best alternative to using solver prices. 
Less clear is how horizontals should be dealt with. As illustrated, both flow and 
traded volume, besides gains from trade, are necessary to uniquely determine 
quantities. It can be argued that both (more volume and less flow) increase trade 




Chapter 5  
Auction problem with blocks 
The previous two chapters dealt with network constraints. As discussed in the 
introduction, most exchanges also have to deal with block orders. European power 
exchanges with block orders are APX (Netherlands), Powernext (France), EEX 
(Germany), EXAA (Austria), Borzen (Slovenia) and Nord Pool (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland). 
This part of the text bundles four chapters on the auction problem with blocks. This 
chapter introduces the problem and how exchanges deal with blocks. First block 
orders are introduced. Second, it is discussed how exchanges deal heuristically with 
blocks. Third, this approach is formalized as a constrained optimization model. 
Fourth, a batch of representative scenarios is introduced. Finally, the concept of 
Paradoxically Rejected Blocks (PRBs) is analyzed in detail.  
5.1 Block  orders 
A block order consists of a quantity that is offered or requested in multiple hours at 
an average price limit. Besides this inter-temporal rigidity, blocks also have a fill-or-
kill constraint, meaning that the order has to be accepted completely and in all hours 
included in the order, or not at all.  
An auction with block orders could therefore be called a combinatorial auction. 
Combinatorial auctions are auctions in which participants can place orders on 
combinations of heterogeneous items, called packages or bundles, rather than just on 
individual items. An inspiring and comprehensive work on that topic is the book 84                                                                   AUCTION PROBLEM WITH BLOCKS 
 
edited by Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg (2005). These auctions have recently 
been employed in a variety of industries. For example, they have been used for 
truckload transportation, bus routes, and industrial procurement, and have been 
proposed for airport arrival and departure slots, as well as for allocating radio 
spectrum for wireless communications services. De Vries en Vohra (2003) provide a 
survey on combinatorial auctions. 
The advantage of combinatorial auctions is that participants can more fully express 
their preferences, such as complementarities between heterogeneous items. In 
electricity markets, there are complementarities between deliveries of electric energy 
in consecutive periods, for instance because of start-up costs of power plants (see 
chapter two: the costs of generators are non-convex). Block orders can indeed be 
seen as a combination of hourly orders. Instead of having to price the hourly orders 
separately, blocks allow participants to express an average price for a combination 
of hours. Therefore, blocks are characterized by a price and quantity, but also by the 
hours that are included in the order. 
All exchanges restrict the size (MWh/h) or the type (span in terms of hours) or the 
amount (the number of blocks that can be submitted per participant per day times the 
number of participants) of blocks that can be introduced. Table 5-1 illustrates the 11 
types of block contracts that can be traded on the German exchange EEX. On this 
exchange, blocks can be up to 250MWh/h in size. On other exchanges, the 
maximum size is more restricted. For instance, on the Dutch exchange APX the 
maximum block size is 50MWh. However, APX participants can submit more 
blocks per day, which suggests that there is some sort of trade-off that needs to be 
made. Block order restrictions (size, amount and type) are further discussed in 
chapter 7. With regard to this chapter, it is important to recognize that block order 
restrictions exist when constructing representative scenarios in section 1.1. 
Important to note is that exchanges and participants consider blocks as important. 
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Table 5-1: Block products at EEX – auction market 
Contract name  Time interval under block contract 
EEX Night  Hours 1 to 6 (00.00-06.00 h) 
EEX Morning  Hours 7 to 10 (06.00-10.00 h) 
EEX High-Noon  Hours 11 to 14 (10.00-14.00 h) 
EEX Afternoon  Hours 15 to 18 (14.00-18.00 h) 
EEX Evening  Hours 19 to 24 (18.00-24.00 h) 
EEX Rush Hour  Hours 17 to 20 (16.00-20.00 h) 
Baseload  Hours 1 to 24 (00.00-24.00 h) 
Peakload  Hours 9 to 20 (08.00-20.00 h) 
Off-Peak 1  Hours 1 to 8 (00.00-08.00 h) 
Off-Peak 2  Hours 21 to 24 (20.00-24.00 h) 
Business  Hours 9 to 16 (08.00-16.00 h) 
 
Note that almost all combinatorial auctions are single sided and that often 
participants can only bid on combinations of indivisible items. Power exchanges are 
therefore twice exceptional. First of all, they are double sided as blocks and hourly 
orders can be introduced at the demand side as well as at the supply side. Second, 
blocks (indivisible) are auctioned together with hourly orders (divisible). Therefore, 
power exchanges are an interesting reference market for combinatorial auction 
literature, but have not yet been described in this very recent literature. 
5.2  Heuristic approach applied by exchanges 
Exchanges only have a limited time frame available to solve the problem and 
publish results. They search for a good but not necessarily optimal combination of 
block orders to accept, i.e. specialized heuristic search. If N is the number of blocks 
in the problem, the number of combinations to be checked is 2
N. Given that 
exchanges easily deal with up to 100 blocks per day, the number of blocks to be 
checked is of the order of 1.3 E30. 
Note also that to find the optimal solution it is not straightforward to eliminate 
combinations before checking them. Consider an example with three blocks A, B 
and C. It is not always possible to exclude ABC after checking AB. C can be a 
demand block, while A and B are supply blocks so that ABC is possible, while AB 
is not. Alternatively, A can be a demand block that cannot be accepted with supply 
block B, but can be accepted if also supply block C is added, etc. There are of course 
exceptions. For instance, consider two identical supply blocks A and B. If A is not 
possible, the same will count for AB. 
The heuristic search algorithm is similar for all exchanges, but the details of the 
procedures are not publicly available. As described in Madlener and Kaufmann 86                                                                   AUCTION PROBLEM WITH BLOCKS 
 
(2002), all exchanges decompose the problem into a block selector and a 
coordination module that determines the price for a fixed block set. 
Figure 5-1 summarizes the basic steps of the algorithm: 
•  The block selector selects a combination of blocks. The accepted blocks are 
transformed into price taking hourly orders, i.e. for every block an order is 
'created' for every hour included in the block and with a zero price for 
supply blocks and the maximum price for demand blocks. The price taking 
hourly orders are added to the hourly orders. 
•  The determination of prices is then based on hourly orders. If no network 
constraints need to be taken into account, the hourly prices are at 
intersection of the aggregated supply and demand curves. Otherwise, an 
auction problem with network constraints needs to be solved, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. If these constraints are binding, prices can differ 
per location. 
•  The feasibility check at the end examines whether the average price 
constraints of the blocks that have been accepted are met. If the accepted 
supply blocks receive enough money and accepted demand blocks do not 
have to pay too much, a feasible combination of blocks has been found and 
the solution can be stored. 
•  The procedure stops when a time limit has been reached or when all 
combinations of blocks have been tried. The final solution is the best 
feasible solution that has been stored in terms of gains from trade. 
 
Determination   





Block             
selection 
 
Figure 5-1: Heuristic procedure applied by European power exchanges to deal 
with blocks 
As a simple example consider a 2-period auction with four simple hourly orders and 
one block order spanning both hours (Example 1: Table 5-2). There are two delivery 
periods (Pe1, Pe2): 100 MWh is requested at 90€/MWh in Pe1 and 150MWh at 
90€/MWh in Pe2. Supplier 1 (S1) offers to supply 60MWh at 10€/MWh in Pe1, HEURISTIC APPROACH APPLIED BY EXCHANGES  87 
 
Supplier 2 (S2) offers 60MWh at 40€/MWh in Pe2 and Supplier 3 (S3) offers to 
supply 100 MWh in Pe1 and Pe2 as a block at an average price of 30€/MWh. 
 
Table 5-2: Example of Auction with Block Order 
Period 1 (Pe1)  Period 2 (Pe2) 













Figure 5-2 illustrates both possibilities, being accepting or rejecting the block. 
Without the block, the price in Pe1 and Pe2 is 90€/MWh. The prices are found at 
intersection of the order curves derived from the hourly orders (Figure 5-2). 
Accepting the block means that a supply order of price zero is added to both periods 
so that the supply curve shifts to the right and prices drop to respectively 0-10 and 
40€/MWh in Pe1 and Pe2. Most exchanges take the middle price of a vertical 
segment, meaning that the price in Pe1 would be 5€/MWh so that the average price 
is 22,5€/MWh ((5+40)/2). This is not a feasible solution as the average price is 
lower than the price limit of the supply block. Therefore the only feasible solution is 
to reject the block. Note that the middle price assumption has no impact in this 
example, as the average market price cannot be higher than 25€/MWh. 














































Figure 5-2: Prices with and without block offer Example in Table 5-2 88                                                                   AUCTION PROBLEM WITH BLOCKS 
 
In the above example the only feasible solution is to reject the block. As a result the 
average price is 90€/MWh. At this average market price, the block is in the money 
because the market price is higher than the price limit of the block. The block could 
make a profit by supplying at the determined prices and is therefore paradoxically 
rejected. Still, the block cannot be accepted as long as uniform or linear prices are 
imposed. 
As discussed in chapter 2, exchanges could avoid PRBs by applying nonlinear 
pricing as in power pools. Under nonlinear pricing side payments can be made to 
block orders. In the above example, accepting the block results in an average price 
of 22,5€/MWh, while the price limit of the block is 30€/MWh. If settled at the 
market prices, the block would therefore incur a loss of 7,5€/MWh. To compensate 
for this loss, a total side payment of 1500€ (7,5€/MWh*200MWh) is needed. 
Depending on the approach used, this side payment is then recovered with a uniform 
charge for the demand side (uplift), or orders are charged proportional to their 
incurred profit, etc. 
5.3 Formal  problem 
In this section, respectively the auction problem with hourly orders and with hourly 
orders and block orders is formalized as a constrained optimization problem. 
5.3.1  Auction problem with hourly orders 
Hourly orders are characterized by the hour (h) in which they are introduced, 
whether they are supply (i) or demand (j) and by a price (€/MWh) and quantity 
(MWh) limit ( h P , h Q ) The (hourly) auction problem with only hourly orders, can be 
formulated as a constrained optimization problem maximizing gains from trade, 
with accepted order quantities as the decision variables ( ih q ,  jh q ): 
jhj h i h i h q
ji
Max q P q P
⎛⎞
− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑                         (4.1) 
Subject to the market clearing constraint, equalizing demand and supply: 
ih jh
ij
qq = ∑∑                            (4.2) 
and the order constraints: 
ih ih qQ ≤                            (4.3) 
  jhj h qQ ≤                            (4.4) 
5.3.2  Auction problem with hourly orders and blocks 
The following two sections introduce the basic problem (MILP1), which requires 
nonlinear pricing and the problem as solved by exchanges, which allows linear 
pricing (MILP2). Both models are Mixed Integer Linear Problems (MILP). FORMAL PROBLEM    89 
 
5.3.2.1 MILP1 
Block orders are characterized by the hours included in the block (H ), whether they 
are supply (k) or demand (l) and by an average price (€/MWh) and quantity 
(MWh/h) limit ( P ,Q ). 
Adding blocks to the auction problem means that the hourly auction problems have 
to be solved jointly. Furthermore, binary variables ( 1 b = 1 if block is accepted;  1 b =0 
otherwise) are used to implement the fill-or-kill constraint of block orders, making 
them indivisible, i.e. they have to be accepted fully or not at all. To simplify the 
notation, an hourly quantity ( 0 h Q =  ifhH ∉ ) limit is used for all blocks even if 
they only apply to a few of 24 hours. 
Given the above, every day exchanges have to solve the following auction problem 
with blocks, with accepted order quantities as the decision variables ( ih q , jh q , kh q , 
lh q ): 
jh j h l hl h i hi h k hk h
hj l i k
Max q P q P q P q P
⎛⎞
+−− ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑ ∑∑∑∑                    (4.5) 
Subject to market clearing constraints, equalizing demand and supply in every hour 
of the day is given by: 
: ih kh jh lh
ik jl
hq q q q ∀ +=+ ∑∑∑∑                       (4.6) 
and the order constraints: 
ih ih qQ ≤                            (4.7) 
jhj h qQ ≤                            (4.8) 
1 kh k kh qb Q =                                                     (4.9) 
1 lh l lh qb Q =                           (4.10) 
Note that (4.9) and (4.10) are different from (4.7) and (4.8). The accepted quantity of 
an hourly order can have any positive value smaller or equal to the quantity limit, 
while a block has a fill-or-kill constraint. The binary variable can only be zero or 
one so that because of (4.9) and (4.10), the accepted quantity can only be equal to 
the quantity limit of the block or to zero. Furthermore a single binary variable is 
used so that putting the variable to 1, means equalizing the decision variable to the 
order quantity in all hours included in the block. Note that because  0 h Q =  for the 
hours not included in the blocks, the decision variable will automatically be zero for 
the hours not included in the block.  
Solving (4.5) to (4.10) for the example illustrated in section 5.2, implies accepting 
both demand orders completely, S2 for 50 MWh (5/6), and to accept the 100 MWh 
block order, yielding total gains from trade of 14500€ (100x90+150x90-100x2x30-
50x40). The shadow prices of the market clearing constraints (4.6) are 0-10€/MWh 
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cleared on a vertical, different solver software can yield a different price. However, 
the average price is between 22.5 and 25€/MWh, which is not enough to pay the 
block.  
As explained previously, nonlinear prices are necessary to clear this solution. In 
other words, the example shows that the solution to the problem (4.5) to (4.10) does 
not necessarily allow linear prices.  
5.3.2.2 MILP2 
As illustrated in section 5.2, exchanges look for a market outcome that allows linear 
prices. This market outcome is further characterized as follows: 
•  First, block orders can be paradoxically rejected, but accepted blocks are 
always in the money (otherwise the solution is not feasible). 
•  Second, the hourly order incentive conditions are satisfied.  
Constraints with the hourly prices ( h p ) as decision variables need to be added to the 
problem  (4.5)-(4.10) to guarantee the above. First, constraints are necessary to 
guarantee that accepted blocks are in the money, with nH  the number of hours 








∀≤ ∑                        (4.11) 
(4.11) reads as follows: the price limit ( k P ) of a block offer is a lower bound for the 





∈ ∑ ) of the hours included in the block, if the offer is 
accepted ( 11 k b = ), while there is no such bound if the order is rejected ( 10 k b = ). In 
other words, if the supply block is accepted, the average market price should be at 
least as high as the price limit of the blocks. 




l p nH P P b
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∀≤ + − ∑                                (4.12)  
(4.12) reads as follows: the price limit ( l P ) of a block bid is an upper bound for the 





∈ ∑ ) of the hours included in the block, if the order is 
accepted ( 11 l b = ), while there is no such bound if the order is rejected ( 10 l b = ). In 
other words, if the demand block is accepted, the average market price should not be 
higher than the price limit of the block. 
Second, constraints are necessary to satisfy the incentive conditions of hourly 
orders, with  1h b  a binary variable equal to one if the hourly order is accepted (and 
zero otherwise) and  2h b  a binary variable equal to one if the hourly order is partially 
accepted (and zero otherwise). 
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,: 1 ih ih h ih b P p ∀≤                        (4.13) 
(4.13) reads: the price limit of a hourly offer ( ih P ) is a lower bound for the hour 
price ( h p ), if the offer is (partially or completely) accepted ( 11 ih b = ), while there is 
no such bound if the order is rejected ( 10 ih b = ).  
max ,: ( 1 1) hj h j h jh p P P b ∀≤ + −                      (4.14) 
(4.14) reads: the price limit of a hourly bid ( jh P ) is an upper bound for the hour 
price, if the order is (partially or completely) accepted ( 11 jh b = ), while there is no 
such bound if the order is rejected ( 10 jh b = ).  
max ,: ( 1 2 ) hi h i h i h ih p P P b b ∀≤ + −                                  (4.15) 
(4.15) reads: the price limit of the hourly offer ( ih P ) is an upper bound for the hour 
price ( h p ), if the order is rejected ( 12 0 ih ih bb = = ) or partially rejected 
( 12 1 ih ih bb == ), while there is no such constraint if the order is completely accepted 
( 11 , 20 ih ih bb == ). 
max ,: ( 1 2) jhj h j h h jh P P b b p ∀− − ≤                                  (4.16) 
(4.16) reads: the price limit of the hourly bid ( jh P ) is a lower bound for the hour 
price ( h p ), if the order is rejected ( 12 0 jh jh bb = = ) or partially rejected 
( 12 1 jh jh bb == ), while there is no such constraint if the order is completely 
accepted ( 11 , 20 jh jh bb == ). 
In other words, (4.13) to (4.16) implies that hourly orders are accepted when they 
are in the money and hourly orders out of the money are rejected. Furthermore, 
satisfying these constraints implies that partially accepted orders set the price, i.e. 
the hourly price equals the price limit of the order. 
Solving (4.5) to (4.16) for the example illustrated in section 5.2, implies curtailing 
demand in both periods to 60 MWh, and to accept S1 and S2 completely, yielding a 
total gain from trade of 6600€ (60x90+60x90-60x10-60x40). The resulting prices 
are 90€/MWh in both periods, which are the price limits of the curtailed demand 
bids. In other words, the constraints are binding and have resulted in one PRB and a 
loss in gains from trade of 7900€ (14500-6600). This is the price to pay for imposing 
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5.4 Representative  scenarios 
APX is the only power exchange that makes its aggregated order curves of every 
hour publicly available. Other exchanges sometimes make these curves available to 
their participants, but not publicly. 19 historical days have been randomly selected 
(Table 5-3). These days are from different years, seasons, week-weekend. The 
hourly orders are extracted from these curves. Every scenario includes the hourly 
orders of one of these days. Pmax is assumed to equal 2500€/MWh, as at APX. 
Table 5-3: Days used to distract hourly orders for scenarios 








15/01/03 32  108  32636 
27/03/03  30 41 31240 
20/05/03  33 91 32874 
04/07/03 33  100  27691 
22/11/03  36 96 34102 
22/02/04  20 26 34474 
19/04/04  29 41 35864 
15/06/04  35 70 31357 
18/08/04  31 44 35279 
21/10/04  32 42 38886 
10/12/04  36 75 46350 
29/01/05  33 44 50146 
10/02/05  36 45 42239 
25/03/05  39 60 46373 
03/04/05  26 50 40843 
07/05/05  32 42 42964 
25/05/05  43 80 35119 
26/06/05  31 46 47448 
20/07/05  45 63 47792 
 
As mentioned in section 5.1, blocks represent up to 20% of the volume traded on the 
exchanges. Accepted block volume is included in the aggregated order curves, as 
price taking orders, but cannot be distinguished from real price taking orders. 
Instead of trying to extract block information from these curves, blocks have been 
randomly generated. To every scenario a randomly generated set of blocks is added. 
Block sets have been generated as follows: 
•  100 has been assumed to be a realistic amount of blocks. The number of 
blocks in a scenario has been determined as a random integer, smaller than 
200. 
•  Equal distribution between demand and supply blocks has been assumed 
realistic. When generated, every block has 50% probability of being a REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS    93 
 
purchase block order or a supply block order. In other words, not all 
scenarios have such an equal distribution but the average scenario does. 
•  It has been assumed that blocks are price-setting orders, meaning that their 
prices are significantly different from zero and close to the market prices. 
The price limit is a random deviation, smaller than 10%, from the average 
price of the day, which would have been the average day price if no blocks 
were added to the scenario.  
•  Block size restrictions are publicly available information. As discussed in 
section  5.1, EEX allows up to 250MWh/h sized blocks, while other 
exchanges only allow smaller blocks. For every scenario, a maximum block 
size (MWh/h) is generated as a random integer between 10 and 300. 
Consequently the size of the blocks in that scenario is random, but smaller 
than the maximum block size. 
•  Block  type restrictions are publicly available information. Table 5-1 in 
section 5.1 illustrates the 11 types of blocks that can be traded at EEX. For 
instance, at Powernext the 10 types
36 illustrated in Table 5-4 can be traded. 
On APX, participants can freely choose which hours to include in the 
block. Every combination of consecutive hours can be made, which means 
that 354 (=24+23+22+…+1) block types can be traded. Every scenario has 
a 50% probability of having a block type restriction. If there are no 
restrictions, all combinations of consecutive hours are possible as at APX. 
If there is a restriction, every block is randomly one of the 10 types traded 
on Powernext.  
Table 5-4: Block products at Powernext 
Contract name  Time interval under block contract 
Block Bid 1-4  00.00h – 04.00h (covering hours 1 to 4) 
Block Bid 5-8  04.00h – 08.00h (covering hours 5 to 8) 
Block Bid 9-12  08.00h – 12.00h (covering hours 9 to 12) 
Block Bid 13-16  12.00h – 16.00h (covering hours 13 to 16) 
Block Bid 17-20  16.00h -20.00h (covering hours 17 to 20) 
Block Bid 21-24  20.00h – 24.00h (covering hours 21 to 24) 
Block Bid 1-24  00.00h – 24.00h (covering hours 1 to 24) 
Block Bid 9-20  08.00h – 20.00h (covering hours 9 to 20) 
Block Bid 1-6  00.00h – 06.00h (covering hours 1 to 6) 
Block Bid 1-8  00.00h – 08.00h (covering hours 1 to 8) 
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A batch of 200 scenarios has been created in the manner explained above. The 
results are presented in the next section, but also chapter 6 and 7 are based on the 
same batch of 200 scenarios. Batches of 100 scenarios yielded somewhat different 
results. Increasing the batch size to 200 has proved to be sufficient to present results 
that are not batch specific. Moreover, scenarios within the batch are diverse enough 
to indicate sensitivities. PARADOXICALLY REJECTED BLOCKS                                                             95                                 
 
5.5  Paradoxically Rejected Blocks (PRB) 
PRBs are a consequence of imposing linear prices. This section clarifies the concept 
of PRBs. First, two types of PRBs are distinguished. Second, an urban legend 
concerning PRBs is countered. 
5.5.1  Depth of PRB 
As discussed in section 5.3.2.2, in the two-period example with one supply block the 
only feasible solution is to reject the blocks yielding an average market price of 
90€/MWh. In this example the PRB is deep in the money, i.e. there is large 
difference between the average market price and the price limit of the block (ΔP). 
In the batch of scenarios discussed previously, MILP2 yields 4,15 PRBs per day on 
average, with a maximum of 27 in a day. In total for the 200 scenarios there are 829 
PRBs, while there are 19619 blocks in total in these scenarios. Therefore, the 
likelihood of block to be paradoxically rejected is only 4%, which is further 
discussed in the chapter 7. 
As illustrated in Figure 5-3 almost 40% of these PRBs are actually not loosing any 
money, i.e. the price limit is equal to the average market price (ΔP=0). Still, these 
traders want to be accepted so that they should be counted. However, applying 
nonlinear pricing is not a solution for PRBs with a zero ΔP. These blocks will not 
receive any compensation, as they are not in the money. Therefore, they are not 
taken into account in chapter 8.  
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5.5.2  Common wisdom PRB 
Amongst traders and exchanges it is often said that if blocks cannot be accepted 
completely, they can become rejected fully, suggesting that the indivisibility is 
causing paradoxical rejection. To check the truth of this commonly accepted 
explanation for the phenomenon of PRBs, all scenarios have been rerun leaving out 
the fill-or-kill constraint of blocks. (4.9) and (4.10) impose the indivisibility of 
blocks. These constraints have been replaced by the following to make blocks 
divisible: 
1 kh k kh qb Q ≤                                                   (4.17) 
1 lh l lh qb Q ≤                           (4.18) 
With divisible blocks, the total number of PRBs in the 200 scenarios reduces from 
829 to 112, with a mean of 0,56 and a maximum of 5.8 PRBs per day. In other 
words, the inter-temporal rigidity of blocks alone is sufficient to cause paradoxical 
rejection. 
5.6 Conclusions 
Blocks are important for traders and exchanges. An auction with blocks is a special 
type of combinatorial auction. This chapter has provided a model to study the 
auction problem with blocks. Furthermore, a batch of representative scenarios has 
been introduced. The model and scenarios are used in the next three chapters to 
further study the auction problem with blocks.  
4% of the blocks are PRB when applying the linear pricing approach of exchanges 
to the batch of scenarios. However an important distinction has been made between 
PRBs that are actually losing money due to a lost trade opportunity and blocks that 
were rejected with a price limit equal to the average market price. When studying 
the difference between linear and nonlinear pricing in chapter 8, the second type of 
PRB should not be counted. As argued, nonlinear pricing is not a solution for this 
type of PRB, as these rejected blocks would not receive compensation. 
Finally, despite what is often said among traders and exchanges, the phenomenon of 
paradoxically rejection is not only caused by the fill-or-kill constraint of a block. 





Chapter 6  
Computational complexity 
auction problem with blocks 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has formalized how exchanges deal with blocks. The 
constrained optimization model with binary variables for blocks and constrained 
continuous variables for hourly orders are Mixed Integer Problems (MIP), which are 
difficult to solve. The available commercial software has evolved substantially the 
last decade, but there is still the fundamental problem that in the worst case all 
combinations have to be enumerated to select the optimal solution, i.e. the problem 
is computational intractable. 
First, the computational complexity of the auction problem with blocks as faced by 
exchanges is further discussed. Some exchanges actually have a more difficult 
problem to solve than the problem formalized in the previous chapter. Second, a 
simple but fast algorithm is introduced that yields a feasible but not necessarily 
optimal solution. Third, the solution of this simple algorithm is compared with the 
optimal solution (MILP2 of the previous chapter) to quantify the exposure to sub-
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6.2 Computational  complexity 
The auction problem with blocks (4.5) to (4.16) assumes a flat hourly order system. 
In Europe, there are actually two hourly order formats, sometimes referred to as flat 
orders and orders with interpolation. In both systems participants submit supply and 
demand curves by submitting price-quantity (P,Q) pairs. However, under a flat order 
system this implies introducing a step curve as illustrated in Figure 6-1, while under 
an order system with interpolation this implies introducing a piecewise linear curve 
as illustrated in Figure 6-2.  
Omel, APX and Borzen for instance use the flat order system. Nord Pool and 
Powernext for instance use the order system with interpolation. Note that the MILP1 
and 2 assume that there are no slopes in the curves so that they can be cut up in 
orders of a certain quantity with a flat price limit. Due to the slopes in the curves of 
an order system with interpolation, the objective function would be quadratic so that 
the problem is a Mixed Integer Quadratic Problem (MIQP).  
MIQP solvers exist but are not well developed. Therefore a flat order system is 
assumed to run simulations.  
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Figure 6-1: Supply curve without slopes: flat hourly order system    99 
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Figure 6-2: Supply curve with slopes: hourly order system with interpolation 
It is important to note that on the one hand exchanges with interpolation have a more 
difficult problem to solve, but on the other hand they do are not exposed to 
horizontals so that they do not have indeterminacies in quantities (see chapter 4). 
However, they are confronted with indeterminacies in prices because the horizontal 
aggregation of two curves above each other yields a vertical that connects the two 
order curves.  
6.3  Lower Bound performance Algorithm (LBA) 
As explained in section 5.2, the heuristic approach of exchanges consists of a block 
selector and a coordination module that determines the prices for a fixed block set. 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the process model of a very simple algorithm based on such a 
decomposition of the auction problem with blocks. The algorithm initializes by 
selecting all blocks. If that solution is not feasible, the algorithm continues by 
selecting a block to go out. The process is repeated until a feasible combination of 
blocks is found. The first feasible solution that is found is the final solution provided 
by the algorithm. 
The selection of blocks to go out is based on criteria also applied by exchanges, as 
indicated on their websites. The block with an average price limit that deviates most 
from the average market price, is selected to go out first. If there is a tie, the smallest 
block is selected first. If there is still a tie after that (in the case of identical block 
orders), the block submitted last is selected to go out first.  
The reasoning behind these criteria is that the block that is most out of the money 
(average price that deviates the most from the average market prices) is less likely to 
be part of the optimal combination. Putting out other blocks does not easily result in 
the block being in the money. It is more interesting to keep blocks that are almost in 
the money in the selection, as a relative small change in prices, triggered by 
changing the block set, could put them in the money. On the other hand, rejecting 
large blocks is giving up on a lot of potential surplus. Therefore, from a gains from 
trade point of view it can be more interesting to keep a large block in the selection, 
even though it is more out of money than a smaller block. Some exchanges therefore 100     COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AUCTION PROBLEM WITH BLOCKS 
 
select blocks to go out based on the price difference multiplied with the size of a 
block. However, this is not necessarily better as finding the optimal combination of 





select block        
to go out
Stop




Figure 6-3: Process model of the Lower Bound performance Algorithm (LBA) 
for the heuristic approach of exchanges 
To guarantee finding the optimal solution, the block selector has to be such that all 
combinations of blocks are tried for feasibility so that the best in terms of gain from 
trade can be selected. For N blocks there are 2
N block combinations. The above-
described algorithm (LBA) guarantees to find a feasible solution after trying N block 
combinations. It can therefore not guarantee finding the optimal solution, but it is 
much faster, especially for problems with many blocks. 
The feasible solution that is guaranteed to be found by LBA after trying N block 
combinations, is the solution without blocks, which is how the procedure ends. The 
performance guarantee is therefore very poor, i.e. scenarios exist in which the 
algorithm performance is not better than an algorithm that simply rejects all blocks 
from the start. However, this does not mean that the algorithm will perform badly in 
representative scenarios. The quality of the LBA solution in representative scenarios 
is a good indication for the exposure to suboptimal solutions of the specialized 
heuristics used in practice. 
6.4  Exposure to sub-optimal heuristic solutions 
The batch of scenarios introduced in the previous chapter is used to indicate the 
exposure of exchanges to sub-optimal solutions when applying heuristic procedures 
to clear their market. First, the calculation time of the software used to calculate the 
optimal solution is discussed. Second, the exposure respectively in terms of gains 
from trade and PRBs is discussed.    101 
 
6.4.1 Calculation  time  MILP 
The scenarios have been solved for MILP2 on a Pentium® IV, using the CPLEX® 
solver software called from Matlab® using the Tomlab® interface. 
In two scenarios, the optimal solution was not yet found after 2.5 days so that the 
solver was stopped. For all other scenarios in the batch of 200 scenarios, the solver 
calculation time was 4 minutes on average. The minimum and maximum calculation 
time was respectively a few seconds and 3.5 hours. 50% of the scenarios solved in 
less than one minute and 95% less than 10 minutes. This is typical for the 
performance of commercial MILP solvers. No MILP solver can guarantee to find 
the optimal solution fast, but the best available solvers find the optimal solution fast 
in most cases. As said in O'Neill et al. (2005), today's MILP solvers are quasi as fast 
as LP solvers 10 years ago for equally sized problems.  
In other words, heuristics are necessary because exchanges have to clear their 
markets in a time frame of minutes and commercial solvers cannot always find the 
optimal solution to MILP2 in that time frame. Of course, exchanges could run the 
MILP2 in parallel to their heuristics to use the latter as a backup solution. Note that 
this is only true for the exchanges with a flat order system. As discussed in section 
6.1, several exchanges actually have to solve a MIQP. 



















Figure 6-4: Calculation time MILP2 (minutes) of all scenarios except two that 
were stopped after 2.5 days 
Pekec and Rothkopf (2005) discuss non-computational approaches to mitigating 
computational problems in combinatorial auctions. Limiting the combinations 
participants are allowed to bid is described as an effective way to reduce the 102     COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AUCTION PROBLEM WITH BLOCKS 
 
computational complexity of combinatorial auctions. Park and Rothkopf (2005) 
even propose an auction with bidder-determined allowable combinations. 
Also in combinatorial electric energy auctions this is true. As mentioned in the 
previous section, in 50% of the scenarios blocks can consist of every combination of 
consecutive hours, while in the other 50% of scenarios all blocks are one of the 10 
combinations that are allowed at Powernext. In the terminology of this text, most 
exchanges such as Powernext have a block type restriction. For most scenarios, there 
is no significant difference. However, all scenarios that needed to be stopped after 
running more than a day, such as the two scenarios in this batch that were stopped 
after 2.5 days have been scenarios without a type restriction. As illustrated in Figure 
6-5, also for the scenarios that were solved, the most extreme outliers were all 
scenarios without a type restriction. 
One could also expect a correlation between the number of blocks and the solver 
time, as the number of block orders increases the problem size in terms of binary 
decision variables, but such a correlation could not be found (=0.041). Furthermore, 
coherence with other block characteristics could not be found. However, there is a 
substantial difference between the calculation time of MILP1 and MILP2. In this 
batch of scenarios, MILP1 only took 0,6 seconds on average to solve with a 
maximum of 1,4 seconds.  In other words, these results clearly indicate that the real 
computational complexity of MILP2 comes from the constraints that are necessary 
to allow linear pricing. 
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Figure 6-5: Calculation time MILP2 (minutes) with and without type 
restriction    103 
 
6.4.2  Heuristic exposure in terms of gains from trade 
As illustrated in Figure 6-6, this difference is relatively small. Most of what can be 
gained by adding blocks is already achieved by LBA. On average the difference is 
0,04% and never higher than 1%. The reason is that even in a solution without 
blocks, gains from trade are very high due to the hourly orders.  
In absolute terms, the difference between the MILP2 and LBA is 2488€/day on 
average going up to 77,902€/day. A simple t-test for the null hypothesis that both 
averages are equal assuming a normal distribution and equal standard deviations 
yields a p-value
37 of 0,9889. This implies that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
so that the difference in gains from trade is not statistically significant.  
However, when projected on a longer time horizon, a substantial amount of euros 
can be gained by designing a heuristic search algorithm that finds a set of blocks 
closer to the optimal set than LBA. For instance, the cumulated difference over the 
batch of 200 scenarios is almost half a million €. 


































































Figure 6-6: Heuristic exposure in terms of gains from trade                          
(light bar: LBA, dark bar: MILP-LBA)  
6.4.3  Heuristic exposure in terms of PRB 
LBA almost yields 8,13 PRB on average and a maximum of 49, which is almost the 
double of MILP2. A simple t-test for the null hypothesis that both averages are equal 
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assuming a normal distribution and equal standard deviations yields a p-value of 
0,0000024. This implies that the null hypothesis can be rejected so that the 
difference in terms of PRBs is statistically significant. 
Figure 6-7 illustrates the exposure to PRBs due to using heuristics. The Cumulative 
Distribution Function illustrates that in up to 50% of the scenarios both solutions 
yield an equal amount of PRBs. Furthermore, in a bit more than 5% of the scenarios, 
LBA even yields less PRBs. This indicates that maximizing gains from trade does 
not always minimize the number of PRBs. 



















Figure 6-7: Heuristic exposure in terms of PRB 
6.5 Conclusions 
The computational complexity of the auction problem with blocks is such that 
heuristics need to be used. The detailed procedures used in practice are not publicly 
available. The optimal solution to the constrained optimization model (MILP2) 
introduced in the previous chapter is the upper bound for the performance of the 
heuristics used in practice. 
Furthermore, all exchanges decompose the problem in a block selector and a 
coordination module that determines the prices for a fixed block set. A simple 
algorithm (LBA) based on such decomposition has been introduced that can be used 
as a lower bound performance measure for the heuristics used in practice.  
The scenarios introduced in the previous chapter have been used to indicate the 
exposure to sub-optimal solutions. The scenarios indicate a substantial gap between 
the MILP2 solution and the LBA solution; both in terms of gains form trade and    105 
 
number of PRBs. In other words, a well-designed heuristic search algorithm is 
important. In the next two chapters, the auction problem with blocks is further 







Chapter 7  
Block order restrictions 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters introduced the auction problem with blocks, how it can 
be modeled and its computational complexity. This chapter analyses the rationale of 
block order restrictions. All exchanges restrict the size (MWh/h) or the type (span in 
terms of hours) or the number of blocks that can be introduced per participant per 
day. There is no methodology available to impose such restrictions. This can partly 
explain why all exchanges have very different restrictions. 
The attractiveness of a block in comparison with hourly orders comes from its 
indivisible and multi-period character. However, blocks can become paradoxically 
rejected, which makes them less attractive. The question could therefore be raised 
whether restricting the use of blocks reduces the problem of PRBs. The results 
indicate that this is not an effective way to reduce the problem of PRBs so that there 
is no reason to impose such restrictions, as it will only reduce the volumes traded on 
exchanges and will oblige traders to find alternatives. 
First, the constraints block order restrictions impose on traders are discussed. 
Second, the number and likelihood of PRBs in representative scenarios is indicated 
in function of these restrictions. Finally, the rationale behind restrictions is 
questioned and recommendations are provided. 108                                                                          BLOCK ORDER RESTRICTIONS 
 
7.2  Constraint for traders 
Most exchanges have restrictions on block orders. As illustrated in Table 7-1, there 
are substantial differences between exchanges. Powernext does not restrict the 
number of block orders that can be submitted per participant per day, while the size 
is for instance more restricted on APX (50MWh/h) than on EEX (250MWh/h). On 
APX, participants are allowed to make any combination of consecutive hours. 
Powernext and EEX on the other hand restrict blocks to 10 or 11 types (the types are 
discussed in chapter 5).  
The number of blocks that can be introduced to an auction per day is never really 
restricted as the amount of participants is not restricted. Market parties could even 
register more than once to avoid this restriction, although this increases transaction 
costs. In other words, this restriction is actually only a discouragement to market 
parties.  
A size restriction is binding for traders, as generation units are easily larger than 
50MW, but also larger than 250MW. A 250MW generator faced with a restriction of 
50MWh/h could submit 5 blocks of 50MWh/h. However, this would mean he is 
exposed to the risk that some of the blocks could become paradoxically rejected. If 
he is only able to produce 250 or nothing this means he is exposed to balancing 
penalties. 
A type restriction is binding for traders, as it can be that a trader wants to sell or 
purchase a contract for a combination of hours that is not allowed. Note however 
that most trade is in standardized periods such as base and peak load. Block types 
traded on exchanges encompass these typical combinations of hours that are most 
important for trade. 
What these restrictions mean for trade efficiency is very uncertain. Faced with these 
restrictions, traders could choose to act in the consecutive bilateral markets 
operating before and after the day-ahead auction. They could also introduce price 
taking hourly orders at the day-ahead auction and hedge the price risk with futures 
or other financial derivatives. Therefore, it depends on the availability and 
transaction costs of the alternatives. 
What is certain is that by imposing such restrictions, exchanges will attract less 
volume. In the extreme case, traders would stop using blocks, as their use is too 
restricted. 
Table 7-1: Block order restrictions on APX, Powernext and EEX 





1 50  50 
Powernext 10  INF
2 100
3 
EEX 11  6  250 
1 All combinations of consecutive periods are allowed 
2 Per portfolio it is possible to submit every type once, but participants can submit several portfolios 
3 Before 2005 it was 50MWh/h                                                                                                                                    109 
 
7.3  Rationale of restrictions 
As argued in the previous section, restricting the number of blocks that can be 
introduced by a participant per day does not restrict the total number of blocks that 
can be introduced. However, it will discourage market parties to submit many 
blocks, as it is expensive to have more than one subscription to the exchange. 
Furthermore, type and size restrictions are binding for traders. 
The attractiveness of a block in comparison with hourly orders comes from its 
indivisible and multi-period character. However, blocks can become paradoxically 
rejected, which makes them less attractive. As discussed in chapter 5, the deeper in 
the money and the larger the block, the larger the opportunity cost is of being 
excluded from trade. The opportunity cost linked to a PRB is equal to its size times 
the number of hours it covers multiplied with its depth
38. Therefore, this section 
analyzes whether block order restrictions effectively reduce the visible problem of 
PRBs.  
The numerical results that are presented are based on the MILP2 model and the 
batch of representative scenarios introduced in chapter 5. First, some PRB statistics 
for the whole batch of scenarios are given. Second, the effectiveness of restrictions 
in reducing the problem of PRB is discussed. 
7.3.1 PRB  statistics 
In the batch of scenarios designed to study the auction problem with blocks, the 
number of PRBs is large. On average there are 4 PRBs per day with a maximum of 
27 PRB in one day. The likelihood of PRBs is small on average but is high in some 
scenarios. When introducing a block, on average there is a 4,36% probability that it 
will be paradoxically rejected, with a maximum of 50%. However, the probability of 
small blocks (<50MWh/h) being paradoxically rejected is much smaller, i.e. 1% on 
average with a maximum of 10%. 
In other words, risk of being paradoxically rejected is not such that it is an important 
issue for traders. Furthermore, the results indicate that traders that submit smaller 
blocks are less likely to be paradoxically rejected. Table 7-2 summarizes these 
findings. 
Table 7-2: PRB statistics 
 Mean  Max 
Nr PRB  4.1450  27 
Likelihood PRB 
(Nr PRB/Nr blocks) 
0.0436 0.5000 
Likelihood PRB         
blocks < 50MWH/h 
0.0101 0.1250 
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7.3.2  Effect of restrictions on PRB 
The results in the previous section are based on a batch of scenarios with:  
•  Maximum block sizes going up to 300MWh/h, which is larger than allowed 
on most exchanges (in Table 7-1 the maximum with 250 MWh/h). 
•  Total number of blocks going up to 200 per day, whereas a realistic number 
is 100 per day. 
•  More or less half of the scenarios with only the 10 Powernext block types, 
and the other half of the scenarios with blocks of all possible types. 
By imposing restrictions, the exchange can for instance make sure that scenarios 
with many large blocks are avoided. The rational could be that this way exchanges 
reduce the visible problem of PRB. 
Type restriction 
As discussed in chapter 5, restricting the allowed combination of hours in a block 
reduces the calculation time of the MILP2 model. In other words, the computational 
complexity of the auction problem is reduced. Therefore it could be argued that the 
exposure to sub-optimal heuristic solutions is reduced, also in terms of number of 
PRBs. However, the analysis presented in this chapter makes an abstraction of 
computational complexity.  
All scenarios in the batch of representative scenarios can be categorized into 
scenarios with a type restriction (meaning that all blocks are one of the 10 types 
traded on Powernext) and scenarios without a type restriction (meaning that all 
combinations of consecutive hours are possible as on APX). Table 7-3 illustrates 
some statistics for the two samples. Even though the means and standard deviations 
are different, this difference is not statistically significant
39. In other words, there is 
no significant difference in number of PRB between these categories of scenarios. 
Therefore, the results indicate that exchanges cannot reduce the visible problem of 
PRB by imposing a type restriction. 
 
Table 7-3: Effect of block types on PRB 
Nr PRB  All types  Powernext types 
Mean 3,6292  4,5586 
Standard deviation  3,6444  5,2651 
Max 15  27 
 
Number of blocks per participant per day 
Table 7-4 illustrates that even though there is a significant correlation between the 
total number of blocks in a scenario and the number of PRBs in that scenario, this is 
                                                           
39 The null hypothesis that the means are equal, assuming a normal distribution for both samples and 
equal standard deviations cannot be rejected for a 5% significance (p-value is 0,1585).    111 
 
not true for the likelihood of PRBs. In other words, for traders the probability of 
being paradoxically rejected does not increase if in total more blocks are introduced. 
The table also illustrates that this is true for blocks in general as well as for small 
blocks. Therefore, exchanges cannot reduce the problem of PRBs as perceived by 
traders by imposing a restriction on the number of blocks that can be introduced per 
participant per day. 
Perhaps the restrictions have been imposed from the logic that every PRB is a 
potential complaint. Indeed, the number of PRBs can effectively be reduced with 
this restriction. The traders’ concern is however that of the likelihood or the risk of 
being paradoxically rejected.  
Max size restriction 
Smaller blocks are less likely to be paradoxically rejected, but this in itself is not a 
reason to impose the use of small blocks on all traders (see previous section). 
However, this in itself should not be a reason to impose a block size restriction on 
all traders. It could be argued that such a restriction is necessary if large blocks 
submitted by one trader increase the likelihood of paradoxical rejection for all 
traders. Note that this would also create opportunities for abuse. 
As illustrated in Table 7-4, the maximum block size only explains 9,3% of the 
variations in the number of PRB between scenarios (R
2 of the linear regression). For 
the likelihood of PRB this is even less. In other words, for traders introducing small 
blocks, the risk of being paradoxically rejected is not significantly affected by the 
fact that others introduce larger blocks. Therefore, exchanges cannot reduce the 
problem of PRBs by imposing a size restriction. 
 
Table 7-4: Effect of nr of blocks and maximum block size on PRB 
Correlations (R
2)  Nr blocks  Maximum block size 
Nr PRB 
(Figure 7-1) 
0,6407 (41,4%)  0,3053 (9,3%) 
Likelihood PRB 
(Figure 7-2) 
-0,0362 (0,13%)  0,2139 (4,6%) 
Likelihood PRB         
blocks < 50MWH/h 
(Figure 7-3) 





























































































































Figure 7-3: Likelihood PRB < 50 MWh/h (MILP2 solution) 
7.4 Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this chapter clearly indicates that exchanges cannot reduce 
the problem of PRBs by restricting the type, size or number of blocks that can be 
introduced per participant per day.  
The analysis has shown that the number of PRBs increases with the number of 
blocks in a scenario. Furthermore, small blocks are less likely to be paradoxically 
rejected, but this in itself is not a reason to impose the use of small blocks on all 
traders. A block will not be more likely paradoxically rejected if the total number of 
blocks introduced to the exchange is larger, nor if also larger blocks or many 
different types of blocks are introduced. It can therefore be concluded that 
exchanges restrict too much the use of blocks. It is in their benefit and in the benefit 
of traders to omit these restrictions.  
Block order restrictions are an artificial and ineffective way of reducing the problem 
of PRBs. If PRBs were a real problem for trade efficiency, they should be avoided 
with nonlinear pricing, which is discussed in the next chapter.  
Note that the analysis in this chapter implicitly assumes that omitting the restrictions 
on blocks does not reduce the number of hourly orders that are introduced. When an 
exchange is introduced in an immature market, it does not necessarily have hourly 
orders for every hour of the day or just a few. This can for instance be observed on 
the Slovenian exchange Borzen. The situation with many blocks and just a few 
hourly orders has not explicitly been addressed here. In other words, this chapter is 
not intended to claim that every exchange should start with blocks without any 114                                                                          BLOCK ORDER RESTRICTIONS 
 
restrictions. For instance, EXAA introduced blocks after one year when the market 
had somewhat matured. An interesting extension to this study could therefore be to 
explicitly address this issue. 





Chapter 8  
Clearing auctions with blocks: 
linear versus nonlinear pricing 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters discussed how exchanges treat blocks. As discussed in 
chapter 2, nonlinear pricing, as typically applied by power pools, is an alternative 
pricing approach for an auction with blocks. Most literature even prescribes 
nonlinear pricing for non-convex auctions, such as auctions with blocks. The main 
argument is trade efficiency. 
Under nonlinear pricing, there is an hourly reference price but not all contracts are 
settled at that price, i.e. pricing is to a certain degree discriminatory. Therefore, there 
are many ways to implement this approach. The most extreme form is pay-as-bid, 
meaning that all accepted bids are settled at their price limit. The approaches used by 
power pools are however very different from pay-as-bid. Most trade is settled at 
hourly reference prices, but some contracts are settled at these prices in combination 
with a discriminatory payment, i.e. side payment. The use of side payments can even 
be minimized, as in Galiana et al. (2003). 
Nonlinear pricing has been extensively studied by academics and practitioners and is 
also referred to as two-part tariff, augmented, or uplift pricing. Most of the literature 
is applied to power pools (e.g. Madrigal and Quintana, 2001; Motto and Galiana, 
2002; Galiana et al., 2003), with the exception of O’Neill et al. (2006) who 
introduce a nonlinear pricing approach for auctions with blocks based on the ideas 116                                                           LINEAR VERSUS NONLINEAR PRICING 
 
presented in O’Neill et al. (2005). Much less studied is linear pricing
40, the approach 
commonly used among exchanges. Exchanges impose hourly prices by rejecting 
blocks that actually want to trade at the determined prices without compensating 
them for this lost trade opportunity. The previous chapters have analyzed this 
approach. The contribution of this chapter is to evaluate whether exchanges should 
shift to nonlinear pricing. As argued in this chapter, the increase in gains from trade 
would be costly in terms of side payments that are necessary under nonlinear 
pricing.  
First, the optimization models used to compare linear and nonlinear pricing when 
applied to auctions with blocks are discussed. Second, the approaches are compared 
qualitatively. Third, the linear and nonlinear pricing solutions to the auction problem 
with blocks are compared on the basis of representative scenarios introduced in 
chapter 5. 
8.2 Models 
The Mixed-Integer Linear Optimization Problem (4.5) to (4.16) (MILP2) introduced 
in chapter 5 formalizes the approach used by exchanges. Therefore MILP2 in this 
chapter models the solution under linear pricing.  
As discussed in chapter 5, constraints (4.11) to (4.16) needed to be added to allow 
linear pricing. To model nonlinear pricing, these constraints can therefore be 
omitted. The Mixed-Integer Linear Optimization Problem (4.5) to (4.10) (MILP1) is 
used in this chapter to determine the solution in terms of quantities to the auction 
problem with blocks under nonlinear pricing. However, there is no unique set of 
prices to consequently settle this market. 
In a convex auction, the shadow prices (λh) of the market clearing constraints (4.6)
are market clearing in the sense that at those prices demand equates supply in all 
hours (Samuelson, 1952). For an auction with blocks this is not necessarily true. The 
MILP1 solution does not clear at λh, as gains from trade will not be maximized for 
all participants at these hourly prices, even though total gains from trade are 
maximized.  
Participants can be accepted at a loss and others can be excluded even though they 
are in the money. Nonlinear pricing means that side payments will be used to 
compensate these participants for their losses and lost opportunities. In other words, 
also under nonlinear pricing, it is possible that blocks that want to trade at the 
determined market prices are rejected. The difference is that under nonlinear pricing 
they will be compensated for this lost opportunity to trade. Linear pricing yields 
PRBs, which are blocks that are in the money, rejected and not compensated. 
Side payments are recovered from the accepted bids that are making a profit. It is 
important to underline that there is no unique way of doing this. To keep some 
generality, abstraction will be made of how the side payments are recovered when 
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comparing nonlinear with linear pricing. Only the side payments are analyzed in this 
paper assuming that the hourly prices are taken as λh, which is the case in many of 
the approaches proposed for pools. 
8.3 Qualitative  comparison 
In general, literature prescribes nonlinear pricing for non-convex markets such as 
auctions with blocks. The main argument is trade efficiency. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, exchanges impose linear prices, which can indeed imply smaller 
gains from trade. However, in Europe trade is mainly bilateral and exchanges are 
voluntary fine-tuning markets so that inefficient day-ahead auction trade does not 
necessarily imply that the wholesale market is inefficient. All depends of course on 
how inefficient linear pricing is. If the loss in gains from trade and the number of 
PRBs is large, the incentive to trade elsewhere is large so that in the limit the 
exchange is obsolete. 
The question is whether exchanges with blocks would better apply nonlinear pricing. 
First of all, a change in price rules is costly in terms of reform costs. Second, making 
these price rules understandable to participants is also costly. In fact, nonlinear 
pricing approaches are often criticized for their complexity. Linear pricing is simpler 
as it yields prices at intersection of supply and demand curves, even though these 
curves are somewhat constructed (see chapter 5: blocks are included as price-taking 
hourly orders). Exchanges make optimal use of the property by publishing the 
aggregated curves.  
Third, many alternative implementations of nonlinear pricing have been advocated 
and there is no consensus on which is best. Such a situation could result in an 
implementation benefiting certain parties at the cost of others.  
Fourth, nonlinear pricing approaches have in common that trade is settled at hourly 
prices in combination with side payments. Participants can hedge against the day-
ahead hourly price risk exposure with standard financial contracts (futures), but not 
against discriminatory charges that the exchange would need to use to recover side 
payments. As there is no counter part for these discriminatory payments, hedging 
them is expensive, i.e. personal insurance
41. Again, all depends on how large these 
side payments are.  
8.4 Quantitative  comparison 
Especially interesting in light of the argumentation of the previous section is to 
quantify the cost in terms of side payments to increase gains from trade by applying 
nonlinear pricing. The batch of scenarios introduced in chapter 5, is used to indicate 
the size of this ratio. Therefore, all scenarios have been solved under linear (MILP2) 
and nonlinear pricing (MILP1). 
In this chapter, abstraction is made of computational complexity. Note however that 
the calculation time of MILP1 is substantially lower than that of MILP2. As 
                                                           
41 Note that this can partly explain why pools use nonlinear pricing approaches with less discriminatory 
payments than under a pay-as-bid approach and sometimes even (implicitly) minimize the use of side 
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discussed in chapter 6, the solver calculation time for MILP2 is 4 minutes on 
average, with a maximum of 3.5 hours. The solver calculation time of MILP1 is 
only 0,6 seconds on average with a maximum of 1,4 seconds.     
Figure 8-1 shows that the two approaches yield very similar hourly prices, as the 
daily averages are equal in up to 50% of the scenario days, and never deviate more 
than 10% in the sample. 



















Figure 8-1:  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the average day price 
difference nonlinear (λh) – uniform (ph) pricing 
Figure 8-2 illustrates that the difference in gain from trade between the two 
approaches is small. In more than 50% of the scenarios the gain from trade is equal 
in both approaches, and the loss in terms of gain from trade of imposing linear prices 
is never more than 3697€ (max 0.05% of total surplus).  
Figure 8-3 illustrates that the number of PRBs
42 can go up to 17, while in 75% of the 
scenarios there were no PRBs. On average there is 1 PRB per day, but the likelihood 
of a block being paradoxically rejected is very low (<0.1%).  
Figure 8-4 illustrates that to avoid PRBs and to maximize gain from trade in all 
scenarios, side payments are necessary in up to 60% of the scenarios. In 10% of the 
scenarios side payments from 5000€ to 47498€ (max 0.64% of total surplus) have to 
                                                           
42 As discussed in section 5.5.1, only PRBs that are actually loosing money are counted here. PRBs with a 
price limit equal to the average market price are not counted, as nonlinear pricing is not a solution for 
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be made. Note that side payments in the sample are only made to block bids
43, with 
the average payment being 502€.  



















Figure 8-2:  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) difference gain from 
trade nonlinear – uniform pricing  
                                                           
43 This is consistent with the theory presented in [6], where it is shown that side payments can also be 
determined as the shadow prices of the constraints that cause non-convexities, such as the indivisibility 
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Figure 8-3:  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Paradoxically Rejected 
Blocks (PRB) under uniform pricing 

















Figure 8-4:  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) side payments under 
nonlinear pricing    121 
 
Relative to total surplus, both side payments and the increase in gains from trade 
from applying nonlinear pricing are small. In comparison, a total of 317393€ is paid 
in side payments, which is 8,7465 times more than the sum of the differences in 
gains from trade. 
The ratio side payments over difference in gain from trade is an interesting statistic 
to look at per scenario. In scenarios with a difference in gain from trade, the ratio is 
finite and can be plotted as illustrated in Figure 8-5. Some of the values are off the 
graph to increase the visibility of the other values, but the maximum value of the 

































































Figure 8-5:  Sensitivities of the ratio side payments nonlinear pricing over 
difference in gain from trade nonlinear – linear pricing 
In Figure 8-5 only 9 of the 97 scenarios yield a ratio smaller than 1, meaning that in 
general for every € won in terms of gains from trade, several € side payments are 
necessary. Note that in 31 scenarios, side payments were made; even though this did 
not increase gains form trade. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The European exchanges apply linear pricing, while most literature prescribes 
nonlinear pricing for non-convex auctions. In this chapter, it has been argued that in 
the case of exchanges the drawbacks of linear pricing are less severe, while there are 
clear advantages. 
Based on representative scenarios it has been indicated that trade in the voluntary 
auctions organized by exchanges is not fully efficient. However, inefficient day-122                                                           LINEAR VERSUS NONLINEAR PRICING 
 
ahead auction trade does not necessarily lead to an inefficient dispatch in a market 
with several voluntary wholesale markets. Furthermore, a shift to nonlinear pricing 
would be costly in comparison with the possible gains from trade.  
Besides the obvious costs caused by the reforms, it has been argued that there is also 
a cost linked to the use of side payments. Due to side payments, the day-ahead price 
risk cannot be fully hedged with standard future contracts, which are settled against 
the hourly reference prices. Furthermore, nonlinear pricing is often perceived as 
complex and not always well understood. Finally, the analysis performed in this 
chapter indicates that for every € won in terms of gains from trade, several € side 
payments are necessary. This result holds on average but also in the individual 
scenarios, with a few exceptions. 
Note that this work is also of relevance for other non-convex markets, but it is not 
intended to claim that all these markets should apply linear pricing. For instance, 
inefficient trade in a mandatory pool is likely to result in an inefficient dispatch, 
meaning that the drawbacks of linear pricing weigh much heavier in a power pool. 
Still, an interesting extension to this work could be to calculate the above-mentioned 
ratio of side payments over increase in gains from trade for representative power 





Chapter 9  
Market coupling algorithm: 
centralized versus decentralized 
block order selection 
9.1 Introduction   
Most European countries have a power exchange. Traders acquire cross-border 
transfer capacities to arbitrate between the exchanges. These capacities are auctioned 
independently per border and on different time scales. Alternatively, the 
Scandinavian exchange Nord Pool optimizes the clearing of orders introduced in 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland (partly also Germany). This implies that 
Nord Pool implicitly auctions all available capacities on the internal 
interconnections between these countries. If the network allows it, Nord Pool 
therefore determines a single price for all zones; otherwise the market is split into 
predefined price zones, i.e. market splitting. Market splitting, as currently 
implemented in Nord Pool, is however not flow-based. 
The association of European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) has long been 
promoting a coordinated and flow based approach for the allocation of capacities. 
The association of European power exchanges (EUROPEX) added the idea of a 
decentralized approach. Instead of having one exchange, the idea is to couple 
existing exchanges without fully harmonizing them. In the EUROPEX proposal 
(2003), the idea is concretized by a scheme in which exchanges share information on 124                               CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED SELECTION 
 
net-export curves (NEC). This scheme was consequently also the basis of a joint 
statement by ETSO and Europex (2004). Most of these proposals are political and 
do not include an implementation or model. For instance, Ehrenmann and Smeers 
(2005) have raised concerns on the implementation of network constraints in some 
of these proposals. 
NECs contain enough information about hourly orders to have an optimal 
coupling
44. However, most exchanges in Europe also have block orders. As 
discussed in previous chapters, dealing with blocks is challenging. To accommodate 
for blocks, ETSO and Europex (2004) propose to exchange NECs in several 
iterations. This implies that block order selection is decentralized. The contribution 
of this paper resides in discussing the impact of decentralized block order selection 
on the performance of the market-coupling algorithm. 
In France, Belgium and the Netherlands, an algorithm with decentralized block 
selection has been developed to couple the exchanges Powernext, Belpex and APX. 
The three national regulators are currently validating the chosen approach. One of 
the concerns they have raised is on the extendibility of the approach to more markets 
(CRE, CREG and DTE, 2005). Decentralized block order selection might also be an 
issue in the German proposal 'Open Market Coupling' (OMC). The OMC proposal 
was for instance presented by EEX at the mini-forums on congestion management 
(EEX, 2005) and is currently being evaluated by the German regulator. The OMC 
proposal addresses the fact that not all countries in Europe have an exchange, while 
some have more than one. The proposed approach is to let exchanges and other 
interested parties bid on the capacities, which are then allocated by an open auction 
office. The proposal does however not discuss the information that is exchanged 
during the bidding process. 
First, the concept of decentralized block order selection is explained. Second, the 
impact on performance is discussed. Finally, the difference in performance is 
numerically compared for representative scenarios using a simple algorithm with 
decentralized and centralized block order selection. 
9.2  Decentralized block order selection 
To accommodate for blocks, ETSO and Europex (2004) propose to exchange NECs 
in several iterations. NECs express per location per hour how the price would evolve 
if there were import or export at that location. As discussed in the proposal, NECs 
can be derived straightforwardly from the aggregated supply and demand curves
45. 
This is however only true for a given block set. Therefore, the proposal to exchange 
NECs in several iterations to deal with blocks implies that the auction problem is 
decomposed into a coordination module and a block selector (see chapter 5). 
In fact, the problem is even further decomposed as every exchange produces a NEC, 
meaning that block selection is done decentralized as illustrated in Figure 9-1. 
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Determination of prices 
 
Figure 9-1: Scheme with centralized versus decentralized block order selection, 
with gray area showing the decentralized modules of the different exchanges 
In a scheme with decentralized block selection, block order information is 
decentralized so that the number of possible solutions is not known centrally and 
enumeration
46 is not possible.  
Consider the two period example of chapter 5 with one supply block (section 5.2, 
Example 1). There are only two possible solutions and the only feasible solution is 
to reject the block. Imagine that every exchange would simply respond to prices by 
selecting all blocks that want to trade at the current prices. Assuming that the 
procedure starts by putting the block in, the following would happen in Example 1:  
•  Iteration 1: the supply block is accepted meaning that the average price is 
22,5 €/MWh. When this is communicated to the exchange, it would 
respond by putting the block out and producing a NEC without the block. 
•  Iteration 2: the block is rejected meaning that the average price is 90 
€/MWh. When this is communicated to the exchange, it would respond by 
putting the blocks in and producing a new NEC. 
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•  Iteration 3 = Iteration 1, etc. 
As shown in Figure 9-1, the procedure can only be stopped if the NECs do not 
change from one iteration to the other, i.e. the same blocks are selected as in the last 
iteration. This means that convergence needs to be guaranteed by the decentralized 
block selector. In principle also the solution found with decentralized block selection 
can be stored and the process repeated, but it would not be possible to choose 
between several feasible solutions. Blocks are included in NECs as price taking 
orders so that gain from trade or the number of PRBs is not known centrally. As a 
consequence, even if enough time is available to try all block combinations, the 
scheme with decentralized block selection cannot guarantee to find the optimal 
solution. 
9.3  Impact on performance 
Clearly, a scheme with centralized or decentralized block selection can be 
implemented in many ways so that it becomes difficult to compare them, also 
because the comparison will be sensitive to the assumed available calculation time 
and power. To have some indication of their relative performance, simple algorithms 
can be used. The idea is that the performance of these simple algorithms is a lower 
bound for the performance of more specialized algorithms and that the relative 
performance of the lower bounds gives an indication about the relative performance 
of specialized algorithms. The lower bound algorithms respectively LBAC and 
LBAD are introduced and discussed in what follows. Figure 9-2 shows both flow 
diagrams.    127 
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Figure 9-2: LBAC-LBAD flow diagram, with gray area showing the 
decentralized modules run by the different exchanges 
Note that both algorithms are an extension to multiple markets of LBA, the simple 
algorithm introduced in chapter 6 (section 6.3). Both algorithms initialize by putting 
all blocks in and every iteration step a block is selected to go out. Blocks cannot 
come back and the algorithm stops in both cases when a feasible solution is found. 
The difference is that in LBAD a block is selected to go out per exchange (per 
location), as block selection is decentralized. 
9.4 Simulations 
The goal of the simulations is to asses, based on representative scenarios, if LBAC 
and LBAD exhibit significant outcome difference on average. Furthermore, it is to 
verify if the difference in performance significantly increases with the number of 
markets (or zones to be coupled). 
The scenarios are constructed in a similar way as the batch of scenarios used in 
previous chapters (chapter 5 introduced the batch of representative scenarios). The 
difference is that in these simulations hourly orders for different locations or markets 128                               CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED SELECTION 
 
are needed. APX curves of different days are used for different markets. Table 9-1 
illustrates the days that have been used. 










25/03/05 39  60  46373 
03/04/05 26  50  40843 
07/05/05 32  42  42964 
25/05/05 43  80  35119 
 
For the scenarios that are discussed in what follows, the minimum number of blocks 
added to a scenario is 50 times the number of locations in a scenario, while the 
maximum is 100 times the number of locations in a scenario. In other words, the 
results presented here are for a conservatively low number of blocks. 
Blocks are added to the scenarios as follows: 
•  Every block is randomly one of the 10 types traded on Powernext and has 
60% probability of being a supply block order and only 40% probability of 
being a demand block order. 
•  Block size (MWh/h): random integer between 1 and 150. Note that blocks 
are taken smaller in these scenarios, which is more realistic as most 
exchanges restrict the size of blocks (as discussed in chapter 7).  
•  Block price limit (€/MWh) is a smaller than 10% random deviation from 
the average price of the day representing the location where the block is 
introduced. In other words, the prices limits are close to what would be the 
price when no blocks were included. 
2 markets increasingly interconnected 
In the extreme case when there is no interconnection capacity, prices are decoupled 
and the problem with blocks could actually be solved separately for the different 
markets. However, the more network that needs to be allocated, the more prices are 
coupled, the more LBAC outperforms LBAD (Figure 9-3). 
Figure 9-3 illustrates for two markets that the more these markets are interconnected 
the more LBAC outperforms LBAD both in terms of Gain from Trade (GfT) and 
number of PRBs. Note that both LBAC and LBAD perform better as more 
interconnection capacity is available, but the increase in performance of LBAC is 
significantly greater. 
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The average differences in GfT for 2 locations is of the order of 450€ per day, which 
is not spectacular as such, but is significant on an annual basis. A simple 
extrapolation to 365 days yields a cumulative difference of 164250 € per year. 
Furthermore, the difference in terms of PRB is of the order of one. On average, 














































































































Figure 9-3: Relative performance lower bounds for 2 markets increasingly 
interconnected 
Increasing number of markets interconnected by copper plate 
Figure 9-4 illustrates that on average the difference in performance between LBAC 
and LBAD increases, as the number of locations increases and more blocks have to 
be dealt with. For 2 to 4 markets, 200 scenarios have been run assuming a copper 
plate network.  130                               CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED SELECTION 
 


































































































Figure 9-4: Relative performance lower bounds for increasing number of 
markets 
9.5 Conclusions   
In relatively small-scale scenarios with a small number of blocks, all potential 
solutions could be enumerated within the time available to the exchange and the best 
solution selected. If the selection of block orders is decentralized, enumeration is 
however not possible. Neither is it possible to use a single optimization model. It is 
not even possible to compare different solutions. Decentralized block order selection 
is therefore clearly inferior if there is no binding time constraint.  
In realistic scenarios, a binding time constraint is however likely as not much time is 
available to the exchanges and the problem to be solved is computational intractable. 
To find a good but not necessarily optimal solution fast, it is common among 
exchanges in Europe to decompose the auction problem into a block selector and a 
coordination module that determines prices (see also chapter 5). However, if this 
block selector is decentralized, the auction problem is even further decomposed, i.e. 
different modules are selecting blocks without direct communication or 
coordination.  
Representative scenarios have been solved with a very simple algorithm with 
centralized and with decentralized block order selection. The relative performance of 
these lower bound algorithms indicates that decentralizing the selection of block 
orders has a negative impact on performance, which can increase as the market 
develops and more markets are coupled.    131 
 
Decentralized market coupling could replace the system in place throughout Europe 
with separate explicit auctions for interconnection capacity on the borders. As 
discussed in this chapter, the decentralized approach is however not the best way to 
treat block orders. In other words, the decentralized system with implicit arbitrage is 
imperfect, but also the current system with explicit arbitrage has its imperfections 
(see discussion in chapter 2). This chapter is therefore not intended to claim that 
decentralized market coupling is better or worse than the current system with 
explicit auctions. 
                                                                                                                                    





Chapter 10    
Conclusions and Future 
Research 
10.1 Overview 
In what follows, the main conclusions are outlined, indicating potential extensions to 
this study. Finally, some thoughts on future research are provided. 
10.2 Main conclusions 
Most power exchanges in Europe are platforms where market parties can exchange 
electric energy within the control zone of a TSO, which is often confined within 
national borders. Trade is anonymous and traders do not have to worry about the 
insolvency of their counter party. The exchange itself is counter-party for all 
transaction. Contracts that can be traded on the exchanges are standardized and are 
settled without discussion or negotiation, according to transparent and simple rules. 
Increasingly, electric energy auctions are also used to organize trade between TSO 
control zones. This allows for a better clearing of orders introduced at different 
exchanges. The changing context implies new challenges for the exchanges, but also 
renews the discussion on how former challenges have been addressed. 
The auction problem has been modeled as a constrained optimization problem and 
alternative solutions have been analyzed. This has provided valuable insights for the 
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main conclusions on the auction design (chapter 2), the treatment of network 
constraints (chapters 3 and 4), block orders (chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) and political 
constraints (chapter 9) are discussed. 
10.2.1  Auction design  
The three main design characteristics of electric energy auctions are related to 
participation, non-convexities and network constraints. From this perspective, 
auctions organized by exchanges in Europe are different from auctions elsewhere.  
First, exchanges are voluntary, while power pools are mandatory wholesale markets. 
Note that this is important for the argumentation that follows. It means that 
inefficient trade in these auctions does not necessarily lead to inefficient wholesale 
trade and inefficient dispatch, as there are many trading alternatives. In other words, 
some of the claims made in this study are not applicable to power pools. 
Second, exchanges have in common with power pools that they are non-convex 
auctions. However, they deal differently with non-convexities:  
•  Exchanges have block orders instead of the more flexible multi-part orders 
that can be found on pools. Pools allow participants to express fixed costs, 
variable costs and all kind of technical constraints. Exchanges only have 
hourly orders that are simple price-quantity orders and block orders. Block 
orders are for multiple hours and have a fill-or-kill constraint. The auction 
with blocks is not incentive compatible. E.g. a generator will have to fix 
volume to have revenue certainty, even though he could recover his costs at 
several output levels and prices. However, the use of blocks is so common 
that it has been taken as given in this study. 
•  Exchanges do not actually clear their auctions. The prices they determine 
do not necessarily equalize demand and supply, but the exchanges force the 
equality. More specifically, they exclude blocks that are in the money 
without compensating them for this lost trade opportunity
48, i.e. they apply 
linear instead of nonlinear pricing. Even though linear pricing is common 
among exchanges, the alternative has been analyzed. The conclusions of 
this analysis are discussed in the main conclusions on the auction problem 
with block orders.  
An interesting extension could be to study the inclusion of other products on the 
exchanges. Block orders are characterized by a fixed quantity that is introduced for 
several hours with an average price limit. The most obvious extension could be to 
allow traders to submit an average price for ‘profiles’, instead of fixed quantities for 
multiple hours. Other product extensions could be inspired by the multi-part orders 
of power pools. Note however that in contrast with power pools, exchanges allow 
traders to introduce these products at the demand as well as at the supply side. 
Therefore, adding more flexible multi-part orders to the clearing of exchanges is 
computationally more difficult than in the case of power pools. 
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Third, in contrast with pools most exchanges do not take into account network 
constraints. However, exchanges are increasingly involved in cross-border trade, 
which means that they also need to deal with network constraints. 
10.2.2  Network constraints  
Transmission network constraints are not ordinary transport constraints. Power flow 
is economically uncontrollable, meaning that flows are distributed over the network 
according to the relative impedance of the available paths from generation to load.  
When imposed on a market, transmission network constraints are generally 
simplified into linear constraints, meaning that the auction problem with these 
constraints is an easy to solve linear optimization problem. 
This study has however identified two problems with this well-known problem 
when applied to exchanges. Due to the discontinuities in the aggregated curves of 
the exchanges, the problem does not uniquely determine prices and quantities. As 
illustrated, this means that the software used to solve the problem has a significant 
impact on the market outcome.  
The possible sets of prices to choose from equally provide efficient locational 
signals to demand and supply. Furthermore, this feasible set can be formulated as a 
set of linear equations, so that the choice can be formulated as a separate 
optimization problem. This formulation needs an objective function to decide on 
prices. Minimizing the cost of congestion has been proposed, arguing that 
congestion revenue is not always used efficiently. 
Less clear is the choice between possible sets of quantities. As illustrated, both flow 
and traded volume, besides gains from trade, are necessary to uniquely determine 
quantities. It can be argued that both more volume and less flow increase trade 
efficiency, but how to weigh these objectives is arguable. 
10.2.3 Block  orders 
Blocks are important for traders and exchanges. With blocks, traders can better 
express their multi-period cost structures than with hourly orders. For exchanges it 
means that they can attract more volume in competition with bilateral markets, 
where contracts are as flexible as parties can agree upon. 
To study the auction problem with blocks, it has been modeled as a constrained 
optimization problem and alternative solutions have been analyzed in a batch of 
representative scenarios. 
Computational complexity 
First, the computational complexity of the problem has been analyzed.  
•  The computational complexity of the auction problem with blocks is such 
that heuristics need to be used. For the simulations presented in this text, 
the problem has been modeled as a Mixed Integer Linear Problem (MILP). 
Note however that a flat hourly order system has been assumed for the 
simulations, which is not used by all exchanges. As discussed, some 
exchanges have a more difficult problem to solve than the one modeled in 
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•  The complexity of the model has been discussed based on the calculation 
time of the software used to solve the problem in representative scenarios. 
Against expectations, the number of blocks was not determinative for this 
calculation time. The constraints necessary to allow linear pricing have 
been identified as the major source of complexity. Without these 
constraints, the problem could be solved within 1,4 seconds for all 
scenarios in the sample. If the constraints were added, scenarios were found 
that did not yield a solution within the day. 
•  All exchanges decompose the problem into a block selector and a 
coordination module that determines the prices for a fixed block set. Such a 
decomposition of the problem allows them to find a feasible but not 
necessarily optimal solution fast. The heuristic procedures used in practice 
are not publicly available so that they could not be evaluated. The optimal 
solution has therefore been compared with the solution found by a simple 
algorithm based on the decomposition as applied by exchanges. The results 
indicate that there is money to be made with designing a good performing 
heuristic. The heuristic algorithms should therefore be carefully validated. 
An interesting extension could be to add network constraints to the model of the 
auction problem with blocks. As mentioned previously, network constraints are 
imposed on a market simply by adding a set of linear equations. However, the price 
properties of the auction problem with network constraints (Locational Marginal 
Pricing, as discussed in chapter 4) can change when blocks are added. To keep these 
properties, the optimality conditions of the problem with network constraints but 
without blocks will have to be added to the model. Furthermore, all exchanges solve 
the problem with the same decomposition. Most exchanges do however not yet take 
into account network constraints. Perhaps there is a superior alternative approach 
when also network constraints have to be taken into account. 
Block order restrictions 
Second, block order restrictions have been addressed. 
•  The attractiveness of a block in comparison with hourly orders comes from 
its indivisible and multi-period character. However, to clear their market, 
exchanges exclude blocks that are in the money without compensating 
them for this lost trade opportunity, which makes blocks less attractive for 
traders. The question could therefore be raised whether restricting the use 
of blocks reduces the problem of PRBs
49. This could partly explain why all 
exchanges have restrictions on the size (MWh/h) or the type (span in terms 
of hours) or the number of blocks that can be introduced per participant per 
day. 
•  A sensitivity analysis has been performed on scenarios with and without a 
type restriction, with a total number of blocks going from 1 to 200 and with 
maximum block sizes going from 10 to 300MWh/h. Against expectations, 
                                                           
49 A trader introducing such a block is expecting to be accepted based on the determined prices, while he 
is not. When faced with this problem, traders possibly file a complaint and perhaps also start distrusting 
the product and even the exchange.    137 
 
blocks are not more likely paradoxically rejected if the total number of 
blocks in the scenario is larger, nor if also large blocks or many different 
types of blocks are included. It has therefore been concluded that 
exchanges over restrict the use of blocks. It is in their own benefit and in 
the benefit of traders to omit these restrictions, as these restrictions only 
reduce the volumes traded on exchanges and oblige traders to find 
alternatives. 
•  Small blocks are less likely to be paradoxically rejected. However, this in 
itself is not a reason to restrict all traders to using small blocks, as traders 
submitting small blocks are not affected by the fact that other traders are 
submitting larger blocks. Note also that overall the likelihood of a block 
being paradoxically rejected is rather low (average of 4% in the sample). 
Note that abstraction of computational complexity has been made in the above 
analysis. Furthermore, the situation with many blocks and just a few hourly orders 
has not explicitly been addressed. In other words, this chapter is not intended to 
claim that every exchange should start with blocks without any restrictions. For 
instance, EXAA did not introduce blocks from start, but after one year when the 
market had somewhat matured. An interesting extension to this study could 
therefore be to explicitly address this issue. 
Linear versus nonlinear pricing 
Third, the pricing approach has been questioned. 
•  As mentioned previously, exchanges have in common with power pools 
that they are non-convex auctions. However, they deal differently with non-
convexities. Exchanges have blocks, while power pools have more flexible 
multi-part orders. Furthermore, exchanges do not actually clear their 
auctions. They exclude blocks that are in the money without compensating 
them for this lost trade opportunity, i.e. they apply linear instead of 
nonlinear pricing. Nonlinear pricing as typically applied by pools is also 
prescribed by most literature for auctions with non-convexities. O’Neill et 
al. (2006) propose a nonlinear pricing approach for auctions with blocks. 
•  The main argument in favor of nonlinear as opposed to linear pricing is 
trade efficiency. However, inefficient day-ahead auction trade does not 
necessarily lead to an inefficient dispatch in a market system with several 
voluntary wholesale markets. 
•  The main drawback of nonlinear pricing is the use of discriminatory 
payments. Under nonlinear pricing, there are hourly prices but there are 
also side payments to compensate participants for losses or lost trading 
opportunities. There are many ways to recover these payments from 
participants that are making a profit, but all imply that these participants are 
exposed to discriminatory charges. The size of these so-called side 
payments is an indication for this exposure. An exposure to discriminatory 
charges is a problem for traders as it is expensive to hedge, i.e. personal 
insurance. Furthermore, a shift from linear to nonlinear pricing in Europe 
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•  In other words, there is a clear advantage to linear pricing (no 
discriminatory charges), while the disadvantage (trade inefficiency) is less 
a problem because the exchanges are voluntary markets. Furthermore, the 
linear and nonlinear pricing solutions have been compared in representative 
scenarios. Indeed, linear pricing is slightly less efficient, but the results 
indicates that for every € won in terms of gains from trade, several € side 
payments are necessary under nonlinear pricing. This results holds on 
average but also in the individual scenarios, with a few exceptions. 
Note that in a mandatory pool, inefficient trade is more problematic meaning that the 
main drawback of linear pricing weighs much heavier. Still, an interesting extension 
to this work could be to calculate the above-mentioned ratio of side payments over 
increase in gains from trade for representative power pool scenarios. 
10.2.4  Political constraints  
The association of European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) has long been 
promoting a coordinated and flow based approach for the allocation of capacities. 
The association of European power exchanges (EUROPEX) added the idea of a 
decentralized approach. Instead of having one exchange, the idea is to couple 
existing exchanges without fully harmonizing them. 
A decentralized approach can be interesting from a regulatory and political point of 
view. However, the proposed decentralized scheme implies that block order 
selection is decentralized. As explained previously, it is common among exchanges 
in Europe to decompose the auction problem into a block selector and a coordination 
module that determines prices. If this block selector is decentralized, the auction 
problem is further decomposed, i.e. different modules are selecting blocks without 
direct communication or coordination. 
If the selection of block orders is decentralized, enumeration of all possible solutions 
is not possible. Neither is it possible to use a single optimization model. It is not 
even possible to compare different solutions. Furthermore, representative scenarios 
have been solved with a very simple algorithm with centralized and with 
decentralized block order selection. The relative performance of these lower bound 
algorithms indicates that decentralizing the selection of block orders has a negative 
impact on performance, which can increase as the market develops and more 
markets are coupled. 
Decentralized market coupling could replace the system in place throughout Europe 
with separate explicit auctions for interconnection capacity on the borders. As 
discussed in this chapter, the decentralized approach is however not the best way to 
treat block orders. In other words, the decentralized system with implicit arbitrage is 
imperfect, but also the current system with explicit arbitrage has its imperfections. 
The analysis is therefore not intended to claim that decentralized market coupling is 
better or worse than the current system with explicit auctions. 
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10.3 Looking ahead 
The current market is built on the network foundations that resulted from a pre-
liberalized context. In the liberalized context, new opportunities have emerged for 
old technologies and new promising technologies are under development. The grid 
of the future will very probably be larger, more flexible, more controllable and 
automated. The challenge facing network operators today is to invest in the network 
in this new context in order to be more independent from generation for system 
operation, such as for reactive power support and other ancillary services. 
Consequently, the challenge is of course to optimally use the new operational 
opportunities created by these investments. 
First, the investments will improve market facilitation by making the network more 
available to the market. One of the advantages could be that more network capacity 
can be made available for wholesale trade, ultimately leading to a single European 
electric energy price for most of the time. Second, it seems unavoidable that market 
organization will also change to optimally take advantage of the newly created 
opportunities, such as controllable flow.  
In other words, the challenge will be to develop market mechanisms that besides 
using the network also control it to the extent that it is considered economically 
opportune. The coupling of electric energy auctions organized by exchanges takes 
into account simplified network constraints, assuming that flow factors and available 
network capacities are a-priori fixed by the TSOs. In the future, control over flow 
factors, available capacities and interdependencies could for instance be taken into 
account in the clearing algorithms of electric energy auctions. Naturally, this also 
implies new challenges for auction trading platform design.                                                                                                                                    
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